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L THE L[\llTS OF "ABSOLlITF A:"D PIRFECT CANDOR" 
Does an attorney owe a client a duty or "absolute and perfcct 
candor?" More than a dozen recent cases from Texas, California, 
Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia ha\e used this phrase to 
describe an attorney's fiduciary obligations, I Figuratively, thc ex-
pression sets a useful moral tone, for it makes clear that lawyers 
must diligently apprise clients of matters bearing upon their affairs, 
Absent such information, a consumer of legal services would oftcn 
be unable to chart an intelligent course, and to that extent would 
be deprived of the right to self-determinalion,~ 
However, "candor" entails a duty to disclose information with-
out request as well as a duty to respond honestly when an inquin 
is made,' If the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" is read liter-
l. See Part III ill Fra. 
2. Cf ].\\lLS E. \\OI.IIIR'O, CASES ",n \L\ ITRl\1 S')' I HI, LA\\ G()\'IR'I", L\\\ 
YI.RS 1<)1 (2000) (stating "Itlhe communication duty is critical to maintaining a qualit\ 
lawyer-client relationship. ,[I]n order for the client to intelligently manage hi;, own 
affairs, the lawyer must explain matters"). 
3. This interpretation is consistent with ooth dictionary definitions and case prece-
dent. See Till. R·\'I)()\1 HOIS! DlCll"'ARY OF E,( d ISII L\'<OI''\(;F 30:; (2d ed. 19X7) 
(defining "candor" as "the: state or quality of oeing frank, open, and sincere in speech or 
expression"): WllhllR'S :"1:\\ l',lYFRS,VL L'AllRII)(i1I) DI<'TIO,ARY 263 (2d "d, 19x.') 
(delining "candor" as "frankness: sincerity: honesty in oneself" and <i, ":1 di:,!,")-
sition to treat other, with fairness: freedom from preludlce or disguise"). The iir,t Texas 
decision usinl,! the term "ah'nlutc and perfect candor" to descrioe the ohlil,!:llillll, ,)f an 
attorney' to a client imohed an attornc:y''s nondisell)surc' nf the f:let that he had rcccllc'd 
compensation from a third I'art\. State \. B:lker, :;,,9 S.\\.2d ,j(.~ i7-+ (Tex. ('1\.'\1'1'.--
Austin 197(), l\Tit ref'd n.r.e.1 (per curiam). :"otwithst:lnding that the client had 111<1lk no 
n:quest for the information, the court held that ,Ill' client. ":t, a matter of law, was entilkd 
to knO\\ in detail whate\er n:l'O\erV ., Ithe attorne\1 \\:Is ahle to ohtain from thc judg-
ment deotor." III. The conciusiun that "ahsolute and candor" requires discllhllre 
of information in the ahsencc nf a request also finds sUI'I'ml In cases :trlsing in other llelds. 
'lllC phrase "absolute: :ll1d perfect candor" can he traced I,) Ihe definition of "{(/!,'/TlII/<I{' 
fidn" in HI .\' r;'s L\\\ DI' II< "\In. Sce ill. (applvini'. Ih,' kl'l11 10 the allorne\'-l'iienl r,'LI-
tionship). The ductrine uf "((hamllll/' tides" has been h ... ld il) applv' to marInc 111SUl':II1CC. 
Sec, C.g., Houston Cas. Co, y. ('crtain l'nderwriters al Llmd\ LDndon,:; I F. Supp. ~d -,,<J, 
x02 (S.D. ·kx. 1999) (as\ertll1g that an omission lll:llCrI:ti to risk \iolalCs the d')Clrllle 
whether it is made \\illfulh or accidentally). Addrc'sslni'. lS'ues in the marine insllranc'e 
context. courts have written: 
This stringent doctrine requin:s the assured to discil)se to the insurer all known cir-
cumstances that materially affect the risk oeing insured. Since the assured is in the 
best position to know of al1\ circumstances material to the risk. he must reveal those 
lacts to the underwriter. rather than wait for the undenHiter to inquire, 
Home In,. Cn. \, Spectrum Info. Techs .. Inc" 93() F. Supp. 1\25. X,,6 (E.D.N.Y. 1<)96) (quot-
ing with approval Knight \. ('.S. Fire Ins. Co .. XO-+ F.2d 9, I:; (2d ('ir. 19x6)). 
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ally and without qualification, it cannot possibly be an accurate 
statement of an attorney's obligations under all circumstances. To 
begin with, such a standard would be impractical. A duty of can-
dor that is '"absolute and perfect" would require a lawyer to convey 
to a client every piece of data coming into the lawyer's possession, 
no matter how duplicative, arcane, unreliable, or insignificant. Lit-
tle would be gained by imposing such an exacting obligation, and 
much would be lost in terms of efficiency and expense.-+ If lawyers 
were required to be mere relayers of information and not permit-
ted to exercise judgment in terms of what facts to convey to clients, 
the legal system would run far less smoothly than it does today. It 
has been impressively urged that the essence of good lawyering is 
the exercise of judgment.~ Arguably, e\aluative discretion must 
extend just as readily to communicating with clients, as to investi-
gating facts, examining witnesses, negotiating deals, drafting docu-
ments, or crafting solutions. 
An unbending requirement of "absolute and perfect candor" 
would also leave no room for competing interests favoring the pri-
vacy of information that a client might in some sense want or even 
need to know. Such competing interests arise in an infinite variety 
of situations, and occasionally they may be of sufficient weight to 
warrant accommodation. The issue here can be drawn in relief by 
just a few questions. Does the duty of "absolute and perfect can-
dor" require a lawyer to disclose that he or she: (a) is currently 
suffering marital difficulties that could affect the quality of the rep-
resentation'?, (b) was granted special accommodations in law 
school for a learning disability,?," (c) failed the bar examination on 
.+. SCi' 'it'llera//l SIII'III '. ('IIIIYS. RI·(,ILAII"'. <II L\\\)Ll'~: PR()IlLE\I~ ()f L\\\ 
·\'.1) E Illi<S 7'+-7~ (~th cd. 1\.)\.):-;) (diSCUssing. the conflict hctwccn an attorneY's dut\' of 
dilig.cllcc and dut\ [() cclJ11Jl1unicatc). 
). SCI' A'. I ll"'.) T. KJ<"'.\IA'.. Till Losl L\\\,> I I{ .' (I()\.)-') (discussing thc idc;!lllf 
the law\er-statesJl1an and assenin;'. "it IS thiS qualit\ ()iIUci!lI1le:nt that thc ideal nl thc law-
\'er-stalt.',man \aluc~ most"): id. at hi (CXplalnill;'. "c,cc'lkncc of juci;'.ll1cnt"): id. Cit ().i (dis-
cussing. "e,cellencc ollucig.mcnt"). 
h. (I France, A, \Ic\!mris. A 'pirillg {({III('/' lIull /)n/Clia Cels Ii',I{ ilccess. W \1 I 
Sr. .I .. July li-i. 1\.)97. at 131. 1997 WL-\VSJ 2.+2:-;2.+) (Slatll1;'.. in a diSCUSSion of a lawvcr who 
was g.ranted double time to take: the har exam. "laJlthllu;,'.h IcJwyers aren't required to dis-
close their disabilitic's to clicnts, he says hc felt it wasn't ethical to charg.e for all 01 his 
tiJl1e" that he took to n.:ad records and write letters while work in;'. lor clients). In I 99(). 
Cong.ress passed the Americans with Disahilities Act. One 01 the consequences is that 
cducational institutions arc now required to provide special accommodations for students 
with learning. disahilities. which mav include sLlch things as extra time to complete tests 
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the first try?, or (d) knows interesting. but nones~cntial. confiden-
tial information about a friend of the client? Each of these ques-
tions raises an issue as to whether other interests can take 
precedence over the attorney's duty of candor to the client. At a 
minimum. competing interests should not automatically be disre-
garded simply because a lawyer-client relationship exists. Conse-
quently. "absolute and perfect candor" must ine\itably mean 
something less than total disclosure of everything a lawyer knows 
that might be of interest or use to a client. 
The question of what a lawyer must disclose to a client is of ubiq-
uitous importance. Lawyers face this issue with respect to every-
thing they learn about their client's affairs. This Article will probe 
the limits of the concept of "absolute and perfect candor" in the 
context of civil liability. for malpractice actions frequently allege 
that attorneys have failed to disclose sufficient information to a c1i-
ent. 7 This Article will show that the disclosure obligations owed by 
lawyers to clients, while of eminent imporl nce and mightily de-
manding, are not always "absolute and perfect" in terms of the du-
ties they entail. This Article argues that the concept of "absolute 
and perfect candor" applies only in selected areas of legal repre-
sentation (such as business transactions between attorneys and c1i-
entsS and within the terms of specific rules relating to matters such 
as conflict of interest.') client funds and property, 1<1 contract initia-
(e.g .. douhle time). privale exam morns_ and COI11PUICf., or olher cljulj11llCnL .<;", ticl/cwll\' 
Donald H. Stone. }VIIIII L(/I\' Schou/, .. II''' noill;,; {() ACcolllllloi/alc SIIII/"IIIS ,,'ilh '-cIIl'llilll.; 
Disahililies . . +2 S. TI \,. L RI \. I 'i. ~h (2()OO I (discus,in>2 d. ~()mmo(LIII011S I 
7. -')CC, e.g.. T\\o Thirt\ :\ine .101111 \enlure \ . .Iue. IJ() S.\\,,'cI ,S'ill. ()()I) (k'(. r\pp.--
Dallas 2001. peL filed) (re~ardin~ :111 ,I(lj<m for Ie~al malpractice'. hrc'dch Df fiduciarY dut\ 
and lovaltv duty hascd on failurc 10 dl,cl,\sc' lhat the all()fIle\. ,h ,I m':Il1I'er of city coullcil. 
would or could lake' positions lhat \\ould ;Ifkel lhc' rc':iI estale Irall'ilCllon, in which lhe 
firm represented the plaintiff) . .'leI' ~1'II('/'(/II\.I1 111{1 ) \1. S\1I11! c\': R, , ... \1 I) E. \! \11 I .... 
PRF\'I'.II'o,'; 1.1(;.\1. \!\II'R\( Ii( I S.~ II')S,)) ( lhat dll<)r!le\s Ll1lurc 10 slliri-
cientl\' anal\'ze cliems and transaCllOI]'. has produced a 'ii>2nificanl illll<lUnl of malpractice 
litigation). 
S. Sec Golden :\llggCt. Inc, \, Ibm. ~)"9 P.2d 17.'. 17:'1 (:\e\, I'P») (holdine'. lhal i\ 
corpora Ie director. \\ho oblained a lea,chold with an oplion to purch:lse' ,II a lime whel1 lhe 
corporation had an interesl in ilCljllirin>2 such proper\\. had :1 "lIut\ to lhe (Orpor:1Iion. ;IS 
its allofllev. not only to inform .. [the corporationj full\ of lhe iaclu;iI circumstances of 
the transaction. bUI also ... of its rights in re~ard thereto"). 
'I. Sec Conom Inc. \. Baskin. Sit, S.W.2d '+111 . .+19 (Tes. App.~-Ell'a'io 19<J1.llo \\fill 
(stating that the Texas Disciplinar\ Rules of Prokssional Conducl permil "an ,1lIOfne\ or 
law firm to conlinue Illultiple reprcsenlalion of adversan clients \\ herc' _ consent is 
ohtained frolll each client after full chclosure of the esistence. 11i1IUre. Il11pllCallllns and 
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tion, II and settlement offers). I.' Otherwise the disclosure obliga-
pw,sibJc aun:rs<: Clll1Sequcnces of ,uch Illulllj,k rL'pres<:nLllilln"): \i'(' 1!I,n Simp,on \. 
JaIlles, 90:; F.2u 372 .. '.17 ('\th Cir. 1990) (>i\dlin" Ihal. und<:r!csas la\\ for real <:Slal<: trans-
actions. once an attorney has und<:naKen full disclo'llre. in '<lI11e circul1lsl.lncc, lh"re 111<1\' 
not be a conflict of mlerest if the attorn<:\ rqlr<:scIlts hnth p~lr\lesl: Ell1l'lo\er, Casualty 
Co. \. Tillc\. -l9!J S. W.2d '\';2. 'i'iS (Tex. 197.' 1 (sut in',! that .. [ iJt a conflict MISCS bel\\eCn the 
inll'rcsts of the insur<:r and the insur<:d. IhL' ~111')rIlL'\ ,)\\eS a dut\ tll th..: II1slll'cd to immedi-
atch ad\ise him of th" conlliet"): lim Tillrn \ill,' .10/111 \ '('111111'1'. hI) S.\\ .. 'd at 900 (con-
cluding that <In attorn,,\'s fiduciary duty to a L'IIl'l1t Includes th..: dlSL'l,lSurL' "I ,tl1\ cOl1liicts 
nf interest that cnuld affect an altl)rn<:\'s rCl'r\.:SL'IlLilillll ,)f thc clicnl's 1111>:rL'sls l-
10. Sec \Io!)! I RI liS 1)1 PIH>I'I ('1) .... 111' I R. 1.1'i(dl (20()2) (sl.llll1'-' Ilul "Iuipon 
rccci\in',! funds or othcr propcrt\ In \\hich a cllL'nt or Ihlrd persun 11.Is .111 Il1krL'sl. a 1<1\\\cr 
shall promptl\ l1oti!\ the client or third pcr'<)I1. . ~lI1d. upon rcqucst h\ Ihc L'lient or third 
pef';on. shall promptl\ render a full aecountln',! rL'"ardln',! such propcrt\ "). 
II. See .Jackson Law Office. P.e. \. (,h~I]'l'cll. Y;- S.\\.3d I~. 22-2.' (Tc\ .. \pp.-T\ icr 
20()O. PCI. denied) (hnldin',! th~ll the e\ille'l1cL'. \\ hich sho\\cU amul1',! ,,[her thlll!,!s that the 
attornevs were \ <l',!uc rc',!ardin',! their fcc arral1'-'CIllCIlI. \\as sufi'icicnt I" SUPI',)ri the jUr\ \, 
findin',!ofhreaehuffiduciar\dut\):\\'>I)jI Ri Ils'>I PRi)I'1 (·')'-.I)I'! R. 1.~(h)(2()()2) 
(statin!! that "the basis or rate of the fee and e\I'cl1sCs for \\hich thc (111..'111 \\ill hc respon'ii-
hie shall be communicateu to thc clicnl. prclcral'l\ In \\rJtin',!. hcfnre ,'r \\llhln d rcasol1a-
hie' time after comlllencing the rcprCsel1L1II"n"!. AccorLiin',! I" Ihe' '\111L'I'ICall 1.,1\\ 
Institute: 
111e hasis or ratc mi',!ht he a spccified hourh char',!c. a percenla',!c. m ,I sct of factors 
on which the fcc will be based. If the fec is hased on a percenta',!c 01 rcc()\cn (or 
other base). thc client should also hc inforilled If a different perCenL]QC applies in the 
cvent of setticment. trial. or appeal. For a client sophisticatcd in rctainln',! law\ers. a 
statemcnt that "we will ehlH',!c our usual houri< ratc'," ordinarily \\ ill suffice. 
The information shoulu indicate thc matter I'm \\hich the fee will he duc'. for exam-
ple. "prcparing and trying (but not appealinC') your auto injun suit." II' thc scn iccs 
lire not specificallv descrihed. the la\\ \'er \\ill hc held undcr ~ IS 10 I,m\ Ilk the ser-
vices that a reasonahk client would ha\c L'\I'L'ctcd. 
\Iost >tate, rcquire thlll contin',!ent-fce C<lnlracts he In \\ 
RI\I.\II\II .... I ITllml)) 01· 11I1 Lv<\ (j()\II"-I .... ', 1.\\\'II"~.'SC1l11 10121111111. It hllll-
portant to fWlL'. h\l\\ 1.'\ er. that the dlscltlsurc "hllQalltlllS f' 'llncnt to c"lltr~ICI Inltlatioil arc 
limitcd. II' no pn1fe"il)Jlal rclationship hel\\L'en IhL' ~Iltorne\ ~lIld ciiL'llt (\lstS ,Il lhe tllllC 
Ihc agrcelllent is cnterc:d inlo. thc sl, :nQL'l1t ruks ~Ij'I'lic:Jhie 10 hUSitlL'" Ir,lns:Jctlulh be-
t\\'CCIl altornc\ and clicnt dn not apph. and Ihcref,)rL' Ihc l'ontr~lct " !lot pJ'csulllptl\cl\ 
frauduknt on thc part of thc 'Ittmnc\. SI'" J"hIH>Il \ ('<)fer. II., S.\\ .2Li lJh.'. 9h:'i (rex. 
Ci\. App.-Austll1 19.'S.l1o \Hit) (,;t~llil1',! IILII IhL' ruic \\herc ~11r;lllsdctj('11 ['ct\\ccn 11I\\\'cr 
and client \\ill he "slrictl\ scrutil1l/cd" olll< ~Ij'I'liL's .llter ClllllIllCl1l'L'!llc'lll \llihe dttorI1C\· 
and cliellt reLilionshlp). 
12. SI'(, .lous \. A.utu-O\\ner, IllS. ell .. =,'-,,'-, ,\.\\.2d -1-l.'. -l-l.~ (\liL·h. ('1 \pp. 1979) 
(holdin',! that all att,lrne\ hreached applicahk s\;lnlLird of carc \\hcl1 hc f:lIkd 10 Inforlll his 
cliel1t of olTers 10 ,;ettie prinr to trial): Ri!'!" \ 11.1111C\ .. """ A.2d :'\,'-:. (of; 11'.1.1<),'-:9) li1oldin',! 
that an altorllc\'s failure to COll\C\' each sClliclllenl ofkr to cilento, ill l'erso!l~iI injurY case, 
and failure to in\esti',!atc olTer, that \Verc propusc:d constitutcd Illalpracticc): \1<>1)11 
Rl I.IS 01 PROI'I CO .... lll' I R. 1.-1 eml. I 12(1I)~) ('iati!l',! that "a Ll\\\er \\Iw recei\e, fmm 
opposin',! cOUilsellin offer of setticillent in a CI\ il c"ntn1\ erS\ or a proffered pica har',!ain in 
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tions of attorneys should be defined by the reasonable-care 
standard of negligence, 
II. OTHER FORMULATIONS OF DISCLOSlJRI Ol)ll( j\r!o,-:s 
The rubric of "absolute and perfect candor" is rooted in the law 
of fiduciary duty," In this area of the jurisprudence. American 
courts frequently have been moved to invoke the mnst demanding 
rhetoric,l-1 perhaps because clients are often at a disadvantage in 
terms of expertise, information, or economic power. I' The soaring 
imagery of Justice John B. Winslow of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court is illustrative, He wrote: 
Attorneys are ministers of justice as well as courts. ,md justice will 
not be contented with half-hearted service on the part or her minis-
ters, nor will she tolerate a bargain counter within her temple. ll' an 
attorney purchasers] his client's property, concerning which his ad-
vice is sought, the transaction is always viewed with sLlspicion. and 
the attorney assumes the heavy burden of proving not only that there 
a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its suhstance unk,s" rrim discussions 
with the client have left it clear that the prorosal will he unacceptahk). 
13. See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard. P.c.. 73 S.W.3d 193. 199 (rex. 2()02) (discuss-
ing the general nature of fiduciarv dutv in a case involving the ()hli~~ltions of associate 
attorneys to law firms for which they work). The court wrote: 
Fiduciary duties are imposed hv courh on some relationshirs heclu,e of their special 
nature .... [lIt "is impossihle to give a definition of the term thdt I, c'()l11prehenSl\C 
enough to cover all cases." ... "1(,lcncrallv sreaking, it arplie, Il' :111\ persoil who 
occupies a position of reculiar confidence iowards another. It reiLr, 10 1I1lCgnty ~l11d 
fidelity. It contemplatcs fair dealing and good faith, rath,'" thdn k~~tl ohligatilll1. ;1\ 
the hasis of the transaction." Our courts hayc long recogni/ed tlut ,'crLlln fiduCldf\ 
duties arc owed hy a trustee III a hendician of the trust. an e,CClII<H' 10 the henefi-
ciaries of an estate. and an attorneY to a client. 
1£1. 
I·t Cf STFI'Hl"~ C'ILU'YS. RI(ill \II()' 01 LV\\,I'R,: PROlll1 \i' <II L\\\ .\'11 EIII-
I('S 67 (5th cd. 19(11) (staling "Islome fiducianc's ha\c higher ohligatilln, than ,Hher fiduci~l­
ries. and lawyers have among the highest"). 
15. SCI' ill. (providing three rea,OI1, supporting fiduciary ohltgdtltl!lS). (;ilkr, stalCs: 
At least three reasons support il11p()sll1~ fiduclarv ohligations un cl Icl\\\er alter the 
professional relationship is estahlished. First. the client will likeh h~I\l> hegun to dc-
pend on the attorney's integrity, fairness. superior knowkdge and Judg111ent. Second. 
the attorney may have acquired information ahout the client that c', the allorney an 
unfair advantage in negotiations hetween them. Finally. the clicnt \\ til generall, not 
be in a rosition where he or she is free to change attorneys. hut will rather he eCOfl()I11-
ically or psychologically dependent on the attorney's continued representation. 
lei. 
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was no overreaching of the client. but that the client acted upon the 
fullest information and advice as to his rights. 1h 
Similarly. Justice Alberto Gonzalez of the Texas Supreme Court 
wrote: 
In Texas. we hold attorneys to the higJ1est standards of ethical con-
duct in their dealings with their clients .. " As Justice Cardozo ob-
served. "[a fiduciary] is held to something stricter than the morals of 
the market place. Not honesty alone. but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive. is then the standard of behavior." Accordingly. a 
lmvyer must conduct his or her business with inveterate honesty and 
loyalty. always keeping the c1ient's best interest in mind. 17 
However. in exploring the meaning of "'absolute and perfect can-
dor"' as a fiduciary concept. it is useful to remember that fiduciary 
duty len\' is only one source of the legal principles that govern the 
actions of attorneys. Other important sources include tort law and 
contract law.l~ The obligations imposed by these various bodies of 
16. Young \. \lurphy. <)7 01. W. -196. -197 (Wi,. IC)O.,), TIle court further stated: 
In other words. the attorney must prove uherrtlll({ lidcs. or the transaction will be set 
aside bv a court of eljuity. These principles are so well established as to need no 
citation of authorities. and to the credit of the profession. be it said. it is rarely neces-
sarv to invoke them. 
Id. at -IY7 (emphasis added). 
17. Lopez \. \Iufiol:. Hockema & Reed. L.1..P .. ::>2 S.W.3d 5.'\7. 566-67 (Tex. ::>0(0) 
(Cion/aiel. J. concurring and dissenting) (ljuotin~ \kinhard v. Salmon. Ih-l 0J.E . .'i-l.'\ . .'\-16 
(:\.Y. 1<)20)): ICC a/so r\rcher v. Griffith. "YO S.W.~d ;.'-'. 730 (Tex. 1%-1) (expanding on the 
allnri1e\-client fiduciarY relationship). The court 'itakd: 
The relation het\\c:en an allorne\ and his d[c'nt [s hiehl\ fiduciarY In nature. and their 
dealings \Iith each other arc suhject tn thc' ,;[me scr~[tin\. inkndments and imputa-
tions as a transaction hetween an ordinan tfLiske ;lnd his c<'SlIIi 1111(' {msl. "'The hUf-
den of estdhli,h[ng its rerfect fain'c\s. ;ldequac\. and eljuit\. is tl1mwn upon the 
attorney. 
/d. 
I s. Of course, dl,ciplinary ruks aho ,h;II'e the duties of attorne\ \. Scc. c.g .. MOJ)EL 
RI II S (II P[{()I'[ ("()'-Ill ( I R. 1.-1 (2002) ht;iling the Ruk for CClilll11L1nICalion). Model 
Ruk 1.-+ ,talCs: "(;11.-\ 1;I\\\'er shall .. (.i) Keep the client feasonahIY Informed about the 
st;[tlh nlthe matter ... (-+) promptlY cnmr" \\[th ['ca,onahle reque,[s lor information 
(h) r\ law\er ,hall cxplain a mallef tu thc' c,knt rea,nnablv necessary to permit the client 
to make informed dec[,ions regarding the reprc\c[llaticHl'" Ii/. Hll\\c\cr. such ethics rules 
arc intended to protcct the public and do nnt purport to establish the qandard of care for 
ci\ il cause'> uf action. 'nlUS, raragraph ::>() of the Preamble w the \Iodcl Rules states: 
\'iolation 01 a Ruk ,hould not itSelf give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor 
should it create al1\ presumption in such a case that a kgal duty has been 
breached. The Ruh:s arc designed to prmide guidance to laWYers and to pro. [de a 
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law must. in the end. be consistent or at least reconcilable if law-
yers are to be able to determine what i~ required of them when 
performing profes~ional duties. 
A. Torr Lmr 
Under the law of torts. the ob\ious starting point for thinking 
about attorney liability for breach of the duty of candor is the tort 
of deceit. l ,! 111 at widely recognized action c" requires proof of a 
false or misleading statement or of a failure to disclose information 
under circumstances where there is a duty to ~peak.'1 The plaintiff 
must also show. typically by more than a mere preponderance of 
evidence.22 that the defendant acted \\ith scienter (that is. knowl-
slruclure lor re~ULllln~, (llneluct Ihruu~h dl,cipllllcll"\ .1"c'IlL'le" rhe\ .Ire 11(H 
tn he ,I l1a'I' lor CI\II 11.1111111\. 
IJ al Preamhle. rhe Ilurp(he 01 Ihi, <!rilck i, I(l eli,cu" m:ill'r:lclice 11:lhilll\ or :lllllme" III 
clienls, ralher Ihan attorne\ disL·lplll1e. ('lln'L'LJuL'l1lh. IhL' Ll\\ "rduorne\ discipline \\ill he 
discussed llllh \\ here it is imporlant to dn under,ldndll1" ur ci\ II-liahility principles. 
I <). Sec. e,g .. Holland \. Bf(m n, h6 S. W.::'d I ()<)5, II (I.::' (Tex. Ci\. App,-Beaumollt 
I<)~~, writ rd'd) (stating the rule that "failure of an allurne\ dealing "ith his cliellt to 
discluse to him the material facts and the legal conseLJuences r\o"ing from the facts consti-
tutes actionable fraud"): ct: Thomas \. White, 43S S.E.::'d ,;66, ~6t) (Cia. Ct. App, 19'),;) 
(discussing claim hased on fraudulent concealment that client";, clse had heen lost), 
20. See VI"'I ,I R. j')II"')'.. 8.: AI \, (,I '" SII 11I1' I, A\II RI( \, TORI L\\\ 2\~n 
(2d cd. 19<)<)) (stating that "Iel\l~n iuri"liction recognl/e' :In action for ',kceit'''): ICC <II\() 
W. P,\(II KII I(), I I \1" PI{("'I H 8.: KII I(), ,), T()I{I' -::':-::'S (:'th cd. 19S4) (tracin>2 the 
"ancient" ori~in of deceit h:ICK to a \\rit Kn()\\n a, earl\ .1' 1::'(1). 
21. Sce hey' \. :\e\land, ::'5 S.\\.2d ,;\.', 31:' (Te\. C()ll1mn .-'-pp. 1 <),'(). hl)lding ap-
pn)\ed) hlating that "I" Ie thill~ the relilliol1 l)f attorn,'\ .11lL! (11cl1l e\hled and thilt il II:!'> 
the duty of thc dttume\, :mel hi, agcnt in c1calll1g IIllh Ihe (lielli. to make a full alld I:m 
disc\usure of all material maltcr, KIl()\\1l t" the attornc\ III Cl\llnC(tillll "ilh the st()C~, and 
that a failure lU do Vl lIoulel con,titute legiil fraud"): johll'l(1I1 \ Andr:I,ie:, 54 S,\\.::'d 11)::'9, 
10-'1 n'c'i, ('1\. App ... -Fort \\'orth 19.'2, IIril reed) (lwldll1>2 all()rnc\ liable to cliellt hased 
nl1 failure lu disci'lSe kn(m\cLh.:e "f pendin>2 ncg()liall()lls .Iik(tilh' Ihe \alue uf pr()I'crt\ 
hClllg ,old): RI 'I \11 \11 ,I lSI «)'..I») <)1 j'(>I{I, ~ 'i'iil I) 11'1-") (,\,Illn" lhL' ruk on klhil-
it\ fur llolldlsclll'.lHL' I: \\'. I' \'.1 KI I I ()'.. I I \1. PRe "" H ,\: Kl I I ()'.. (,'. T< H' I' 7::'S (.'lh 
cd. I'J:-i4) (stalin" lh:lt de(ell rL'ljlllre, "[:lllal,e rcprL"Cl1liill(ln madc h\ the ddend:IIlI"1: 
1<'(' Ur'll Arnall, (inlden & (ire"on \ Health Sen. Clr" 111,'" .'()C) S.L::'d 'i6:" -;1>7 (ia. 
:\pp. Cl. 19lJO) (llllldin~ in an action h\ iI clielll :lg:IJI1st .1 1.1\\ lirm th:n :1 frillid claim ,,:1\ 
sutlicient to raise i"ue, or tad e\en though Ihe claim \\:1, ha,>ed on concealment. (l)m-
pared to aClLlal mis,talCmenh, for "[cloncealmenl per ,e ,'on,titute, actual fraud "here 
one party ha, the right III expect full communication of the raclS from another"): Hennl~:ll1 
\. Harris County, :'l)~ S.W.2d .'SO. -,:-i~-:-i4 (1"\:\. Ci\. App.- Waco I ()79, writ ret"d n.r.e) 
(permitting fraud action b\ third persons hased on attorne\'" failure to disclose that a 
judgment had been satisfied). 
n. Sec VI,C[,\:I R, j()f{\:S()'. 8.: Al.,"" Cit,\:, SllDIE, I\: AS1Ut!I,\\: TORI LA\\ 8K~ 
(2d ed. 1')<)<)) (stating that "Ifjraud, it is often said, must be established by 'clear and con-
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edge of the representation's falsity ur reckless disregard for its 
truth )2; and intended to induce reliance .'1 However. even then lia-
bility will not he imposed unless the misrepresentation was suffi-
ciently trustworth y2' and material-'h that a reasonable person would 
\incin~ e\idenee' or h\ a 'clcdr I'reI'OndcLlnl'c' (ll ihc' c\idcncc'···). 11111 I,'," Yeldell \. 
(;oren. KO S.W .. 'd h.'-\. h:en (ICx. AI'I'.~[)aILls ~IIIC Ill) peL I (Iwklin" that "I,jli~ht cir-
cUlllstantidl c\'idenec of fraud. \\hen considered \\1111 Ihc' hreaeh of Jl'rtlnHse tn perfornL i, 
sufficient tl) support a findin" or I'rauduk'nt ink'nl") 
2.;. See RI Sl \11\11 ,I (SI ({)'-I)I 01 TORIS ~ ':'1· II'nil (dcfinllH' SCienter in sli~hth 
different terms): \\'. I'\<d KII "" I I \1 .. PR""I R \,1) KII I'" 'l'- I(\R!\ 7-\1--\2 ('ith 
elL 19K-\) (statin~ that "ltJhe intent \\hleh heClll1lc" 11111'(lrtant is Ihc' Il1tent to LiCCc'l\e .. 
which has been ~i\ en the name ·scienterIT· II1I Is I,rc,enl \\ hen the reprcsel1tation is 
made without an\ belic!' as to its truth. ur \\itll rec~Ic'" disre~al'd \\hether it bc true ur 
falsc"): ICi' (//so Prudenti~d Ins. Co. \ .. klferS(1I1 .\s,,'e .. ,-;96 S.\\.2d l:'h. 16.' (Tex. 199:') 
(stating that "laJ statement is not fraudulent unkss Ihe maker Kne\\ it \\as raise \\hen he 
made it or made it recklessh' without klHmledge ,)1 thc' Irulh··). 
2-+' Se?ar:'. Rllehuck 8.: Co. \. \!cad()\\s. K-- S.W.2d 2KI. 2K2 (Te?s. 199-\) (pcr 
curiam) (re\ersin~ illll~IllCnl heeause? trial court rc'lus,'d IU Includc' "Inknl III l1lisle?ad" in 
definitioll of rraud). 
25. See VI"I ,I R. J(>lI'''''. \\"11 RI", I'WI' ~~I (~d c:d. I'N')) hLIl 111 \2 that in 
part. trust\\orthiness is a prC'clllldltlllll 10 prool ,,( I'c'II.II1Cc'. \\hich Is ~1I1 c'icmelll ()( deceit). 
-1l1e? text explains: 
l:nlcss the? plaintirf has in ract rdicd upon the ~hserkd misrepre?se?ntation. there is 
110 factual conne?etion bClwecn the defendant's e<mcluct ~llld the alk~cd dalllag.es (that 
is to sa\'. no factual causation) and. hence. there can he no suit. 
If the? falsit\' of the ddcndant's statelllent is nb\ illus 10 the plaintilTs Se?l1SCS at the 
tillle it is made (e.g .. thc plaintiff se?es that the 11\),.se has t\\O eyes. l1<1t three? as claimed 
b\' the? ddcndant) or could hc disCi)\ered h\ :1 I11c're eurson e?\al11ination. Ihc:re? ma\' 
be 110 reliance. 
Reli:ll1ce is also nut Pe?rt11llkd II a "danger sl~l1dl" tlr "re?d 11.'-'111" places the? plainliff 
on notiCe? that lunher InquirY I, requlre?d 
Id. at 2:'1. Trust\\onl1ine\\ aho ul1lk'rlie, the s,,<,tlkd "(,'CI" rcqlllrcll~cni. Thus: 
1l1e? ton aClions inr IlllSrcpresenlalion (includl\l\2 d,'l','II) arc.' Il1Ic'lllkd 10 prokct thc 
ri:lht 01 illdi\idual, 10 lkeide intelli~e?l1t" their (\\\1) :111:IlrS based '111:111 assessment 01 
re!c\al1t infornutinn. COl1se?quel1li1 1m ,Ill ,lcll(ll1 1\\ Ilc. Ihcrc I11USI he? :1 1~lhc :Isse?r-
tion that carries \\ith It suificicnt ddinilenc'ss ,i\1e! IrLhl\\orthlnc'ss th:lt it i, likel\' t,) 
int'e?ct the plainlin", dc'cision-making procc\\. II is t:-c'ljllentl\ said that Ihe? as,enion 
must he lllk' or laci and not n1c'rc'l\ an "1'1111'\1) SI'C:<':I,<I ClrCllI11Sl~IiKe?S mel\ 
JllStil\ re?liance on ~In ()plniol1 ur prc'dicl\(ln. II) \\ hleh C:ISc: ,111 IICl\Il\) 11111\ lic If thai 
stale?ment is I11lslt:adillg. . But. in ~e?l1c'raL nil rclul1cc l11a\ hc 1,1,lcc:d ()\1 'ICltCl11enrs 
or pure opinion. The?\ arc mere pe?rsonal \ ie\1S 1\ h :C'h ,In 11()1 11lIsrcl're,ent thc facts 
rele\anl \l) the plainlilTs decisl()n-I11:lkin~ process. ,'\cn II' thc\ cspre\\ ~1Il unfa\orablc 
conclusion or hlm the? e?\ idcnce? should he? \ le\\ cd. 
M at 2-1-6: cf Chenc\ \. Barbel'. 2-\2 S.E.2e! _':'K. :;:,1.) Ilia. Ct. [\pp. 197K) (stating that 
"[f]raud cannot consist of mere hroken promises. unfilled predictions or erroneous conjec-
tures as to future cvents"). 
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have taken it into account in choosing a course of action. State-
ments that amount to mere puffing or that concern matters logi-
cally having no bearing on the client's decision-making process will 
not give rise to liability.~7 Presumably, if an attorney tells a client 
that the tract of land the client is considering buying is "beautiful." 
the utterance will not support an action for deceit even if the attor-
ney in fact thinks that the land is ugly and makes the statement 
only out of "courtesy." Thus, even in cases of high culpability (i.e .. 
cases where there is clear and convincing e\idence of scienter), the 
duty of candor falls short of being "absolute and perfect." 
Deceit is not the only tort action bearing upon issues of candor. 
Malpractice claims against attorneys by clients are frequently 
founded not on intentional or reckless conduct. but upon nothing 
worse than mere negligence. In a tort action for professional negli-
gence the legal question is whether the attorney did what an ordi-
nary, reasonable, prudent attorney would have done under the 
same or similar circumstances.~s Liability depends not on the dL'-
fendant lawyer's state of mind (scienter),:CJ but on \vhether the law-
26. See Vincent Robert Johnson, Fralld illld Deceir, [1lc!lIdill)!, Segfig!'lll and flillocelli 
/v/isrepreselllillioll ~ 1.(13171, II[ PI RSO'.;AL hH'RY: A, II(,'.;S, DI·F1'.;SLS, D.·\MACFS (19~~) 
(defining materialitv). The text states: 
Virtually all common law forms of rdid based on misrepresentation require that the 
statement relate to a material fact. A material fact is one to which a reasonable: per-
son would give some weight in makin!! a decision: it need not he the sok or predomi-
nant factor in the recipient's dccisiun making pruce\\. 
fd. (citations omitted): Wi' 0/.10 it!. * I.03[ I] (stating th,1l "all aClion Will not lie in the ab-
sence of some perversion of material factual data ehar;.:eahle to Ihe defendant"). 
27. SCI' RISI.,\ II \11" I (SI'()'.;!)) ()I T'JIHS ~ ~-I: LillI. e (l'ni) htating. tlnl hlller, 
are not entitled to rdv upon "puffing"): WI' ii/SO Streher I HUlller. _.21 F,,'d 701. 7.2~ 1l.-l1J 
(5th Cif. 2(00) (recogni/ll1g that deceptiw trade pr,I,'ll,'e, action C:1!1Il()t he hased ,)n "<l 
vague, immeasurable opinion," but holding. that the l';l\c' hdure It "c,luld not he mol',' 
different"): Douglas I. [kip. l)~7 S,W.:'d ~7'). ~~h (Tc\. I ')l)')) (eitinl! C;lses il1\ oil 
"mere" puffin!! and statinl! III an <lClIon <lgain,t a lall firm hl\ed Oil \ iolatioll oi tile <keep-
tive trade pr<lctices act. rather than deceit. that a !!encr,ti r,'!'rC"l'11LltiOIl that a ,cltlement 
agreement wlJuld protect the cllellt's interests was lOO \ ,1~lIC under the facts of the case III 
support liabilitv): f'mil('/li/u/ [ill. ((io, ~<)h S.W . .2d at In.' ( lhal I'c'presentatiUlb lilal ,I 
"building. was 'superh: 'super fine: and '()Ile of the fillC,l little properties in the Citl uf 
Austin'" were "mereil 'puffin{ or llpiniol1, and thlh cmild Il()l Clllhlitute Iraud"). 
2~. Sec Cosgrove v. (;rimes, 77-1 S.W.2d hh2. hh-l ( Ic\. It):';c)j (,tatllll! that 'ltl law-
yer ... is held to the st<lndard ni care \\hich would be c'\c'rCised bl d reas()nahlv prudent 
attorne\'. 111e jury mustc\aluate his conduct hased on the Iniurm;[tl()11 the attorne\, has ,it 
the time ()f the alleged act \11' negligence"). 
29. SCI'id. at ohS I indicating that "Itihe standard I' ,in objectivc exercise of profes-
sional judgment. not the subjectile belid that his acts arc in good faith"). 
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yer's conduct measured up to what may reasonably be expected of 
a professional in the field of law.'I' If the conduct falls short of 
meeting the standard of care. the lawyer will be held liable regard-
less of what the lawyer thought about the risks or intended." 
There is a world of difference between a legal standard that re-
quires "reasonable" disclosure and one that requires "absolute and 
perfect candor." By embracing a rule of reasonableness. negli-
gence principles recognize that the complexities and uncertainties 
of law practice mandate existence of a scope of action within 
which. free from the risk of legal liability. attorneys must be able to 
exercise judgment as to how to conduct representation. 
The reasonableness standard of negligence law is echoed in vari-
ous expressions of state law'2 and in the blackletter law of the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. which states: 
~ ~O. A Lawyer's Duty to Inform and Consult with a Client 
(1) A lawyer must keep a client 1'I.'({.\illluhlr iI/limned about lhe 
matter and must consult with a client to a rCilIillluhlc cxtCII{ concern-
ing decisions to be made by the lawyer 
(2) A lawyer must promptly comply with a client's rcasollah!c 1"1.'-
(jlles{s for in/iJrlll{[{ion. 
(3) A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the 
client ... and must explain a matter to the extent reasonahlv l1ee('s-
.wry to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation." 
30. Cf iii. at hh..[-h.') (>;tating that ··allowing the: altllrlle:\ tIl ;!';,e:rt hi, >;Uhje:CII\C g\lod 
faith. "hcn the: act>; hI.' pursue:s arc unre:asonahle as mC;I>;ured hy the: re:asollahll' compete:nt 
practiti()ner standard. cre:atc:s too gre:at a hurde:n for 1\ rllngcd clicnts to mercol1lc··), 
.'1. 'lei'. e.g .. Vaughan \. \lcnl\l\e:. 3 Bing. ('-:.( I -1h". I.~~ Eng. Rc'l" -FlO. -lC)~ (IS';') 
(h()ldil1", that a defendant could not <\\oid liahilit\ lor ~I lire: lu"t he caused lller(iI h\ 
sh\ming lhat he: acted ··hona ride to the he:st of his ludgfllc'nt"). This rule is not sp,'ci~lI to 
la\\ \e:rs. It applie:s thfllughout the \<1\\ of ne:g.igence. :md h:h he:en followed for decades. if 
.'~. SCI', <,g .. ('\1,.13. s. 8: PRI)i. ('.)1l1 ~ hOhS(1ll11 Supp, ~IJ(J~) (SLltill:clh:lt 
:lttOrlle:1S arc under a dut\ "Itlo respond prompt II III il·,/IOI/II!>!e sLiIUS Il1ljuirle s <11 clie:llIs 
:lIld to ke:ep clients I'('(fSOllllhh /l/lllrll/cd of significant dl'\cl()pJl1e:nls in Illatters \\ith re:~ard 
t() which the: att\)fI1e:\ has agrc:ed to prm ide: Ieg:lI '1.'1'\ ICCS'·) (,'mphasis added I. 
33. RLS I ,'\ II \1 L, I (Til I RIJ 1 01 I II L L \\\ (jl)\ I ", I", L \\\ 1 I I" ~ ~() ( ~()(J() 1 (IllI,ILI">; 
added). Other prmisiuns In the: Restatcme:nt that Illl"ht not mdinartil hc' dc>;crihe:d as 
imposing an obligation of candor ne:\crthe:less hear ul'lln \\ hat Inlorlllatlllil ll1ust h: Clllll-
municate:d til clie:llts. Some: of these pfl)\isions impose seel1llllgl\ clear ohligatlon>;.· For 
example:. section 3:-( states in relevant part: 
~ .IS. Client-Lavwe:r Fee: Contracts 
[Vol. 3.+:7.17 
Amplifying the f1exihle nature of the dUly imposed hy these pro-
visions. the commentary to the section sutcs: 
The duty includes hoth informing the clicllt l)f ill1f)OrfWIf dCl'c/o/J-
IIlellfs in a timely fashion. as \\cll as prmiding a SIIIIIIIWIT n(in/emlli/-
{ioll to the clicnt at reasonable intervals so thc client may be apprised 
of progress in the matter. .. , 
-Ille appropriate extent of consultation is ihelf a proper subject for 
consultation. The client may ask for certain information or may ex-
(II Bdore or \\itllin a re'asonahk tillle afkr ill repreSelll a client in a Illat-
ter. a 1<I\\\er I/il/Il ('1I1//llll/nici/I" to the eliel1l. in \\rllin;.: \\hen dl'l,licahle ruks SO pro-
vide, the hasls or rate nf Ihe (ce. unless the cO!l1l1ll1nlcation is unnecessary for the 
cliellt hecause the 1<1\\\er ildS prc\iousl\ represented 111.11 Clle'llt onthc: same basis ()r al 
the same rate, 
RISI\II\II'I(TIIIR11IlJlIIII L\\\(J'l\II"I'(,L\\\\"',~,;SC21)1)(I}(emphasi';ldded), 
SirniLlrh. ,ectioll -+-+ ,Liles: 
~ -+-+, Sak¥uardin¥ ;lI1d Se'¥re¥atin¥ Pnlpert\ 
(2) Lpon recei\in¥ fumb or other property in a pro(c"ional capacity and in which a 
client or third person ()\\ns or claims an interest. a 1;I\\\er JIlII\! !,rolllplil' II 0 I if I' Ihe 
clielll or third person, 'Ille law\er /JI//SI prt)III[!liI' rend('/' iI titll IlCCOlllllillg rqcarding 
,uch propert\' upon request h\' tile client or third person, 
RIS I ,\ 11\11' I (TIIIHIl) l)j i III L\\\ C;o\ If< '1'.<, L\\\, I I" ~ -+-+ ( 20()O) (emphasis adde'd), 
Comment e to ,e'ction 20 slates: 
:\ I;I\\\'er l11u,t llrLiinaril\ re'port I'l'Ompth to the CilCllt ;1 ,,:ttknh:nt offer in a CI\il 
action or ;1 proposcd pka hdr~ain in a Criminal prosccutlon, Further discklsure i, re· 
quired \\hen a propllscd sellklllCilt is part of an d','.','.rc;':,Iic' sellicnlc'nt in\ol\'in','. claims 
of se\e'r,Ji cllcnls, 
RISI\II\II'I (lIIIRI11'iI II11 L\\\ (;')\II{'I'(,L\\\\llh~'::I)CI~" c(20()O), Hm\e\cr, 
other rclatcd prO\ISI01l\ II11POSC ohligati,Hls Ihat arc nol :lh,,)lute, For example:, section -+h 
stales III rcic\:Jllt part: 
(2) On request. II 1;1\\\e'r I11Ust ;illu\\ a client or I'llrllle'r ,'IIL'llt to inspect and cops '111\ 
doclIl11cnt possesscd h\ Ihc' I;\\\\el' rclallll¥ II) Ihc l'c'I'i'c'sCI1LlII1l1l, IIllless \II/J\lallliai 
~r()llIlii\ ni\1 {() rcill\(', 
(3) l 'nks, ,I cilcilt or 1,lrl11e'r cilClll (onse'nls to 11Il1l-ckll\cT\ or suhstantial ¥rtlunds 
CXlst I'or rduslIlg tll maKc deli,,'!'\, <l la\\\cr Illl]',t deli\c'r I,) the clicllt or former clienl. 
;It ;111 appropriatc timt: and in an\' t:\t:nr prolllptl\' <lltcr the representation ends, such 
oll~inals and copies of other doculllents possessed b\ the lil\\\er relating to the repre-
sentation as the client or former client n'lIsol1({h/I' lieI'd,), 
RI,SI\II\II'1 (TIlIRD) III IIII L\\\ (jO\LR'I'l; L\\\'I.RS ~ -+h (2()()O) (emphasis added), 
Anuthcr prO\ision of the Restatement states that Ha lawyer must, , , deal honestly with the 
client.·· See RfSr.,\IT\IE'1 (THIRD) OF nil, LAW GO\FR'I,-(; LAWYERS ~ 16(3} (2000) 
(emphasis added), But that statement raises as many ljucstions as it answers. for the issue 
still remains as to what must be disclosed in order to be honest. 
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press the wish not to be consulted about certain decisions. '111e law-
vcr should ordinarii\' honor such wishes .... To the extent that the - . 
parties have not otherwise agreed. a standard of rl!o.lollilhll!l1l!SS 
IInder all [Izl! CirClIlI1S[{fllCI!S deremlines Ilze tlJ7fJro/Jrillle /I/('I/Slire of' 
C(}lIslI/rmioll. Reasonableness depends upon such factors as the im-
portance of the information or decision, the extent to which disclo-
sure or consultation has already occurred, the client's sophistication 
and interest. and the time and mone\ that reporting or consulting 
will consume. So far as consultation ahmIl specific decisions is con-
cerned, the lawver should also consider the room for choice. the abil-
ity of the client to shape the decision. and the time Cl\ailable .... The 
Icl\vyer may refuse to comply with unreasonable client reljuests for 
information.'4 
In the medical malpractice field. widespread recognition of the 
doctrine of informed consent has increased the disclosure obliga-
tions of physicians.'~ A medical professional. absent special cir-
cumstances. must disclose all material risks of. and alternati\cs to. 
a course of treatment. regardless of \\hat is customary among pro-
fessionals practicing in the community. '" The informed-consent 
doctrine has not yet found equally clear recognition in the legal 
malpractice field. although there is good authority that the same 
principles apply as readily in law as in medicine.'7 But even an 
,'.l, Ric.'> I \ ""I" I (I'll"{I)) 01 1111 L\\\ (j()\ I R"I'.(: L \11 'I II{, ~ ~() cmts. c <'\: d 
COO()) (cll1[1ilaslS added 1. 
3:,. Sec KClCilup I. fi(mard. :i-l3 S.E.2d :'71. ,'-h, ,'SI-S6 ((Ja, Cl. ApI'. 211()O) (r(et)g-
ni/ing Informed-comcnt doctrinc and slllllillari/im" :n ;In appcndl\, thL' lall (lithc lano,,, 
\talCs ). 
,'6. Set'. <'.l; .. Se,Ht \ 13r:ldlord. 6()6 P.2d ":'-1. ""- IOkL!. 1079) (findin02 tlLlt .. \tlhe 
d()c·tnne Imp(),C, ,I dut\ (\11 " phlSiciall Ill' .'>urge()n I,) mlorm d p<ltlcnt 01 hI', ()I,tinlh clnd 
thclr attcnd:lnt ri,I,;," I-
,'-;. SeeRI,1 111\1I"IITIIIRI))(lI 1111 1.\11 (;,,1111.''''' I \\I'III",~2()cml.eI21)1I()) 
(the Rc',t:lIc'mcnt ,talc',: 
Bdore a clicnt '1;'11' a ClllllracL for c\a",plc, Ihe l"I\\cr nrdin;lrIiI should c\plain Its 
pnni,ions. Il)C I.I\\\er ordll1anil must e\pl.lin the pro, .mel C(lIh 01 red"'lIuhil 
;I\ailahk :ilterlntl\c'" rile' approprialc' detail de'\'c'nd, (lI) such IdUUI'S :1, the' 11111'«r-
tdnce ulthc decI'I()I1. h,1\I much allliee the ellellt II 1111 Is. 1111:11 the clielll illl, IIlrc.1cil 
ICllrlled and C()llsldel'cci, and thc timc ll\ailahk I,lr cklil'e"rdtllll1l: 
let' U/\(I Sierr;! Fria ('orJ), \. D()nald .I. b alh 1'( '. 1 ,- le.,'d 1-,'. j"lJ-S() I j,t ('ir. \<)<)-; I-
'n)e Slcrra (()uri e\['LlIned: 
[Wlhcn a client seck, achlce from <In Clllorne\, the: ,Ittenne\ ()\\es the client ",I jut\ ()I 
lull and lair drsclu"ure ul facts mlll<:rial to the cIIL'Ill\, intcre,ts."1l1IS means th,ll the 
allurne\, nlUSlltdl i.,e the elielll of an\' significant kgal risks inlolled in a contemplated 
transaction, and must do so in terms sufficienth plain to permit the client to asses:, 
hoth the risks and their potc:ntial impact on his situation. 
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informed-consent standard requiring disclosure of risks and alter-
natives in legal representation would be les:-; demanding than an 
unrestrained duty of "absolute and perfect candur." 111e informed-
consent doctrine as recognized in the medical field is hedged not 
only by the requirement of materiality.l;'; but hy exceptions that dis-
pense with disclosure if the information in question is already 
known to the patient if an emergency exists. m if revelation would 
be detrimental to the best interests of the patient. 19 
S, Contract Lint' 
Contract law is concerned mainly with obligations voluntarily as-
sumed. rather than with duties imposed by la\\ in the absence of 
consent by the parties.,j() A 1,1\vyer may contr~lCl l() assume obliga-
tions greater than those mandated by othemi:-;e applicable tort and 
Ii/. (citing Williams v. Elv. 66S :\.E.2d 799. S06 (\Iass. [9%11: ,I. 1)1 IH>I{ \11 L. RII<IIII ,\: 
D.\\II) LI·Il\". LUi.·\1 EIIII('i ,,97 (.id l'd. 2()01) (statillg ti1:II'IIf1lorlllL'd Clll1"l'ntJ "t:IIl, 
dard has been il1corporall'd in \ariou, conflict of intl'rl'st pr()\ ISlllIl, rl'ljuiring tilat lawvl'r'i 
shall not rl'presl'nt clients in situations unll'ss 'l'ach ciil'nt eonseflh after consultatioll' "). 
"In principll'. informl'd consent Sl'l'ms likl' an attractive alkrn:lti\c tl) patl'rnalism: in prac-
tice it is often difficult to apply." Ii/. 
3R. See, c.g .. Scott v. Bradford. 606 P.2d SS-+' SS7-SS (Okl:1 I')~'» (dl'scribing disclo-
sure of material risks in the medical field). According to thl' court 
[A I physician's cOllllllunications must hl' ml'asurcd by hi, 1';ilICllt'<.; Ill'ed to k!l(m 
enoug.h to enable him to make all intl'lIig.ent ciwice. In uthel' \\\lIC\<;. full disclosure of 
all m{/fcrial risks incident to trcatnll'nt must bl' made. Therc I' nl) bright line sl'parat, 
ing the matl'rial from the immaterial: it is a qUl'stioll of 1:lcl .. \ rhf: is material II it 
would be likely to alll'ct patiellt\' dcci,ioll. WIll'n lloll-di,cllhlJrc' <>1 a particular risk i, 
open to debate. the issue is fllr thl' filllkr of facts. 
Itf. at :'iSR. 
:>9. See Scnlr. h()6 P.2J :It :;:'S (ddin 
'!lle court wrotl': 
ITlherl' arc l'XCepliOns crl'attnC' a 1'1'1\ Ill'ge III a phYSIClall lJllI I, \ ,hclo,c. '1l1Crl' i, 110 
Ill'ed to disclose risks that clthl'r (lu,:,ht to he knowil h\ l'\c'I'\llIL' \'1' ,Ire dll'l'acl\ kllll\\ll 
to thl' patient. Further. thl' 1'1'1111:11'\ dut\ of a phYsiCian 1'1\\ ,I" \\Iut 1\ hcst lor hi, 
patil'nt and \\hel'l' lull disclll\LIrl' \\l)uld be dctnml'lltal tl' ·1 [',llii'IlI', loul c:\rl' ;lllci 
hl'st imerl'sts a pll\siclan Illa\ \\Ithhold ,uch discio,urc. 1(\1' C\:II11l'k, \\l1l'l'e dlsclo\ul'c 
would alarm an 1'Illotion:tll\ ul',ct 01' apl'rchl'llsi\l' patlellt (,'1"1,111111 to\). IIhc'l'l' thl'rc 
is all elllcrgencY' and the P;llil'llt is 111 nil condition to lklCrlllllh: ["I' hlfllSl'l1 whethcr 
trcdtllll'nt should bc adminisll'red. thc pri\ill'!"c lllay be in\[lf:c'd 
Id. at S"S. 
-Il). See Rm Ryden Anderson & Waltl'r W. Steck. Jr .. FitfuI'iun Dill\'. l,lI'I iflld COIl-
(/'{ICI: A Primer Oil Ihe Legal Jlai{JUlclicc PII~~le_ -17 S\!l' L.. RI \. 2.i:'. 2-16 (1l)9-1) (noting 
that "[tJhe essence of an action fur breach of contract is violation 1)1 :111 ohligation assumed 
hI consent"). 
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fiduciary duty principles. and failure to meet such obligations will 
give rise to a malpractice claim framed as a breach of contract.-+ 1 
Conversely. contract law may be used to waive legal protection 
that would otherwise be available. Thus. a legally enforceable 
waiver of rights by the plaintiff. such as a signed document assum-
ing risks. can insulate the defendant from at least some types of 
liability.-+:> Of course. whether a \\aiver is valid is often the crucial 
Ljuestion. Waivers that are insufficiently specific to cover the un-
derlying facts-+' or contrary to public policy-+~ afford a defendant no 
protection. Thus. if a law firm seeking to rely on a client's release 
fails to rebut the unfairness or invalidity associated with a contract 
between a Ia\vyer and client. the release will be held invalid.'~ 
With respect to malpractice liability and the obligations imposed 
on attorneys by fiduciary duty principles. a key issue is whether a 
lawyer and client may vary the terms of the relationship. That is. 
can the Ic1\vyer and client determine what types of information 
must be communicated to the client and what need not be dis-
closed? If so.-+I> the law of contracts imposes an important limita-
tion on the requirements of "'absolute and perfect candor." 
..( I. SCI' Rf\ I \ 11\11'- I (Till RIl) OF II1I L \\\ (j, l\ I P '-I '-(, L\\\ 'II R -.; * 19 cm1. e (~()OO) 
(indicating that ;In appropriately structured COlli 1';),'1 to increase a lawyer's dUlies will he 
held \alid). 
"(:'. For e\dJllpk. \OI11C iurisdictiun\ hold tll,lI \\;Ii\ers "I' li;lhilit\ arc not "did "ith 
rc'spect to c'ondlll't more egregiou\ than mere' 11c'~h2c'lll'l' 'li'I', ,'. l{ .. /11 !'e Paciric Ad\ en-
tur..:s, Inc..:'7 F. Slipp. 2d 12:',\ 12::':; (D. I-Lill. Il)l)S) Ihnlding that a release of liability ror 
groso, negligence \iolated public polie\ ': (jro" \. S\\..:e1. ..(O() '-:.E.::'d :106, :lOS ('-:.1'. Iln9) 
(holding that "[t[,) the extent that :l,Qreel11enh purport to grant exemption for liahilitv for 
willful ur gro\Sh negligent act') the\ ha\e b":c'l1 \Ielled as \\hull\' void"), 
..(.i. S"I' (j/'ll\\. ,,(Oil '-:.E.~d at ,'II (lwldll1C:;1 rl'k:N' Irolll Ilahilit\ il1\alid hecau\e "111-
stead uf \P'Xil\II1" to prospeclI\e \tudents tl1;l1 the\ \\()uld h;l\e to ahide am con\,'ljuel1c..:s 
;lllrihUldbk to thc' instructor's own L:lrek"nc'''. th,' ddendant seeills to ha\e prekrred the 
lhc' or opaquc' lL'rlllin()log\ "1. 
..(..(. Sec, ('.~ .. run"l \. Regenls of l·ni\. of (','/11 ... is_' !)~d ,,(,,(1. "(-f-f-"(:; (Cill. I%,i) 
(lhcllssing factors hl':lring upon whether an ;lgreel11ent will he \oid as against puhlic 
polic\), 
..(:;, ,';cc Ked.:, \lahin 8: Cate \. '-:;1['1 l'lllllil Fire In\. Co .. ~O S.W.3d 69::', h99 (lex. 
:'O()O) (holding rekase in\alid). 
,,(6. SCI' Pan IV-£: inti-a. 
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C Reconciling (he Srandard of Care 
According to some observers, malpractice claims based on 
breach of fiduciary duty are increasingly common.-17 To the extent 
that is true, it is important to reconcile the expansive rhetoric often 
found in fiduciary duty cases with the more-precise and better-de-
veloped principles that have evolved in the fields of torts and con-
tracts. Otherwise, there is a serious risk that application of 
fiduciary duty principles will undermine the important considera-
tions of public policy that have shaped the law of deceit. negli-
gence, and freedom to contract. To put the point somewhat 
differently, it makes no sense to say that negligence principles al-
low lawyers to exercise discretion on debatable questions. or that 
contract len\' permits a lavvyer and client to tailor the disclosure ob-
ligations in a relationship. if the standard of care in a malpractice 
action is defined solely by reference t ) the law of fiduciary duty 
requiring "absolute and perfect candor." Consequently. fiduciary 
duty may be properly understood only in a broader context that 
includes the expectations and requirements that arise from basic 
tort and contract principles.-lS 
-17, See gCl/erafh \kredith 1, Duncan. Legaf J/aff)l'{ICUC(, fn ;\1/\' Olher 'vllllle: IV/n' {! 
Breach o(Fii/{(cial'\' D{(lI Clailll Doc,l 'vOl Silieff ILl SIlI'(,I, 3-1 W,\"I F< )RI,I L. RL\, II.i7, 
1137 (1999) (stating that "[iJn a recent trend, court, 11;I\c hccn pcrmitting di,grulltkd cli· 
Cllts to hring hreach olliciucian dut\ claims against their ;lltnr11c\,"): LlI\fencc J, Lattn, 
The ReS{({I(,llIelll of l!i" L{/I\' GOI'cmillg f.awI'en: :1 \i(II' 11'11111 rlie TreIlC/WI, 2h H( JI ,I!( \ 
L. RI \, h97, 7-12 (19<)S) (asserting that "[hJreacl1e, olliduclan ohligation, ;lrc inLrc;hingh 
the hasi, lor thc' ci\illi:lhilit\ of la\\\ers and la\\ liJ'll1<'I: Sle\e \lc('ollilico c\: R<lh\ n Ihlc" 
10\\, 'lllllllllillT O(RC(,!'III f)clcfojJlIll'lIll ill 7/'xm t"~i/f \/uff"'(IOi('<' I_i/II'_ .'.' SI, \1 \",', L .. I. 
h(P, h25 (2()()2) (\latlllg that fcc fmfciture claillls h;lse'd nil hre:lch nl liduci:lr\ dUll :ll'c' 
being pled more freljuelltl\), 
-IS, -lllc'l'C is a Illatlc'r <If ciassificatlnn that dc"c'I'\,'\ ,Ollle atkllli<lll, The RI ,Sl III 
111'1 (SI «>'-1)) (II TIll'I' tnnk thc' pl)sition that hre;!c'h o!liduCI:lrI dut\' is;l t(lrt, \<'e 
RI\I \11\11'1 (Sll<)'!)) 1)1 T()!(I\ <S7-1 Clllt, h 11')-"II\Lllllh' th,11 "[:d liJuCI;lrI \\!W 
COllllllil\ d hre;lch of hIS dut\' as a liduclan is guilt\ ill IIIr1i(lLh c()llduCI tn Ihe I'ersoll lor 
II/Hlill hc' \hlluld :ICt"), (Jthe'r ,ourcc, hale c'c/wed tlLiI c':IIc'LC<Ii"I/,11i(1I1 ,')<'e, e,,,, \!creclltll 
.I, Duncall, /.ei.;lIf t/<lil'l"ll<lil'l' hI' :1111' ()Ilier ,\UIllI': \\'/'1 (/ firl'lI('1i III fidliClIIl'\ f)lin (/<1/11/ 
[Joo SOl SIll!'ff 11,1 SIII'('I, ,,-I \\' \,,1 F<wl sl L. RI \.11.'-,11.(;': (1<)i)()1 (statiml tildl hC;lch 
lliliducian dut\ is a illrtl. While it is true that an actinll luI' hl'c'acll ()lliLiucian dut\ Is d 
tnrt actiun in the sen,e Ilut It pnl\ide, a ci\il remecl\ for ddllwges Ilot \;:hed on contraCI. It 
is u,du/t(J rememhcr that the action is hased mainil on principles dtlle la\\ of agency, In 
tll:!t ,ense, the actilln is animated hI' a source olla\\ distinct frolll the law of torts. and it i'i 
therefore appropriatc to draw a distinctillll, Ordinan tort principle, ,(1\ little ahout liduci· 
;Iri<:\: <he principle, of agency ,ay a great deal. An altorllC\ ,ecking !!uiciance ahout his or 
her fiduciary ohligatiolls i, hettcr ad\ ised to turn to the Re\talcmeJlt of Agencv than to the 
Rest akmcnt of Ton" SCi' ;,;<'Ill'mfh Rm R\'llen Amlc'!',oll 8: Walter W, Skelc, .J 1' .. Fir/WI' 
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III. C\SELAW 00: "ABSOIlTl\:--;[) PrRFl(T CA:--;DOR" 
A line of cleven Texas cases. many of them quite recent. it1\oke 
the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" to describe the obliga-
tions of an attorney to a client. That series of decisiuns began more 
than a quarter of a century ago \\ith a disbarment proceeding in 
I){(/{(' \, B{/ker,~'i The defendant att,)rney was charged \\ith violat-
Ing \arious rules of ethics by purclLlSing property at a sheriff's sale. 
~J1Ie"edh on behalf of his client. and then Ltsin~ the title to secure 
~ . ~ 
further compensation for himself from a third party. without notice 
\l) ,)J" consent by his c1ient."11 In discLissing the undisclosed purchase 
Jild a related settlement agreement. the court \\ rote. citing to 
.)midl \, /)COII."I that ··[tJhe relationship between attorney and cli-
ent has heen held to be one of ll/Jarilll([ fides," , Theil. \\ith cita-
ti(Hl only to Rlock'" Lmt' DicriOlwn." the court explained "'[t]his 
ha-; heen described as: 'The most ahundant good Llith: absolute 
,llld perfeci candor or openness and honesty: the absl'nce of any 
c()llcealment or deception. howeyer slight.' ""I Thus. it was vvith 
the talismanic invocation of a Latin term and a definition from a 
,/1 \ nlln, f;;n IInr! COI/{rtlo: A Prilller nil {Ii,' !.,'~(/I \/(//I'mcri,'<' 1'/1 .. -/,' ·r S\It· L. RI \ 
';.;. ~;.; 11\)\/-11 I,h,erlill\!. there <lrt: "[tjllrel' dl'IIIlCI cau'e' of aCI«)J1 ,l\lll[;lhic to elleill, 
;'Ir Illl,bclLI\I<lI' hi lheir 1,1\\ler,: (I) hrellcil ()I liclucurl dUll. 1~II'rcllcil ,'(,'<1I][I'<H.:t: lilld 
,; 1 lil,' !t1l'1 11I1llItipra,'IICl''') . 
.1'1 ';;'1 -;.\\,2d .~(;; ITe\. Cil :\[11'.- '\U'111l I')~h. \\ril (','I'd 111',' I II'cr CUrI,lllll. 
'II "i,lie' \ Bd~'T ';3<) S.\\',::'d .~h7 . . 'h'l (1,'\, (',\ \1'1'",·,,'\U'llll 1'1-'" \\rll rei'd l1.r.(.1 
:',--'r ,-'LJ rLi 111 ), 
'I ~.lll 'i \\,2d -~t) I re\. (·il. "\1'1'.-,\\.1(" I<I'! 11<\ 111'111 
.;~. /)(!~,('f" . .::.~\) \ \\'.~d ,It .~~-L fn .\Illlfl!. Ih,-' \..'tlllrl;" 'j('l'k'd.lll clLhcf",-' l'\h"ll''') .... iolll'\~!illl 
,,,,\',,1 h ,Iil ,llldrll,'I. SlIItlli. ::'·W S.W.:\I ill -'II ill,' III I (lrJh.'\ Iud LI~ell cildL.'e '\(pmi'-
".1,\1 h\ .... '-\1]1J\.'II: :j .... ~ltlornl-·: dlllllr 11 <.;!t..'\..-' (ur ,Ill L',LllL' ,!!ll! 1 h.' \ 1..-'1" ~,!\L' l'h)l!l'\..' ll) an~ or till.' 
"'\1,1111" 111.11 he' \\Ih ciail1lill;l the prol,erll ,1,iI,'r,,'11 III lh,'m, ,\1'(' 11/ Iii "'ill 1,'\ldhllsil-
'ill' !.Jl'itLiI h,h:k~r\lllfld of rl1,--' l':l">l.'j, niL' ,,'llurL ,in:2 \...',II"!I-...'r ,j,--'~'h!\jih. ",lid 111;!t tbL' 
<:(11l"i1ii"\ ,1) .!ll\ll"ll\...'\ ;llld dk'lll h {{h(T!"!;!',1 ',/('\. I'Ll( clHJ 11\1[ Jih.' ),hi"!'>l' ",th\(\iU1L' 
:1'" \\!~ll'l; ;;,\..'d tlh.: ILT111 "/{/II'fT/fllU fidr'\" 1:1 I l'{lU;"'\..-' (ll "L:!I 111.]; ",U'-,I)ll"'''''' lr;IIl'<IC-
\\,,',,'11 .1:[\lfT1L'! .lnd client ,Ir....: !"lrl.'"UiHI'\j\I.'!\ ir.1LldukT1L I~ul :I:lh~ (:1'''-' .... <Ihn did 
i'c :h,' 1'11I,(\c' ",d',,,luk lind PC:l'icCI ,'IIIl,Ie,r' ),' /J <II -lil 1(11 Ikll I Rdll1lrc/. 
"I" \\ i'" /;.'~ 11,'s, ell, AI'P,-~..\lIqli1 1-1.:'-. \\I'it rd'c! 11.1',,',1: .I,)illh"ll I. (·Ilkr. II., 
, \\ .~,:lll; 'Ill.' lies. (·jl. r\pp.-~r\uslin I q,~. ll\\ \1 I'll!: lind Himel I l.d\(I\eK. 1)-1 'i.\\.2d 
" i 1,1/ I ks, ('II App.-Te\arkanll I').~h. 1\('11 dhl1l·d)). 
" III \, ,,', l. \II DI( II< 1'- IRI Ihi){) I~th Cll. 1'i,';II, 
,~ /{iI!\lT, 5"~1} S.\\·.~d ,It _~'7-L 
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dictionary that the Texas line of cases on "absolute and perfect can-
dor" began. 
Black's Lenv Dictionary cites only one source in support of the 
quoted definition-the commentary of Justice Joseph Story.~' In 
his work on Equity Jurisprudcncc. Story proclaimed in sweeping 
terms: 
!T]he burden of establishing, , , [the] perfect fairness. adclju<lcy. and 
equity [of a transaction between lawyer and client] is thnmn upon 
the attorney. upon the general rule. that he who [has] bargain[ed] in 
a matter of advantage with a person. placing a confidencc in him. is 
bound to show that a reasonable use has been made ur tll;![ confi-
dence: a rule applying equally to all persons standing in confidential 
relations with each other. If no such proof is established. courts of 
equity treat the cases as one of constructive fraud.'h 
However, Story was discussing only "contracts and transactions" 
between client and lawyer'7 and situations where "the latter ... 
[might derive] ... benefit ... from the contracts. or bounty. or 
other negotiations of the former. "'s In such instances. the interests 
of the attorney and client are adverse and there are risks of "mis-
chief, which may be brought about by means, secret and inaccessi-
ble to judicial scrutiny, from the dangerous intluences arising from 
the confidential relation of the parties."''! In that context. it is easy 
to understand the need to hold the attorney to a high standard that 
affords maximum protection to client interests. HO\\cver. what 
Story would have said about an attorney's duty to disclose informa-
tion to clients in other contexts is a matter of conjecture, So too. 
whether the Baker court would have found the same quotati("1 
from Black's Lmi' Dictionar:,; appropriate in a malpract ice. rather 
than disciplinary context. or in a case not involving benefit to the 
attorney. is speculative, 
The second Texas decision stating that attorneys han: a duty of 
"ahsolute and perfect candor" was Hetiler r, S{(l{C."'1 a case which 
affirmed the criminal conviction of an attornev for theft of client 
~S. BI,\C"K's LAW DICtl!),,\R'! 16110 (-+th cd. IllSI), 
'ih. I J'1SU'lt SI()ln. CO,t\ll ..... ,.\'W S 1"- [')! II Y J!RI'iI'I{! 111 .... ,! ~ .'It (12th cd. 
lil77). 
'i7. Id. ~ 310. 
~iI, frl. 
'ill. Id. 
60. 7.1" S.W.2d 60il (TeX. App.-Dallas 1()il7. pel. reed). 
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funds. 6 ! The attorney had argued that the trial court erred in fail-
ing to give a mistake-of-fact instruction,6~ The appellate court re-
jected this contention on several grounds. including that the 
attorney lacked a reasonable belief that the client had understood 
and approved the transfer of funds into the attorney's operating 
account.hJ The court declared. with citation to Smith. that the rela-
tionship between attorney and client is uberrima fides,()~ It then 
quoted the definition of that term from Black's Lmt' Dictionary. 
but it cited that language only to Baker.()~ The court concluded 
that an ordinary. prudent man acting in a fiduciary relationship 
could not have reasonably believed that the client had consented to 
the transfer of the funds because the facts showed that the attor-
ney-defendant was aware that the client had "been admitted to 
psychiatric hospitals on at least six occasions" and "was taking 
medication. ,,(,() Because of its unusual criminal-law posture. Hefner 
offers no guidance as to how far the disclosure obligations of attor-
neys extend for purposes of civil liability. 
The third Texas case using the phrase "absolute and perfect can-
dor," Resolution Trust Corp, v. H-, p, C..h7 is more instructive. In 
Resolution Trust Corp., the federal district court held that the en-
tire contents of an attorney's client file belongs to the client and 
must be returned to the client upon demand.6 ?l The court declined 
to endorse the law firm's arguments that the duty was limited to 
materials that the client had previously given to the firm. and that 
therefore documents created by the firm were not client property 
for purposes of the obligation to deliver them upon request. 69 In 
61. Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 601l, 627 (Ie,,\. Apr.-Dallas I'JIl:. pel. rcr·d). 
62. See id. at 610 (asserting the fourteen POlllt;, of error on appeal I. 
63. Sec id. at 623 (noting the appellate court";, opinion of Hefner's claim that the client 
understood and approved the transfers). 
64. See it!. at 624 (citing Smith v. Dean. 24() S.W.2d 71ltJ. 7tJl (Tex. ('iv. App.-Waco 
ItJ:'i1. no writ) and suggesting that Hefner \\ d' III a fiduciary relationship with the 
complainant ). 
65. See id. (eiling State v. Baker. :'i39 S.\\.~d :"h7 . . ,74 n~\ ('1\ /\pp-~AlIstin ItJ76. 
writ reCd n.r.c.) (pcr curiam) (suggesting wIn lktncr \V;1:, nol cntltled to mi;,take of fact 
defense ). 
66. Hefner, T\5 S.W.2d at 624. 
67. 121l F.R.D. 647 (N.D. Tex. 19/-jtJ). 
68. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-. p.e .. 12/-j F.R.D. 647. 650 (N.D. l"\;x. 1911tJ) 
(summarizing the court's decision that a lawyer's client file helongs to the client. not the 
lawyer). 
69. fd. at 648. 
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also rejecting the firm's contention that the "universal practice"7il 
of delivering the entire file applied only "when the file is to be 
turned over to another attorney and not to the clienL"7 1 the court 
quoted the "absolute and perfect candor" statement from Baker.72 
It concluded: 
Defendant's argument boils down to a helief that only another law-
yer can be trusted with the file. This arg.ument cannot he taken seri-
ously, since it would fundamentally unJermin(' the open and trusting 
nature of the attorn('y-client rdationship hy building a wall he tween 
the client and attorney behind which an altorn('y could protect him-
self and his dealings from scrutiny.7, 
The court also expressly repudiated the firm's argument that be-
cause the case involved allegations of misconduct by the client 
against the firm, the firm had a right to retain the files in anticipa-
tion of litigation.7-! It wrote: "SO long as an attorney represents his 
client. he owes that client a fiduciatT dill" ro disc/ose all informa-
tion to the client. "7'; As such, the ruling III Reso/lifioll Trust Corp. 
was broad. 
During the decade subsequent to Reso/ution Trust Corp., the 
American Law Institute crafted the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers. The Restatement, by embracing a more 
nuanced approach, calls Resolution Trust Corp. 's holding into ques-
tion. According to the Restatement: 
A lawyer may refuse to disclose to the client certain law-firm docu-
ments reasonably intended only for internal r('view, such as a memo-
randum discussing which lawyers in the firm should be assigned to a 
case, whether a la\.vyer must withdra\\ hec~lUSC of the client's miscon-
duct. or the firm's possible malpractice liahtlity to the client. The 
need for law:wrs to be able to set down their thoug.hts privately in 
order to assure effective and 8opropriate representation warrants 
keeping such documents secret from the client involved. 7 () 
70. Id. 
71. Id 
72. fd. at 6.+9 (qll()till~ Stale \. Bakcr. .".i9 S.\\' . .2d .~h-; . .i74 (ICx. Ci\. Apl'.--Alhtin 
I 97(), ""Tit rd\j n.r.c.) (per curiam)). 
n. Resoilition hU.II ( orp., 12;.\ F.RD. at 6'+(), 
7'+. /d 
75. fd. (cmphasis addcd). 
76. RrsTAIF\II:\T (THIRD) OF rIll. LAW (j(J\IR:\I:\(; L\wYI RS ~.+o cml. c (2(JOO). 
Note, howcver, that immcdiately following the quotation set forth in the text, thc commcnt 
goes on to state: "Even in sllch circumstances. hOWC\CL a tribunal may properly ordcr 
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Arguably, in light of these developments. the disclosure obliga-
tion recognized by Resolution Tnts( COIp. should be understood to 
apply only when information contained in the client's file was not 
prepared for internal law firm purposes. Thus limited. the duty 
recognized by Resolution Trust Corp. would be considerably more 
precise and circumscribed than a broadly worded duty of "absolute 
and perfect candor." 
Pere:: v. Kirk & Carrigan. the fourth Texas case referring to 
"absolute and perfect candor" provides no guidance on the disclo-
sure obligations of attorneys.7K 1l1at malpractice action focused 
not on what attorneys must tell their clients. but on whether liabil-
ity may be imposed for improper disclosure of client information to 
third parties. 7 ') Ouotation of the "ahsolute and perfect candor" 
and "lIherima fides" language and citations to the earlier Hefner 
and Baker decisions served merely as a preface to the court's rec-
ognition that "because of the openness and candor within this rela-
tionship. certain communications bel\\een attorney and client are 
privileged from disclosure. ",,() The COLlrt held that the defendant's 
disclosure of a client's statement to the district attorney could give 
rise to civil liability.,,1 
The fifth Texas case invoking the language of "absolute and per-
fect candor" was Soliman v. Golt;:.:':' Ironically. this unpublished 
decision is one of the most useful for understanding that there are 
limits of the disclosure obligations of attorneys. Soliman. the cli-
ent. sued Goltz, the attorney. alleging. in part that Goltz had 
breached his fiduciary duty by hiring his (Goltz's) daughter to as-
sist in Soliman's suit against a third part:- withollt revealing that the 
,heme'!'\' or th~ d()cul11~nt wh~n discmer\' rules ", I'ldl Ide. rhe 1<1II\er\ dutl to Inrorm 
lile client ... can require the lawver to disclose n];lller, ,ihcussed In a doculllcnt ~I~n when 
the document ihelr need not he disclosed." Id. 
77 S~':: S.\\..:'d .2h I (Tex. App.-Corpus (,IHIstl I')'! I. IHit denied) 
7S. P~re/ I. Kirk 8: Carrigan. S22 S.W.2d 2hl. 2h" (res. API'.--Cml'us Christi 1991. 
\\ rit denl~d). 
79. 1'<'1'''::'. S~2 S.\\' . .2d at ~6'i-66 (explaining lilat the clienl\; attol'lleY disclosed conri-
,ientlal cOl11munications to the district attornel). 
SI) Id. at 26'i . 
. '\ I. Id. at 266-67. 
S2. "0. O'i-93-()()()()S-CV. 19l)3 WL .+027.+0 (I\:x. App.-Dallas Oct. h. 199J. no writ) 
l!lot dL'slgnal~d for puhlication). 
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daughter was on social terms with a co-defendant's attorney:'" Es-
sentially, the argument was that the social relationship gave rise to 
a conflict of interest that prejudiced Goltz and required disclo-
sure.i)4 There was evidence that Goltz's daughter'S assistance con-
sisted simply of filing several papers for Goltz,'" After quoting the 
oft-cited language from Baker that a lawyer owes a client "the most 
abundant good faith, absolute and perfect candor or openness. and 
the absence of any concealment or deception. however slight." the 
court went on to write: 
While the scope of a confidential relationship is broad. the Texas Su-
preme Court has placed certain general limitations upon the breadth 
of a fiduciary's duty. The Court has recognized that the fiduciary 
duties extend only to dealings within the scope of the underlying re-
lationship of the parties. Soliman argues that Goltz's fiduciary duty 
included an obligation to inform him thaI Goltz's daughter was dat-
ing the Prufrock attorney. We do not agree. Soliman has not ciled, 
nor have we discovered. any authority holding that socializing be-
tween attorneys for adverse parties breaches a fiduciary duty. Nor 
did he allege any facts in his pleadings. summary judgment response 
or summary judgment evidence which persuade us that Goltz 
breached a fiduciary duty. We conclude that any obligation to ap-
prise Soliman of such a situation was outside the scope of the fiduci-
ary relationship established by their attorney-client employment 
relationship. We hold that the trial court correctly ruled that there 
was no legal basis for Soliman's breach of fiduciary duty claim. H() 
The Rankin v. NaftalisH7 decision cited in Soliman had involved 
fiduciary obligations among joint venturers. rather than fiduciary 
duties owed by attorney to c1ient.s.~ However. as discussed below.~<) 
the principle that fiduciary duties extend no f~)rther than the scope 
of the fiduciary relationship is well established in the attorney-cli-
ent context. It is therefore not surprising that the Soliman court 
relied upon the rule. What is surprising. perhaps. is the court's ap-
plication of the rule to the facts of the case. The relationship be-
83. Soliman v. (joltz. ;-";0. 05-'!3-000()I-I-CV. Il!'):; \\ L -W27'+0. at 1-2 (reX :\pp.-Dal-
las Oct. 6. 1993. no writ) (not designated for pllhlic~lli()f1). 
1-1'+. Id. at *9. 
85. !d. 
86. Id. (citing Rankin v. Naftalis. 557 S.W.2d 9'+0. 9.+.+ (Tex. 1977)). 
1-17. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977). 
1-11-\. Rankin. 557 S.W.2d at 944. 
89. See Part IV -A infra. 
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tween the defendant attorney's daughter/employee and opposing 
counsel was not clearly a matter wholly extraneous to the subject 
matter of the representation. Some persons \\ould argue that the 
lawsuit was the subject matter of the representation and whether 
the attorney or his daughter/employee's conduct created a conflict 
of interest was highly relevant. On such matters. reasonable minds 
may differ as to where the line should be drawn with respect to 
disclosure. YO What is important for present purposes is to note that 
the Dallas Court of Appeals. after imoking the "absolute and per-
fect candor rule." proceeded to countenance nondisclosure of in-
formation which the client. quite plausibly. would like to have 
known. 
In re Legal Econometrics. Inc .. cJl the sixth Texas case in the line 
of decisions referring to a duty of "ah:-;olute and perfect candor." 
was the first in which a breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose gave 
90. Sec Rice \. Pl'ri. 3~() :\.W.2d ,W7. ,W7. -III I \lillil. IlJS~) (Iwlding that a la\\ flJ"lll 
and attorney "were under an obligation to disclosc' t,," a client existence of their relation· 
ship with claims adjuster whn settled the client's clall11I, 11le Riel' court Slated: "111e exis· 
tence of the 'husiness relationship' created. at the \en least. a substantial appearance of 
impropriety with respect to Perl. and a serious connict l)i interest for Browne. A reasona· 
ble client would certainly wish to know. and has a rlgllt to this information. before pro· 
ceeding with settlement negotiations." Id. at -III. Relatr:d issues have arisen in other 
contexts. In People L Jackson. the court ()\erturned :1 Cl\n\ iniol1 hased on ineffective assis· 
tance of counsel where neither the defendant or 11IdC'e were informed that the defense 
counsel and prosccutor were dating. Pcople \. Jacksllil. ~L, Cal. Rptr. 521. 521-22 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 19:-\5). California disciplinarY rules now requlrc';1 1:I\\\'er t" reveal (he facts if another 
party's lawyer is a close relati\e or. hes with. or 11:IS ",111 inlimate personal relatiol1'iilip" 
with. the lawver. C\ 1.1 I . RII Is (\1 PR()I. CO .... I)I ( I R,'·"'~() (\\'est 2(02). 111e \Iockl 
Rules of Professional Conduct do not direct" ,Idclrl''' ,'cLltl()nships such as dating, :11-
thoug.h a comment to the general connict of il1krL'sl rule 1,1'(1\ Id,'s: 
When lawvers representing different clients In thL' ',Ill),' nl:ltlc'r or ill substantial" re· 
lated malters arc closc'" related hv hlood ,\r l11aITl,lcc·. Ih"I'C l11a\ be a significant risk 
that client confidenccs will he re\ealed and thai Illc 1,I\\\c'I'\ lalllily relationship will 
interfere with hoth I,,\alt\ and independent pn\k"llll1;11 jlld"I11l'l1t, As a result. each 
client is cnti(led to krl\l\\' "ithe e\i';[cncc and .111<\11' "itlll' rL'Lltinnship helllccl1 
Ihe law\'ers hclorc thc' lall\er ;1"re(S III lIndert,I~(' 'he' I'L'!'rcsc·I1l:illllll. Thus. a [;]I\,\cr 
related to another la\I\l'r. e.",. as p:lr,·ll1. child. sll,II!1" ,\1' si'''lh .. :. l)rdinarilv 111:1\, IWI 
represent a client ill :l l11;llter whcre that l:ll\\cr Is r,'I"','SCI1III1" ;111,Hher partv. link,s 
each client gi\l.~s mforrned con:-.ent. 
\J()DI[ R!LLS 01 PROI'I CO .... I)I( I R. 1.7 crnL II I~IJIJ~I (C:1111,i1:ISI' added). 
91. 191 B.R. 3:')1 (Bankr. ~.D. Tex. 199'i). alfd ill parr al/(I ,acaled ill parr SIIh. nom 
Vaughn \. Atkin. No. :').9'i·CV·()-+'i7-R. 1997 WI. :,('Ohl; (:\.1) Tex. Aug. 29.19(7) (mem.). 
appeal after rel/land. No. CA -":lJS·CV-2297-R. 19l)lJ Wl. .'O-l'i64 (N.D. Tex. May 11. 1999) 
(mel11. and order). 
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rise to civil liability.C):' There, a law firm implemented a restructur-
ing plan that gave a third-party trustee effective control over a 
debtor's businesses without disclosing the firm's own prior. close 
relationship with the third party.'); After noting the requirement of 
"absolute and perfect candor." the court concluded, \vithout dis-
cussion, that the defendants breached this duty by their acts.')4 
However. the court also found, earlier in the opinion, that the same 
conduct also constituted negligence')' and gross negligence.% Con-
sequently, the case can be read to mean simply that negligent non-
disclosure of material information is a breach uf fiduciary duty. It 
is impossible to discern whether. in the \ie\\ of the court. the "ab-
solute and perfect candor" requirement could gi\e rise to liability 
in a case involving a nonnegligent (i.e .. re~lS()!1able, rather than un-
reasonable) failure to disclose information. That. of course, is a 
critical question: Does the "absolute and perfect candor" standard 
require an attorney to do more than act 1'\ ;'qmahly in communicat-
ing with a client? 
The language of "absolute and perfect candor" has ne\er ap-
peared in a majority opinion of the Texas Supreme Court. How-
ever, on two occasions the phrase has been mentioned as part of 
other high court opinions, namely in Vickcn' l'. Vickery'!7 and Lo-
pez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P.')'; 
Civil liability was imposed in Vicker\' Vickerr,')\) the seventh 
Texas case referring to "absolute and perft:ct c<lndor."J(HI Citing the 
quoted phrase to Perc;:, the court of appeals affirmed a jury finding 
of breach of fiduciary duty in a suit arising IWI1l tht: mishandling of 
9~. {II re L':il~li ECOIl\ll11elrl(S. Inc.. I'll 13.R. ,,:;1. .'-l" Ill,111~r '\. I) kx. I l)1):, I. aiI'd 11/ 
p!ln !lilt! (!lUlled ill lian \/lil. 11(1111 \'alll!i1n I. ,'\~;'l. "-,, .. "IJ",C\ ,Ii-l,'- R. 19()7 WL 'hl)hl 
("-.1). Tex. :\lIil. 29.19\17) (lllel1l). 1I,'II,eu! uli,'r rmwlld. '.11 (\ ,':<),"·(,\·2.:'97·R. II)\)\) \\ L 
30.+:'6.+ ("-.D. Te'(. \'lil\ 11.1\)\)91 (lllel1l. and ordnl. 
93. Id. at 3-+1, 
9'+. fd ;11 .''+~. 
9:'. M ~II -'-17. 
%. Iii. ;11 ,'-lS.-llJ. 
\)7. 9\)9 S.\\· . .:'d .q.:'. ,,-10 I Ie'\. I')I)\}) (I k(lll, L di",'llll Ir\lill dC'llI;iI or pe'lili(ln r(lr 
reliew I. 
9~. '10 S.\\ .. 'd ~'i Sh- IL:\ . .:'II(1()) ((jon/;ile/. L ((lI1c'UITlnc' ,Ind di",enlinl'.). 
\)9. "-0. OI·9-\·OIO()-\·C\. 1997 \\L 7:,1\)l):, (Te'(\I'I'.--II,ll!SIOIl Ihl Disl.l Dec..+, 
1997) (not desiililall.:d ror plIhIICIIIOIl). {'(,I. delli1'li. (N\) S.\\ .2d .'-l2 ITe\. 1999). 
100. Vickery I. Vicken. '\.\1. OI·cJ-\·()\(IO-\·CV. I\)\)- \\1. i,'II)I)'. at 36·,)7 (Te'(. 
:\pp.- 'llluston list Dis!.1 Dec. -l, 19\)7) (!lot desiilnakd ((II' l,uhlll';llillll), {"'I. dellied. 9l)() 
S. W2d -'-\2 (lex, J l)l)9). 
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a divorce. lol However. Vickery prc)\ides little guidance as to the 
extent of the duties imposed by "absolute and perfect candor" be-
cause the underlying facts were egreginus. 
The husband. an attorney. tricked his wife into getting an uncon-
tested divorce on the pretext that they would later reunite after 
threat of certain litigation had passed.I"~ There was evidence that a 
second attorney. while acting at the hehest of the husband (a for-
mer law school classmate ),I<I.~ filed a petition for divorce in the 
wife's name without ever consulting her or obtaining her permis-
sion: prepared and filed a counterclaim for the husband. \\ithout 
disclosing those facts to the wife: and never infurmed the \\ife of 
her rights in a divorce. HI..! Not surprisingly. the second attorney was 
found to have breached her fiduciary duties to the \vife. '"'' HO\v-
ever. such conduct would be regarck'd as highly improper under 
vi!'tually any theory of attorney liahilit\ (e.g .. negligence. fraud. or 
deceptive trade practices). Consequcntly. it i~ impossihle to say 
whether the court of appeals thought that fiduciary duty 1,\\\ im-
posed obligations greater than those that arise under the rule of 
reasonable care, 'vvhich is the touchstone for negligence analysis. 
This assessment of Vickery finds support in the suhsequent opin-
ion of Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht. In his dissent 
from the denial of a petition for review of the case. Hecht noted 
that the defaulting second attorney had not been charged with any 
form of heightened culpahility and that the asserted breach of fidu-
ciary duty was "no different than ... [an) ordinary malpractice 
claim."'()h Justice Hecht did not discu"" ",lhsolute and perfect can-
dor," but merely reprinted as an appl.'l1dl\ the unpublished opinion 
of the court of appeals. which contdin:-- the r'hra~c."- Becall~e Jus-
tice Hecht's dissent was concerned pnl1laril~ (if not exclusively) 
'vvith the propriety of mental distre"" Cli1d c\emplary damages 
awarded in the case. it \vould he imrll"\)per to read his opinion as a 
Iii\. lieken. ll)l)7 \\L -.'Il)l).'.:11 .~..! 1l'lllli~ 1'1 .. I-':II~ ,\: (,'lrI~,IIL ':: s.\\ .~d 
.:2,,1. :'h.' I Tl'\. "\PI'.-C"fJ'U\ CIHI,11 1')<)1. \\rll ,kli" Ii. 













lOb. Vickl'rI \. \'ickl'rI.l)l)l) S.W.:'d -'42 .. ~..!'" Ilc\. I')l)l) I Ukcht. L di\\c'JlIIJl~ Irom 
denial 01 petilion lor relil'll I. 
1117. M :ll '76. 
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considered expression of views about the disclosure obligations of 
attorneys. 
In Lopez, the eighth Texas case to refer to "absolute and perfect 
candoe" the quoted phrase appeared in an opinion of Justice Al-
berto Gonzalez, concurring and dissenting. IllS The facts of the suit 
seemed to offer a good opportunity for the court tu explore the 
disclosure obligations of attorneys, but that appearance proved to 
be illusory. 
The law firm in Lopez was sued for breach of contract and 
breach of fiduciary duty based on its collection of an additional 5% 
contingent fee under contractual language providing that the sup-
plemental fee would be paid if the subject personal injury suit was 
"appealed to a higher court. "Ill') After a tentative settlement of the 
underlying suit had been reached. the opposing pMty moved to 
preserve its right to appeal by filing a cash deposit ill lieu of a cost 
bond with the trial court, and a few days later the case was set-
tled. IIO The law firm took the position that under the contract 
these facts entitled it to the additional 5 % because an appeal had 
been filed, and when the settlement proceeds were divided it re-
ceived that amount. I I I However, three years later the client sued 
for a refund of the 5%.112 
The Supreme Court held that because the language of the con-
tract was unambiguous, the firm did not breach its contract with 
the client by collecting the additional 5% fee. I I.1 The court stated 
that "the case was 'appealed to a higher court' n the ... [op-
posing party] initiated the appellate process by filing ... [the 1 cash 
deposit."II-l 
During the appeal in Lopez, counsel for the clil'llt h~!rJ argued 
that the law firm was under a dutv to disclo::,..; to the client "that 
there was an alternate colorable construction of the triggering 
clause,"II~ but that claim was not addressed by the Supr<..'me Court 
lOX. Lopez Y. \1url11z. Hockcmd c\: Reed. L.L.P .. :::: S.\\'.3d S.'- >h-' k\. ::'llOO) {(j<lll-
zalcz.1.. cOllcurring and dissenling). 
lOt). Id. at X5t). 
110. Id. at X5t)-60. 
Ill. ld. 
112. Id. 
113. Lopez. 22 S.W.3d at 1'160. 
114. Id at X5t). 
II). It!. at 1'162. 
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because it had not been pleaded or briefed. I III For the same rea-
sons the court did not consider whether the law firm had "'con-
cealed the additional fee charge."'II-
Justice Gonzalez wrote separately ··to advance the proposition 
that attorneys owe a fiduciary duty to fully explain the ramifica-
tions of their employment contracts to their c1ients."lls He stated: 
[T]here are ... ethical issues in this case. about which the Lopez 
family does not complain. that nonl"lhekss deserve discussion. The 
first relates to a lawyers's duty to fully and honestly inform his or her 
client of a fee arrangement. ... The fiduciary relationship between 
attorney and client requires "absolule and perfect candor. openness 
and honesty. and the absence of al1\ concealment or deception." 
Fundamentallv. a lawyer should alwCl\'- act in the client's best inter-. . 
ests. A lawyer and client's negotiatiolls are often imbalanced in 
favor of the lawyer because of information inequalities and the cli-
ent's customary reliance on the la\\\er's kgal advice. Consequently. 
a lawyer should fitll\' explain to the client the meaning and impact of 
any contract between them. Here. lor e\ampk. tu hest serve their 
client. and to protect their own interests. the Munoz firm could have 
explained to the Lopez family at the time the contract was signed 
that the firm believed it would be entitkd to an additional fee the 
moment Westinghouse preserved their right to appeaL even though 
an agreement in principle had been reached to settle the case. I It) 
Justice Gonzalez's opinion raises important issues. but his dispo-
sition of those questions seems equivocal. In discussing attorney 
disclosure obligations. he chose to speak in terms of the optional 
language of "should" and "'could." rather than the mandatory lan-
guage of "shall" and "must."lc{) \Vas the Justice simply recom-
mending a preferable course for ~ltt()rneys who aspire to high 
moral standards. or was he stating that the cunduct in question was 
legally required'? It \vould be difficult to read the disclosure pro-
posed in the final sentence quoted ahove as a mandatory obliga-
tion. Doing so would require a higJl degree of prescience on the 
part of the attorneys. Quite possibly. at the time the fee agreement 
116. Id. 
1/- Id. 
liS. /.o/!t'.-. " S.\\.3d at :->6-\ ((jon/alC!. L (l)llcllrrin;! and di"el1ting). 
Ill). Id. at S67 ((jon/ala. L cOl1curril1;! i1nd lhsellting) (emphasl;" added) (quoting 
PerCI \. Kirk & Carri;!<m. :->22 S.W.2d 261. 26) (IC:>; App.-Corpus Christi 1991. writ dc· 
nied) and citing \\iIlis \. \Ja\erick. 7611 S.\V.2d h-\2. il-\) (Tex. 19S:-»). 
120. Id. 
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in Lope:: \\as signed. the law firm \\as not thinking about how the 
contract should be construed if at a considerably later point in time 
there \vas a large jury verdict and subseyuent settlement negotia-
tions mmed so yuickly that the case settled shortly after the oppos-
ing party filed notice of appeal. Surely Justice Gonzalez was not 
proposing that there is a legally cnfurceable obligation on attor-
neys to anticipate and make full disclosures with respect to that 
sort of distant contractual-interpretation issue concerning which. at 
that time. there \vas no binding legal precedent. 
Only one other member of therc\<1s Supreme Court (Chief Jus-
tice Phillips) concurred in the Gunzalez opinion. The remaining 
Justices were content to note that the plaintiffs had failed to pre-
serve any claims that the law firm "breached its fiduciar\' duty . . . 
other than by breaching its contract." 1 'I Justice Harriett O'Neill"s 
opinion nol<:d that the plaintiffs held not alleged. for example. that 
the law firm "concealed the additional".; charge. improperly 
delayed execution of the settlement so that Westinghouse would 
perfect an appeaL or otherwise manipulated the settlement and ap-
peal process in order to charge the higher fee." I :':' 
Lopez was followed by Go/fIler I', Robson I:', which added a new 
grammatical twist by leaving out the word "and" between "abso-
lute" and "perfect." and thus referred to "absolute perfect candor, 
openness and honesty. and the absence of any concealment or de-
ception." 12 -l The action alleged that an attorney had improperly 
handled an estate lawsuit and had deserted the client on the day of 
triaL':''> However. the court held that the plaintiff's claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty. breach 01 contraCt. and deceptive trade 
practices merely restated her legal malpractice claim. which had 
been abandoned before trial. i Consequently. a \erdict for the 
plaintiff was re\'ersed.12~ The court did not discuss the disclosure 
obligations of attorneys. so the decisiun is not instructive as to the 
meaning of "absolute and perfect clIldor." 
1'1. IJ ~lt s():" 
I :'2, Iii. 
12,1. 'i6 S.\\,:"d ISh (Tc,. APr.-Houston [I-llh DlsLi 2001, pel. denied), 
12-1. (,oflne\ \. RahsoI1, 'ih S. \\,Jd ISh. ILJ,' (Tc\, r\pp,-Houston [I -Ith Disl.i 2(JO I. 
peL denic:d), 
12'i. Iii. at II\'). 
I2h. fd at ILJJ,lJ-l. 
127, Id. at IlJ-l. 
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Wolfe \'. S/zl'llisl.lc" the ninth Icx<\s case involving an attorney in 
which the words "'absolute and perfect candor" appeaL also pro-
vides no assistance for interpreting the phrase. for it was stated 
simply as part of a recitation of \\hat the plaintiff alleged in her 
breach of fiducial'\" dutv claim ai!~linst her former attorne\"s.I~') To - - ~ -
the plaintiffs consternation. the <llturneys. with court permission. 
had withdrawn from representing her after the plaintiff had given 
an unfavorable deposition in her underlying personal injury suit. I '() 
The appellate court did not discuss the "absolute and perfect can-
dor" language or the disclosure obligations of attorneys in af-
firming a grant of summary judgm,-'nt against the plaintiff. 
1l1e most recent Texas case using the phrase "absolute and per-
fect candor" is Francisco \'. Forni 'I ~l legal malpractice action aris-
ing from the alleged mishandling of a medical malpractice claim,l.1:' 
The appellate court held in an unpublished opinion that the trial 
court had erred in gran~ing sumnun judgment for the attorneys 
hecause: 
The evidence that the Forets settiLd the Franciscos' claims without 
consent. withheld that information [rom the Franciscos, needed to 
settle the claims for personal ftnancial reasons. and threatened and 
harassed the Franciscos to ratifv the "elliLment constitutes more than 
a scintilla of evidence the Forcts breached their fiduciary duty to the 
Franciscos. I" 
llle court invoked the rubric l){' "absolute and perfect candor." 
but then quickly shifted to the use or other terms, It wrote "[t]he 
fiduciary relationship between attnrney and client requires 'abso-
lute and perfect candor. openness ,1l1d honesty. and the absence of 
any concealment or deception,' All at turney is 'obligated to render 
I~S. :\u. ill·()()·()()~S7·C\'. ~()()I \\1. 1.".,,- I !c\.\I'I'.--HI)U\tllll I ht DI\l.\ Dc'c. i.,. 
~()()1. no pel.) (not de\I",llated rllr puhliCIIlIc)l1 I 
I~l). Wolk \. Shclll'il. :\u. ill·IJlI·()il~c;-.(\ 211111 \\1. I~s-.'-+": ,It '-+ ITe\. '\1'[,.-
Houston [hI Di\l.l Dcc. I." 21l111. no pel. 1 1 \( ,k'I~llalCd 1m l'uhlicllllcll1l. 
1-'0. M at 2. 
1.,1. :\0. il:"·OI·()()7s.'·C\'. ~1)()2 \\L ~."-+" IT,,\ .. ·\pp.-f),t1III\·\pr. II. 21)()2. pel. 
lien ic:d) (nut de\1.0.na ted lor publ iedl ion). 
U2. Francisco \. Forct. :\u. 1):,,·0 1·1I1l7s.H'\,. 20(J2 \\L ".':"-+:'''. aI' I (Tex. App.-
Dallas Apr. II. 2()02. pel. denied) Inol dC\i",Il.lted 1m publicatlun I. 
133. fd at'..!. 
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a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's 
representation.' "l~q 
The Francisco court did not l'xplore whether there is a difference 
between candor that is "absolute and perfect" and disclosure that 
is "full and fair." Arguably. the latter phrase is more supple and 
might be expected to give risl' to liability less frequently than the 
former. Certainly. a malprclctice defendant would prefer to be 
judged according to whether his or her disclosures were "full and 
fair." rather than by whethl'r thl'Y were "absolutl' and perfect." 
The Willis v. /vlavcrickL''i lkcision cited in Frallcisco (which was 
also cited by Justice Gonzalez in L()pe~) involved a case submitted 
to the jury solely on a negligl'l1ce claim. I;" 1l1at fact might lead one 
to conclude that the Francisco cnurt \\as interpreting "absolute and 
candor" as roughly equivalent to a duty to act reasonably. The 
conduct in Francisco. which il1\olved undisclosed settlement of the 
clients' claims. would have gi\l'n rise to liability l'\l'n under a negli-
gence standard. Thus. neithn thl' discussion nor application of the 
law in Francisco resolves the question whether the standard of "ab-
solute and perfect candor" means that liability may be imposed 
when an attorney acts reasonably (i.e .. nonnegligently) in failing to 
disclose information. 
B. California, Oklahoma, ([lid District of Coillfllhia Cases 
The phrase "absolute and perfect candor" has appeared in at 
least seven other cases raising issues of attorIll'Y liahility. including 
two malpractice suits from Califurnia. fr)ur disciplinary proceedings 
from Oklahoma, and a tort of t)utrage claim from the District of 
Columbia. 
In David Welch Co. v. Erskille & Tliflev.IP the California Court 
of Appeals quoted the definition of "uherrima lie/cs" from Black's 
Lmv Dicriof/af'Y that refers to "ahsolutl' and perfect candor."l<" 
The court then went on to Iwld that thl' defendant attorney and 
13'+, !d. (qu()ting. Vickery \, Vicker\, l)C)l) S~\\,2d ,,'+2. 376 (Tc\, 1l}99) (Hecht. 1.. dis-
senting. from denial of petition for rc\ 1"\\) ;lnd \\'illis \ ~ \!ci\cnck, ~60 S,W,2d 11.+2. ".+:" 
(l'c:x 191\1\)) 
13:". 760 s, W,2d 6.+2 (Tex, 19S5), 
136, Willis \, :Vlaverick. 76() S,W,2d h.+2, 11'+,' (I\:x. I')i'i') 
137. 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (C'al. CL .-\pp. l\)~S). 
13S, David Welch Co, \, Erskine 6: Tullev, 2:"0 Cal. Rptr. ~'~"), .,.+1 (Cal. Cl. App, 
Il}SS) 
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law firm breached their fiduciary duties to Welch, a former client, 
by failing to disclose that they w'ere "preparing proposals designed 
to undercut Welch's business relationships." Ul) Welch was a li-
censed collection agency that had developed a highly profitable 
business by using confidential techniques to collect delinquent con-
tributions to employee benefit trust funds.I-lO The court wrote: 
[D]ue to the pre-existing attorney-client relationship during which 
defendants were in a position to and did obtain confidential informa-
tion about Welch's business, these defendants had a higher duty [than 
other law firms], which was to refrain from acquiring any pecuniary 
interest involving collection work for these trust funds unless they 
first notified and obtained the informed consent of Welch to submit 
their business proposals. As they did not do so, the trial court prop-
erly found that they had breacl<.:d their fiduciary duty towards 
Welch.141 
Because the attorney-client relationship between Welch and the 
law firm had ended prior to the alleged breach,142 David Welch Co. 
is best understood as a case based on continuing non-conflict-of-
interest obligations owed to a former client (i.e., the duty not to 
misuse confidential information), rather than on the obligation to 
disclose relevant information to a present client (i.e., the duty to 
communicate). The case therefore is not helpful in understanding 
what "absolute and perfect candor" entails in the context of an on-
going attorney-client relationship. 
The most recent California case also sheds little light on the 
meaning of "absolute and perfect candor." In Fox v. Lichter, 
Grossman, Nichols & Sadler, Inc.,143 a minority shareholder 
brought a derivative claim alleging that the defendant law firm had 
committed several wrongs, including breach of fiduciary duty to 
the corporation, its client. 144 In addressing those claims, the court 
described attorney-client relationships as uberrima fides,145 and 
139. Id. at 343. 
140. ld. at 340. 
141. Id. at 343. 
142. Id. at 341. 
143. No. 8148488. 2003 WL 57979 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb 5. 20(3) (not designated for 
publication ). 
144. Fox v. Lichter. Grossman. Nichols & Sadler. Inc .. No. 8148488.2003 WL 57979. 
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 5. 20(3) (not designated for publication). 
145. ld. at "6. 
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quoted the definition of that term from Hluck's L/\\' DiCfiol1or\,.I-lh 
However. the court did not explore the meaning of the phrase "ab-
solute and perfect candor.·· 
The court found that a cause of action was stated on two 
grounds. First. plaintiff alleged that the law firm had received pay-
ments in amounts greater than the 5°1t) of profits that it was entitled 
to under its contract with the client.I-l- The excessive nature of 
these payments was unknO\vn to the minurity director/piaintiff.I-lS 
Second. the plaintiff also alleged that the law firm had failed to 
disclose to the client's directors the fact that the firm had facilitated 
a disadvantageous transfer of a valuable client asset (the name of 
the business) to another entity to which the client then had to pay 
royalties fur using the name. 11 '! Howe\er. with respect to both of 
these claims. the plaintiff argued that the firm had engaged in in-
tentional deception amounting to fraud. I 'II Consequently. the case 
has no bearing upon whether a lawyer em he held liable for non-
negligent (i.c .. reasonahle) nondisclosure tdelt falls short of candor 
that is "'absolute and perfect.·· 
Of the four Oklahoma cases quoting the language of "absolute 
and perfect candor." three do not shed light upon the disclosure 
obligations of attorneys to clients. One of those three cases. State 
ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Laeo.Hc.I'ii concerned false 
statements made by an attorney to a nonclient and to the bar. 152 In 
the second case. SW[C ex rei. Oklahollw Bar Ass()ciariol1 v. Wal-
lacc. 151 the issues related to an attorney's mishandling of funds as 
trustee of the client"s irrevocable trust. i "1 AmI in the third case. 
St{/{C ex rei. Ok/a/zo/llil Bar Associatioll L l(n/ol. 1 the proceeding 
focused on an attorney's misapplication of insurance proceeds that 
belonged in part to the client's doctor. I."', All three of these cases 
1.+6. I". at'h n . .i. 
1'+7. Id. at .'. 
1'+0. Id 
1:'0. Id. at J (alleg.ing. tlLl1 ,h\Ch wer.: "frauJuknill IrdlblcrreJ" tllthc firm anJ that 
the firm "Ialsel, swteJ" inimll1atio!1 related to the tr,llbler (lithe hu\il1cSS name). 
1:,\1. 8l.' P.2d :'01 (Okla. 1001). 
1."2. State ex rei. Okla. Bar .-\'-,'11 I. LaCll\tc. 01., P.2d ~(JI. :'().+ (Okla. 1001). 
153. %1 P2d 818 (Okla. 1008). 
1."'+. State ('x I'd Okla. Bar Ass'l1 \. Wallace. 061 P.2d oiS .. '\26 (Okla. 1008). 
I."." . .+ P .. ;d 12.+2 (Okla. 2()()()). 
156. State ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n I. Tallor.'+ P .. 'd 12.+2, 12.+9·50 (Okla, 20()O). 
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used the term uhcrril/1(/ fld!'s and ljuoted the definition of that term 
from Black's Li/li' DicrioIlOIT. I .'- HU\\ eyer. none of the cases ad-
dressed the disclosure obligations of attorneys. 
The remaining Oklahoma case. S[i/{e cx rei. Ok/ahol/la 13(/r Asso-
ciatioll L Busch. I " upheld the disbarment of an attorney based on 
unauthorized use of client funds and other misconduct relating to 
two different clients. I,') With regard to the one client .. [ t ]he e\i 
de nee ... [was] clear and conyincing that respondent failed to in-
form his client (a) that a judgment had been renckred against her 
and (b) that it contained language which would make the debt non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy. "Ih() 
With regard to the other client. the court found that the attorney 
did not return calls lhl and that '"[n]ot only did. , . [the attorney] fail 
to notify ... [the client 1 upon receipt of the funds. but he ... also 
failed to remit the proceeds.'"lh~ In discussing the latter miscon-
duct. the court wrote: 
A l;l\\yer"s highest fiduciary duty comes into heing \\hcl1 a legal prac-
titioner is entrusted with a client's funds. ,.\ fiducian or the highccit 
order. the trustee must meet the settlor's expectatinI1 that the ohliga-
tions imposed on the office of trustee will be carried out for the ex-
clusive benefit of the cesflli quc {I'llst. To the cesllii (Ilf(' {I'llS{ a trustee 
always owes uherrimo fides. lh " 
The court then quoted the definition of llhcrrillw fides from 
Black's Law Dictionary that refers to '"absolute and perfect can-
dor. "Ih~ However. the invocation of that terminology was unneces-
sary. for the attorney had clearly violated the disciplinary rule that 
imposes an obligation to '"promptly notify the client" after" 're-
cei\ing funds or other property in which a client .. , has an inter-
est.' "I'" In addition. the yarious failures [(, communicate. as the 
1)7. lill/or. -\ P.~d ,It 1:':'-\ 11.-\:': Irul/ace. L)1l1 P2c1 Jt S21l ,\: n.:'.~: '-11""[('. SI.~ 1'.2d .It 
:'i():'i L\: 11 .. \ (Op,da, ('..J .. dh,cnting). In 1,<1('(1\[(' ,lllel 11.11/<1(('. Ih<.: "['llllnlh rLic'Irl'd 1<) (Ill' 
atlllrllL\-cliLI11 rc'Lltlllll,hlj" a, uhari/l/(/ tide\. hut 111 1ill/or th:lt (,'l'l1l \\;1' .1j'1'lic',1 11\ ,ie'-
\crihc the ~)h!i~(ltl\.ln' ()( ,\ trU')k~C tn {l ((Sf/fi IllIt' ,'rtt\!. 
15x. lJ-:r, P.:'d ,~\ (Okla. ll)lJ9 I. 
1:'9, Stal<.' L'\ I'd Okla. Bar Ass'n \, Busch. In. P.:'d .:;S. ,j,) (Okl" 1l}t)'J I 
IhO. !d at :'1. 
Ihl. frl. at 5-\. 
16:'. Id. 
16-'. M 
16-\, Busch. 976 P.:'d at :'-\ n.x5. 
16:1. M at :i-, n.7X. 
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court recognized, were violations of the disciplinary rule requiring 
lawyers to keep clients "reasonably informed" as to the status of 
representation,166 As such, the language about "absolute and per-
fect candor" was surplusage to the court's disciplinary holding and 
does not illuminate what types of disclosures must be made by at-
torneys to avoid civil liability. 
Herbin v. Hoetf'e/,lh7 a District of Columbia action referring to 
the duty of "absolute and perfect candor." \vas a suit in tort alleg-
ing, in relevant part. that a public defender had intentionally dis-
closed confidences to state prosecutors. I"" In finding that a cause 
of action was stated under the tort of outrage, the court, by way of 
background, quoted language from the Perc:: decision describing 
the attorney-client relationship as entailing duties of the "most 
abundant good faith" and "absolute and perfect candor."I"') How-
ever, inasmuch as Herbin involved an impermissible revelation of 
confidences to others, rather than a failure to communicate with 
the client it is uninstructive about the duty of candor that is owed 
to a client. 
C. The Proper Scope of "Absolute and Perfect Candor" 
Although the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" has been in-
voked frequently by Texas courts. as well as by tribunals in other 
states, the cases fail to establish that the language imposes a 
broadly applicable duty, enforceable in civil actions, to disclose in-
formation even when exercise of reasonable care would not call for 
its disclosure. Some of the cases referring tn "absolute and perfect 
candor" can be largely disregarded on the ground that in those 
suits the courts were faced nOl with issues of civil liabilit \" but \vith 
the considerably different questions of whether diSCiplinary or 
criminal liability should be imposed. i - II Other cases can be dis-
counted because while the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" 
I6(), M at :'iO n,-",S, :'i-L 
167, S06 A.::'d ISh (I).C. 2()()2), 
16S, Herhin \, HodleL SOh A.::'d IS6. ISY (D.C'. 2()():::) 
16Y, 1(/, at IY7 (citint! Perez \, Kirk 8: Carri"an, S2::: S, \\.2d :::h L 2h:'i I Tex, App,-
Corpus Christi IYYL writ denied), 
170, See, e,g, Hcfncr \, Statc. 7J:'i S.\V,2d hOS, h2h IIC'\. App,-Dallas IYS7, pel. 
ref'd) (imolvint! criminal prosecution): State \. Baker, :'iJ') S,W.2d Jh7, 3hY (Tex, Civ, 
App,-Austin IY76, writ rd'cl n,r.e,) (per curiam) lin\oivin'l disharment), 
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was invoked it was not explored in any meaningful way!?1 or was 
not critical to the disposition of those suits. 172 In addition, some of 
the decisions using the term "absolute and perfect candor" that 
have imposed liability can be explained simply by the fact that the 
conduct in question violated clearly established standards of attor-
ney conduct such as the rules relating to handling of client 
funds. 171 
It is reasonable to assume that the duty of "absolute and perfect 
candor" applies most forcefully in instances where the interests of 
the attorney and client are adverse.!7.) as in the case of a business 
transaction between them. 17 .'i Although cases involving these types 
of facts generally have not used the phrase "absolute and perfect 
candor," they frequently speak of "lIrherrima fides," 176 which, as 
171. Sec Lope/ v. \IUI10L Hockem<l & Reed. LLP .. 22 S.W.3d H57. H02 (Tex. 20(0) 
(finding. that mmt breach-of-fiduciary duty claims "ere 110t preserved): Goffney Y. Rahson . 
. 'h S.\\·.3d IHh. I'-I() (TeX. App.--Houston [I.+th DisL/ 2()OI. no pel.) (restating. fiduciar\' 
duty claim as legal malpractice claim which had heen dh,lndoned at trial): Wolfe v. Shellisl. 
:\(). OI-(J()-005H7-CV. 2001 WL 15H73.+H. at *'+-5 (kx. App.-Houston list DisLj Dec. 13. 
2()()1. no peL) (eliminating. discussion of "absolutc and perfcct candor"). See generallv 
Stall: ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Taylor . .+ P.3d 12.+2 (Okla. 20(0) (failing to address the 
disclosure obligations of attorncys): Statc ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Wallace. 961 P.2d 818 
(Okla. 199H) (failing. to address the disclosure oblig.ations of attorneys): State ex rei. Okla. 
Bar Ass'n v. Lacoste. H 13 P.2d 50 I (Okla. 1(91) (failing. to address the disclosure oblig.u-
tlons of attorneys). 
172. Sec. c.g. /11 rc Leg.aJ Econometrics. Inc.. 101 B.R. 33I. 3.+7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
1'!95). IIf{'d ill parr illld l'IICtliei/ ill part slIl1. 1101/1 Vaug.hn v. Akin. No. 3-95-CV-O'+57-R. 
Ill'!7 \\L .~60017 (;';.D. Tex. Aug.. ::'0.19<)7) (mem.). 11{)I'<'allifrer rcmalld. No. CA 3:9:-\-CV-
~2'!7-R. 199'-1 WL 30.+56.+ (:\.D. Tex. \la\ II. 190'-1) (mem. and ordcr) (finding the conduct 
In qUe')lion to constitutc ncg.lig.ence and g.f<lSS neg.lig.ence): Francisco v. Foret. No. 05-01-
IIO::-\.'-CV. 2002 \VL 53.~'+-':;. ;ll''+ (1ex. App.-D;ilLI\ Apr. II. 2002. pel. denied) (not 
de,)Ig.I];Ite'd fm puhlicatloll) kljuating. "absolute' and perfect candor" with "full and fair" 
dl\cl," :Irc): Vlckcn v. Vickery. ;';0. 01-9'+-0 I ()()'+-C\'. 1997 WL 751995. at "33-3'+ (Tex . 
. \I'p.-Hou\ton list Disl.j Dcc. .+. 1097) (not designated for publication). pCI. dellicd. 999 
'i.\\'.2d .,.+2 (Tex. 19<)9) Uindll1g. the conduct could Violate ordinary negligence principles). 
17.'. See Statc ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Busch. 'l7h P.::'d 3H. 53 (Okla. 1999) (finding 
the conduct clearlv violated di\cq,linan rule the handling. of client propcrtv). 
17-+. cr RI \1 \11 \11,1 (TIlIl{llj ')j 11I1 L\\v (i"\II"I"," L\VV'IIRS ~ 16(3) (::'O()O) 
1 expressing. that "a I,\\\ver mu')t. . not empl()v aclvant;lg.L"; arising. from the client-Iawver 
relation')hlp in a manner advL'rse to the client"). 
175. SCI' (,oldcn '.;ug.g.ct. Inc. v. Ham. 5:-\9 P.2d 17.'. 175 (:\ev. 1(79) (holding. that a 
corporate director. who ohtained a leaschold with ,li1 option to purchase at a time when the 
corporation had an interest in acquiring. such properlY. had a "dut\' to the corporatioll. as 
llS attorncy. not onlv to inform.. [the corporation/ fullv of the factual circumstances of 
thc transaction. hut also ... of its rig.i1ts in rcg.ard thereto"). 
176. See Lad\' v. Worthing.ham. 135 P.2d 205. ::'07 (Cal. Dis!. Ct. App. 1(43) (involving. 
')uit Iw attorney to enforce promis~or\' note): Johnsoll Y. Cofer. J D S.W.2d 963. 905 (lex. 
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discussed above, is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as requiring 
"absolute and perfect candor. "177 Judicial decisions irrefutably es-
tablish that business transactions between lawyer and client are 
presumptively fraudulent. 17H Such dealings will not survive scru-
tiny unless the lawyer proves that the highest standards of disclo-
sure and fair dealing were observed. J79 11111S: 
If an attorney purchases his client's property. concerning which his 
advice is sought. the transaction is always \iewed with suspicion. and 
the attorney assumes the heavy hurden of proving not only that there 
was no overreaching of the client. hut that the client acted upon the 
fullest information and advice as to his rights. In other words. the 
Civ. App.-Austin 193/\. no writ) (im'olving suit to rec()\ er rents retained under emplm'-
ment contract): Baird v. La\cock. 9-1 S.W.2d 11/\:'\, II Ill) Cl\:x. ('i\. App.-Texarkana 1936. 
writ dism'd) (involving sale of land h\' client to attorney\: Bell Y. Ramirez. 299 S.W. 6:':'. 
6:'/\ (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1927. writ reCd n.r.e.) (in\\ :lg suit 11\ client to cancel deed). 
177. See State \'. Baker. :;39 S.W.2d 367.37-1 (Tex. Ci\. App.-Austin 1976. \\Tit rcl'd 
n.Le.) (per curiam) (explaining "lIrilerrima fides" as "'Itlhe most ahundant good faith: ab-
solute and perfect candor or openness and honesty: the absence of anv concealment or 
deception. however slight'''). 
178. See Baird. 94 S.W.2d at 1189 (applying the rule that the relation between an 
attorney and client is presumptively fraudulent in a suit for cancellation of deed); Bell. 299 
S.W. at 658 (stating that "agreements between them in the course of the relation arc prima 
facie presumed to be fraudulent"): see a/50 Cofer. 113 S.W.2d at 965 (stating that the rule 
that a transaction between a lawyer and client will be "strictlv scrutinized against the attor-
ney. even to the extent of heing considered prima facie fraudulent" only applies "after that 
relationship of attorney and client has come into existence: and docs not apply to a con-
tract of cmplmment, wherehv such relationship is created"). 
179. SCI'. e.g .. Kcck. \Iahin & Catc v. 'iat'l l'nion Fire ins. Co .. 20 S.W .. 1d 692.699 
(Tex. 20()O) (stating that "Ihlecause the relationship is fiducial'\' in nature. there is a pre:-
SLllllption of unfairness or in\aliditv attaching to .. contract', Ibetween attornc\s and clI-
ents!"). Similarlv. in the case III re Bre[:: the court stated: 
When the nidence reflects. as it docs in th:, case. that an attorney has seeillinglv 
pwfited at the expense of his clients. it is incumhent upon the attorney to show bv 
clear and satisfactory e\idl'nce. not only that there \\,!,; n<l undue influence or unfair-
ness. hut that his client had "II [lie illfiJrlllillioll and ad\ icc reasonahlv Ilecessal'\ to 
comprehend and ulldersl<ind the details of their bUSlill'SS 'lrrangelllcnt. 
III I'C Gretz. :,\-12 P.2d 1227. 12-1:' (\hlllt. 197:') (emphaSIS <Jelded): SCi' also Been \. Stall' 
Bar. 739 P.2d 12/\9. 129.) (Cal. 19/\7) (stating in a disciplinan action that husiness tr,lllsac-
tions between attorneY ,md client \\ill be '''set aside at the Ille:re instance of the clicnt. 
unless the attornev can show bv extrinsic evidence that his client acted with full knowledgc 
of all the facts connected with such transaction. and fullv understood their effect'''): Ball v_ 
Posey. 222 Cal. Rptr. 7-16. 7-19 (Cal. C1. App. 19/\6) (stating that an "attornev must demon-
stratc that tile client was fullv informed on all mattcrs related to an\' transactions betwcen 
them" ). 
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attorney must prove uberrima fir/es. or the transaction \\ill he set 
aside by a court of equity. lSI) 
In such cases-the cases about which Justice Story was main Iv con-
cernedlSI-it is accurate to say that attorneys have a duty or :'abso-
lute and perfect candor." 
The interests of attorney and client may also differ substantially 
even in cases not involving business transactions. and in such in-
stances a high degree of disclosure may be required. llws. some 
authorities hold that there is a duty to inform a client of when a 
malpractice claim might be brought against the 1a\\yerl'C and 
others hold that there is a duty to fulh disclose to class members 
ISO, Bell \, Ramirl'l, ~<)9 S,\\·. to).', (,)S lle\. ('i\. ,\pp.-~AlIslin 1l)~7 \\1'11 reCd n,r.l'.1 
(emphasis addcdl (citing Young \, \lurpl1\, '1- ".\\ .+% (\\i\, 19(1.~11 
lSI. Sec I J()\I'I'II SI()R" C"\I\II'I \1<11 \ ,,.... b)1 II, .II HI\I'I,:I III '-<I ~ .'IIIII::th 
cd, IS(7) (di\clIsslng contracts and tran\~Ktil)n\ he'I\\CCn cllcnl\ and i;I\\\c'I'\I. 
I S~, Circlc ehc\ rolet Co. \, (J iordano. Ii;! I Ie- I~lll ,\: Ciesl a, hh:' A.:'d 'III), '1'+ I".J 
1<)9)1. ahrog/'ti/cd /)1 Olds \. Donnclll, h96 .-\.:'d h,'.' 1"..1.19<)71. rilc Clillri \\nlle: 
An attornl'\' has an ethical ohligation to alill'c a clicnt that hc or shl' nm,ht ha\l' a 
claim against that allorne\', c\en if such alII icc Ilie, in thc facc olthat dttuml'\'\; ()\\ll 
interests, , , , I11lls, an attornc\' who reali7es hc nr she has made a mistaKc Illust imme-
diately notify the client of the mistaKe as \\ell as the clil'llt's right to ohtain Ile\, coun-
sel and sUe the attorney for nl'gligl'ncc, [Tlhe attorney is under an overriding 
ethical ohligation to inform the client of the accrual of a prohahle claim ,Igainst that 
attorney, 
Iii. Circle C/U'I'ro/CI was abrogated on other groulllh 11\ a latcr C<hC that reaffirmed that 
"[tjhl' Rl If, 01 PROIISSI()'.\I (''''-Ill' I still I-e'quirl' an attornl'\ to Ilolil\ the cliellt that 
he or she: rna\' have a legal-malpractice ci;lim e'\ Cll If llotiflGltioll IS a"alll\l the attorneY's 
own interest." Sec Olds \, Donnelh, hlih ,\,::d ().'3, hen ("..I. I'N711lwldlng Ihal the l'l1tirl' 
contf'()\'l'rsv doctrine docs Ilot compl'lthc a"Cni,\ll III II kilalmlipr;JClice cbl1l in ul1c1erh-
ing action that gi\cs risc to the claim): \(',' (//\11 /I! I,' \1;ltll'r III Tllil,\I)..+r ".YS2d "II, ~I 
(",y, App. Di\, 19S::) (Iwlding that all alllllllC:\ 'lle'c'kCI 01 a clil'llt', c"llm, lilld Liliurc to 
noti!\' the clicnt of the naturc and e'\lellt of lile' ,111\\I'I1e\ , l1l;liprllcllcl' \\dlT:Illtcd a ,i\ 
month suspcnsion: ",'\n attorne\ has a r'rok"llllul clut\ to promplh notii\ hi' cllcnl 1)1' his 
failure to act ,Ind 1'1' Ihl' p'l\,ible claim ni\ l'llClll 111.1\ lilu, ha\c Ilgdll1\t 111111"): RI SI·III· 
w:sr (THIR!)) ,)( I HI LI\\ (,Il\ I R'I'-<, L\\\, I I" ~ :'11 cmt, c (21101J1 ( Ih,lt "[ill' thl' 
lawyer's conduct of Ihe malkr gl\es the C'IIClli ,I 'U!"tlllllial Illdil'racilcl' ,'I:llm a;2,llilst thl' 
la\\\'cr, thc la\\\cr mu,t di,closc' tlul to the' elle'lll" I. Other '(luree, h,I\c' j,\ul'lc'd \\ilctilcr 
a hroadh applicahle clut\ to disclose: mall,ractll'c' ,'\1\1\. See "anc\ J. \11")1','. 1lIll'limli(\1l\ 
oFCirc!c ('hc\rolet I()I' ,'\II(!rJ/e\ ."iI/pmclI"" ,!Jul 1!lI,m,') Clilin, ~,\ Rt I' ,I )" I . .J. ,7. 71 
76 (191)h) (cli\cu\\lI1g frlctors Il'!c\ant to ;1 dlll\ 10 di'cllhc :mel '{;II)nl:, "I h,l\c' i:lllcd til 
unC()\l'r a single instance in which a Ll\\\cr \\ Ci\ cllilc:r 'llCCC"rlllh slle'd ,lr as II 
result of a merc failure to alhisc the client ollilc: Id\\ \e'r's ()\\ n m~tll'r:letle'c"l: Danlcl \1. 
Sen iss, Ilte EV()/lIlioll orlhe --Elllire C()lIlmH'1'\1 "/)IIClrilie alld ft.1 DII/llnll.' !c'l/i'Ci\ OIlI/IC 
Allomer-C/i1'1II RC/llllolI\hijl: Whal A 1,(JIlt;, SIUlII!!,(' li-ip It !/III 8e('/l, I) 51 1("'" H II I 
C():SSI. LJ. 779, S06 (1999) (stating that "[:lln attornc\ . "cannot conccl\;lhl\ he ()hligakLi 
to inform the client C\l'rv time a miSlilkl' is madc"). 
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the amount of attorney's fees sought in a class action. lxi So too, 
.. [t]he duty of loyalty requires a lawyer. at the time of retainer, to 
disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the 
parties and any interest or connection with the matter at hand that 
could influence the client in the selection of counscl."IS~ 
In a relatively small number of areas, the legal profession has 
developed rules that call for a high degree of disclosure of informa-
tion. For example. in seeking to obtain an effective client waiver of 
a conflict of interest. the lawyer must disclose the existence. nature, 
implications. and possible adverse consequences of the conflicL ls." 
In dealing with client property. a lawyer must promptly notify a 
client of its receipt. 1xh In entering into an agreement for legal ser-
vices with a new client. the lawyer must disclose the basis or rate of 
the fee. lx7 And upon receiving a settlement offer. a lawyer ordina-
IS3 . .'I"" Cell. \.\otor;, Corp. \. Bln\ecl. ')II> S.W . .:'d Y-F). YS7-."'S (1'-'\. IYYh) (statin),!. 
that "ciass act inn setticmellt notices must C()IlLlln the 111<l\II11Um i11l1()Ul1i of attorneY's ke, 
sllu),!.ht h\' cia" coull,el and specify the prol'(),ecl method of cilculatlll),!. the ,Iward" and 
citin),!. similar decisiolls). 
184. Peaslee v. Pedeo. Inc .. 388 A.2d IO.i. 107 (Me. IY78) (involving an attorney's 
failure to disclose that he was an officer and stockholder of the other part\' to a proposed 
transaction ). 
18S. Conncn Inc. \'. Baskin. 803 S.W.2d .flf). 4IY (Tex. App.-EI Paso IYY/, no writ) 
(statin),!. that Texas di\ciplinary rules permit "an attorne\' or law firm to continue multiple 
represcntation of adversary clients where ... COllsent is ohtained from each cliellt after full 
disclosure of tile existellce. nature. implications ,IIld possible advcrse cOllsequellces of such 
multiple representation"): ICC a/so Simpson \ . .Iailles. YO" F2d .-n~ . .i77 (Sth Cir. I <)YO) 
(i1oldin),!. that under Te\as law. "after full lhclo;,ure' hy' the attorney. il may' he proper ill 
some circumstances for an attorneY to repn:,en! hllh ,ide, in a real c"t:lk transaction"): 
Ernl'lmers Cas. CIl. v. Tilkv. 4Y6 S.W.~d 5."2. 'i5:-; ITe\. I07.i) (statlill.' Illdt "[iJf a conflict 
,Irises hctv\ecll the IlllereSh of the insurer ,lIld Ihe Illsured. the attorney ,)\\e'S a duty to the 
in'iurcd to imn1ediateh <Id\'isc hirn of 'he cOlllllet"\: Two Thirty :\llle' .I')lllt Vellture \. Joe. 
I1Il S.W.3d x%. l)(H) (1\:\. App.-Dallas 20()1. pet filed) (holdin),!. tlLlt l'\ldence was suffi-
cil'llt to raise a fact issue as III whether an attorney ,llld 1:1\\ firm hreaehed their flcluei,Jrv 
duty 11\ failill),!. to disclose that the attornc\. a' a Illl'rnhcr of "[e[it\ [c['Hllled. would or 
C<luld lake position, that \\oule! affect the real e"Llte tran>;aetiolls In \\hich" the firm repre-
sellted the pla!l1tiff). 
IXh. \IOIl! I RI II S (l! PI{()I'I CO .... !)l , ! R. I 15(d) (2()().:') (rcLlilllc: tlut "[U[pOIl n:-
cei\ lIlil funds or other I,rupertv in which a cliellt or third person Ius ,Ill !I1krcst. a lawvcr 
shall promptlY notify the Clie'llt or third pcr'OIl ,lIld. upon re'quest h\ the cliellt or third 
Pl'fSOIl. ,hall promptl\ render a full such proper!\ "). 
IS7. Sec Jad~s'lI1 LI\\ Office. p.e \. Chappell.:'.7 S.W.3d I). 22-2.i (Tcx. App.-Tvkr 
2tl()(). pet. lk'nie:d) (iwldin),!. that the evidence. \\ illch ,howed among other thin),!.s that the 
attorneYs were V<l),!.Ul' re),!.ardin),!. their fel' arrangelllent. was sufficient to support the jurv's 
finding elf hreach of fiduciarY' duty): 'vloJ)J1 Rl ! IS,)I P[{OF'I CO'.I)l <"I R. I.S(b) (2002) 
(stating that "ltJhe scope: of the representation :ll1d the has is or rate of the fee and expenses 
for which the client \\ ill he responsihle shall he: cOIllll1unicated to the client. preferahly in 
2003] "ABSOLUTE AND PERFECT CANDOR" TO CLIENTS 775 
rily must communicate the offer to the client promptly.liiii In these 
and perhaps other areas where specific rules of conduct have crys-
talized, attorneys are faced with demanding disclosure obligations. 
However. outside of these limited contexts, the disclosure obli-
gations of attorneys are more properly described by the rule of 
negligence than by a rule of "'absolute and perfect candor": an at-
torney must act reasonably in providing information to the cli-
ent. lii ') There is little, if anything. in case law to suggest that, in a 
case not governed by a specific rule mandating disclosure, nonneg-
writing. hefore or within a reasonahle lime after commencing the representation"). Ac-
cording to the American Law Institute: 
The hasis or rate might he a specified hnuril charge. a percentage. m :1 set of factors 
on which the fee will he hased. If the fcc IS h:lsed on a percent:tge of recovery (or 
other hase). the client should also he informcd if a different percc'nLl"-c applies in the 
cvent of settlement, trial, or appeal. For a client sophisticated in lawyers. a 
statement that "we will charge our usual hOllril rate's" ordinariil \\ill 'illffice .... The 
information should indicate the matter tnr \\ hleh the fee will hc' due. for example. 
"preparing and trving (hut not appealim!1 I<lur auto inlun' suit." It the services arc 
not specifically descrihed. the lawyer \\ i II hc he Id under ~ I X to pm\ Ide t he services 
that a reasonahle client would have eXlxcted, \lost states require that contingent-fee 
contracts he in writing. 
RFSTAIEMENT (THIRD) OF IHE LAW G()VER~I~(I LAW),LRS ~ 3x cmt. h (2000). It is im-
portant to note. however. that the disclosure ohligations pertinent to contract initiation are 
limited. If no professional relationship hetween the attorney and client exists at the lime 
the agreement is entered into. the stringent rules applicahle to husiness transactions he-
tween attorney and client do not apply. and therefore the contract is not presumptively 
fraudulent on the part of the attornev. See Johnson v, Cofer. 113 S,\V,2d 963. 965 (Tex. 
Civ, App.-Austin 1938. no writ) (stating that the rule where a transaction hetween lawyer 
and client will he "strictly scrutinized" onlv applies after commencement of attorney and 
client relationship), 
18K See Rizzo v, Haines. 555 A.2d 5x, hh (Pa, 19S9) (holding that an attorney's failure 
to convey' each settlement offcr to clients in l'er'nn~tI Injun' cases and failure to investigate 
offers that were proposed constituted malpractice): J"u, v, ,.'>.uto-Owners Ins. Co .. 28x 
01.W,2d '+·B. '+-1:'; (Mich, ('t. App, 1979) (holdillg that an attorne\' hreaciled the applicahle 
standard of care hv failing to inform his client ni settlement oilers prim to trial): MOIH,I 
RIll,S 01 PIUlI·1. C()~[)t ;('T R, I A cmt. I (:'O()2 i (stating that "<) lawvCf who receives from 
opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a ci\ II contmvers\' or a proffered plea hargain in 
a criminal case must prompt Iv inform the Clie'lll of its suhstance" Ullle'sS pnor discussions 
with the client have left it clear that tile propns;tI will be unacceptable I. 
Ix9, Even authorities that define the fiduc'I;lr\ disclosure ()hlig~ltiolls of attorneys in 
highly demanding terms sometimes interpret tiltlsC duties in a way tildt seems little differ-
ent from a negligence analysis. Sec. e,g .. 8urlen \lntors. Inc. \. Balch. 513 P,2d 582. 580 
(Wa"h, C1. App, 1973) (stating that an attornc\ l1lust c:xercise reasonahle care): 2 RO;-.JALD 
E. M,\I.LI·.~ & JI.'FIRLY M. SMITH. LUIAJ. \hl I'RACIICL 0 1'+,19 (::;til cd. 2()()O) (slating 
"there must he complete disclosure of all information that may hear on the quality of the 
attorney's representation. , The test of di,closure is objective. measured hy what an 
attorney of ordinary skill and knowledge should tell the client"), 
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ligent failure to furnish information to a client will give rise to civil 
liability. Thus. not surprisingly. the Restatement says that '"[a] law-
yer who has acted with reasonable care is not liable in damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty."I')() Consequently. the "absolute and per-
fect candor" terminology should be confined to the context of law-
yer-client business transactions or conduct that violates other well-
established rules governing attorney conduct. such as those relating 
to conflict of interest. handling of client funds. communication of 
settlement offers. and contract initiation. 
Unfortunately. the proclivity of courts to invoke Latin terms and 
repeat catchy phrases has given the "absolute and perfect candor" 
terminology a life of its own. The phrase is frequently repeated 
without consideration of its demands or pmper scope of 
application. 
The risk. of course. is that e'\pansi\e;udicial writing. even if it 
does not determine the outcome of appellate cases. has an undis-
ciplined influence on subsequent legal scholarship and on daily law 
practice. The duty of "'absolute and perfect candor" has been re-
ferred to in a number of articles.I'I1 including works by this au-
thoLI'I2 In light of sweeping judicial rhetoric about "absolute and 
190, See REST';' rF~IF"'1 (THIRD) ()I I I II LAW GO\i"'I'" L\\\YIRS ~ 49 cmL d 
(2000) (noting. however. that remedies such as di,qualification. re,titution. and inlunctive 
relief may he a\ailahk). 
191, See. {',g,. Rov Ryden Andersoll & Walter \V, Steck. J r .. Fiililcillr\' Dun'. TOri and 
('Ul1ImCl: A Prilller Oil Ihe Legal JfalJlrllcli(e 1'11::::/('. 47 S\1l L. RI\, 2.l~. 240 (1994) 
(referring to "ah,olute and perfect candor"): Dd\id J. Beck. l.e~(i1 ,1/!llpl'({crice ill Texas. 50 
13,\ YI()R L Ri\, 551.552 (19()~) (referring to "al'\oluk and rerteet candor"): \krcdith J. 
Duncan. !~!'~(/I ,\.falproCEic!' hr Am' Olhel' \ ({/!II': \\'//\ a fJreoc/1 o( Fit/lleillrl Dlln Clailll 
Docs Vor Smell ill .'i,,'ec!. 34 W,\KI. FI WI, I L RI \, 11.;7. II S2 ( I IN'!) (referring to "ahso~ 
lute and perfect candor"): Lawrence.l, Lllto, The RCII!7IclI/l'l/I Ii/the !~(/I\' (jo\'('l'IIillg L({II'~ 
len: ,.! Viell limll Ih" Trellches, 2n H( 1I \ I J{ \ L. Rl \ , /197. 721 (19l)~) (noting that "some 
courts describe a lawver's obligations in c\tra\:lgant hut \aguc (cr111\." and then quoting 
the definition of IIl>erl'illlll tiiles as requirillC' ".lho!Ulc' :Ind I,cri'ce( Cll1cillr"): Stc\e \!cCon-
nicn & Rnh\n Bigelow. SIIIIIIII(//'\ "fRcel'llI [)('II'/U/}IIlCIIII ill /,'1(/\ rl'~({1 '>/II/{Jrtlnicc fAll ... 
en SI. \L\R,', LJ, /107.622 coo..:) (quotln,' the' dc'cl'>iOIl ,latlne' :1 dlll\ of '''ahsolute per-
fect candor'''): J<lhn S, Pierce & Be\erh ,'\, Ilrdnd, RI'celil {)/'I C/UI'II/I'IIII ill .. \llOl'IIe.\' (i'l' 
Dil{JIIII'I.7 l'SI-, \hl{. L.J, 2()5. 207 IIIN.+-'J,') Irekrring t" "dh\l,IIJle and perfect can-
dor"): Errin \Iartin. Comment. The Ullt' 11(/1 {ic(,11 f)rilll'll olllhe ,.\II()rnr'l'-C/ielll Relolioll-
ship: The Implil'miolls of Burrow \, /\rce ()1lr;',\'([,1 l'mClili()ncn, .<:' '1'1 " TI Cli. L RI\, 
0,91. 396 (2001) (referring to "ahsolute and perkct candor"), 
192. See Vincent R, Johnson. The Fillin of COlllll1llllimlillg I,illl Plllllli,'(, ClliSS ,Hcm-
bers. 1 7 RI\, LIII<;, 497. 519n.72 (11)9~) (rcierring to "absolute and perfect candor"):sce 
a/so Vincent R. Johnson. Elizical IsslIes ill [)ra/iillg Licellsill~ Alireemeills. ill 45~ P"eI("[IS-
1'-(; L,,\\ J'SI'lII I[ p'\ I 1,'.;1'. C(II''IRI(illl" TR_\IlF'I,\Rr-:S. ,\'.;!) LllLRARY PROPER!'Y 
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perfect candor." a writer reflecting on a case requiring insurance 
defense counsel to disclose a conflict between the insurer and the 
insured may over-interpret the case as creating an obligation to dis-
close "any information that might prevent the fulfillment of' the 
obligations entailed by an attorney-client relationship,I'13 Or a 
writer may over-construe a decision imposing liability based on the 
failure to disclose that the client's case had not been filed within 
the period of limitations as creating a duty to disclose "all informa-
tion which may bear upon the quality of the attorney's representa-
tion."I'J-l Overstatements in legal scholarship should be avoided 
because words matter. Imprecise language can be costly to the le-
gal system. It is but a short step from a judicial opinion stating that 
a lawyer has a duty of "absolute and perfect candor" to the filing of 
a lawsuit on behalf of a client who believes his or her lawyer's dis-
closures fell short of being "absolute and perfect." 1'15 Conse-
COIR\I H.\'.DIl()Or.: SERIES 173, 177-78 (19l)(. I. WL 4:1K I'Ll 1';11 17.~ (re:fcrring to "ahso-
IUle and perfeci candor"). 
193. David J. Beck. Legal Halpracricc ill /('XIIS. 43A 8.\ 11.< Ji{ L. RI \. I. 4:1 & 4:1 n.l 'i 
(1991). WL 43 BLRLR 43 (interpreting only Emplorcrs (as. Co. t. Tilln, ·+90 S.W.2d :'i:'i2. 
:'58 (Tex. 1(73). in the same paragraph that referred to the duty of "absolute and perfect 
candor"). The statement quoted above in the text also appears in David 1. Beck. Legal 
Halpraclice ill Texas Second Edlliol1.:10 B,\YI Oi{ L. RE\. :1:11. 608 (1998). which cites three 
cases as support in addition to Til/n. 
194. Scc Dayid 1. Beck. Legal ,Halpracrice ill 7('x{/s. 4.lA B \ 11 ()R L. RI\. 1. 40 & 46 
11.22 (1991). \VL 43 BLRLR 43 (interpreting ..-llll<'l \. Pllr;. 4l):i S.\\'.2d :'KI. :'i<'l3 (Tex. Ci\. 
App.-Eastland 1973. writ reCd). shortly after reference to dutl of "ahsolute: and perfeci 
candor"). To he: fair. an earlier Tnas Che. !lot cited hI Beck. had held thai all attorneY 
owcs to a clicnt a dutl "to affirmatilt:l\ dl,cl()\c to him. not on" all material facls which 
would affect the:ir relationship hut to disclo\e the Ic;!al cOi1',eqllcl1cc' III thme facl> ;h well." 
BrIant I. Lewis. ~7 S.W.2d 0()4. 607 Ck\. ('1\ .\pp.-,\U'dlll 1l)31). \\fit dism'd II.n.!.). 
Howeler. there: is a dilkrencc-pe:rhaps a sl;!lllficlI1C ';lfe:rc'ncc'-hdllecl1 hcin~ ohllged 
to disclose "({II ill/rlmWli()/l Ilhich mal he;lr lIJ,\ln the: qualill "Ithe dII0rJ1e:1 \ represellul-
lion" and hcin~ re:quired to disc!."e all 1l1U!l'rilil !I/('[\ rllil! 111(1\ alicct the relationship. 
Dalid J. Beck. Legal Jfalpmcrlce ill 7('\11\. 4.'.\ [3 \ 11 (,R L RI \. I. 4(> (I <)<) I). WL .. Ll 
BLRLR.+3 (cmphasis addcd). The sLikJl1c'l1t qUllkd from the I(NI Ikck arllck Ilppe;lre:d 
more recentl, ill Da\id J. Beck .. I.cglll\fill!i/i/ill(·,' ill 7i'\{/I \,'cund F"-dirinll.:ill H.I 11' II{ L. 
RI I. :i:;J. 61D (]'}l)K). 
19:;. Sce. ('c;. Wolle \. Shellis!. "0. ()1-11I1-1)()~<'l7-C\. :(1111 \\1 1 .. ':-;7 .. ~4K .. at-l (kl . 
. \pp.-Houst()ll list Dis!.1 Dec. Li .. :()Ol. no pc!. 1 (not dC\lgndlL'li 1m puhlicatioll) ( 
that defcndants "hreached thl'ir respective dutic, tu communicale with Plalll-
tiff in ahsolute and perfect candor"): Kinc<lid c\: Horton. \I<lrk L Kincaid. & B. RU"e?1I 
Horton's Second Supplemental Response, 10 Requests lor [)isclo,>ure:s .. Wed~e \lallagc'-
ment. Inc. v. Tobey .. Exhibit A at 2-6. 10-1:;. IS-20 (34:ith DIS!. CL Trayis COUllt,. TCI. 
Nov. D. 2()02) (No. l)K-()<):'i12) (alleging thai the defelldant"- malpractice included no Ie" 
than 23 different hreaches of "failing. to make? full disclosure: olmatcrial facts. alld to e:\cr-
cise ahsolutc and perfect candor"). 
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quently, it is important to he precise in articulating the obligations 
of lawyers, 
IV, CONSIDERATIONS BL\RIV; ON TIlE Dt:TY TO DISCLOSE 
The disclosure obligations of attorneys to clients are limited hy a 
variety of considerations, including scope of representation, mate-
riality, client knowledge, competing obligations to others, client 
agreement. and threatened harm to the client or others, The fol-
lowing sections explore these important limitations on the duty of 
attorneys to communicate information, 
A, Scope of the Represenrafiofl 
Perhaps no concept is more important to undl.?rstanding the ex-
tent of attorney obligations than scope of repreSI.?Ilt;ltion. l % 1l1is is 
true because lawyers and clients have great leeway in tailoring the 
range of the work that attorneys will perform.I'r' At one extreme, a 
196. See, e.g .. TEX. DISCIPU:"ARY R. ()f PROI-'f CO:"DIC I R. 1.02. rep rimed ill TEX. 
GOy'T CODE AN:'-: .. tit. 2, 5ubtit. G app. A (Vernon 1991\) (TEX. S 1.-\ II BAR R. art. X, ~ 9) 
(stating the Texas rule bearing on representation. which is typicall\' contained in state 
codes of attorney conduct), The commentary to Texas Rule I,()~ pnl\ides: 
The scope of representation provided bv a lawyer rna\' be limited Iw a!!re:ement with 
the client or bv the: te:rms under which the 1;111\e:r\ st'nice:s are: i11:ldc :Ililil:lble to the 
client. For example. a retainer may he 1m ,I 'I'colicallv defincd ohlc'clIle, Likcllise. 
representation provided through :1 ic!!al :Iid a"enn ma\' be "Uh/l'Cl t() Ilmiialions on 
the types of cases the agency handks, SIIll!l:lril'. \Ihen a LII\lc'r ILlS hc'cn I'et:lined Ill' 
an insurer to reprcsent an insured. the rt'I'I-c'sl'nldlion mal' he Illlllkd In l11atters fc-
lated to the insurance co\crage. 'Ille sCOpc' \1 !thin 1IIIIch the I-CrresL'Ili:llion IS under-
taken also mal' exclude specific ohicct!\es ()[' mcan". sueh as Ihose 111,11 thc' IliI\ler or 
client regards as rt'l'u!!nant or iml'rudent, 
Id. cm!. -I. 
197, See J,\\II s E. 'vIol I II-RVJ. C\SI S \'.1) \1 \II RI \1 , ," 11I1 I \II Ci()\IR,IV; 
L\IIYu{S 192 (20()()) (explaining IWII thc fel.ltillnsilil' ,:In he: tailofed!. \llllitefl1o stlllcs: 
Becausc the ,copc of their relationship IS "c'lh:r,i/11 set 1'1' contr:ICI: 1,1\1 \ cTS Illld tht'lr 
clients mal' lle!!(lIiatc and scttle ul'OI1 the 1.1\\\er\ scope of rc'prcsC'llt.III<)Il. LIII\er 
and client can ncgotiatc over the lengths tl) II hlc'h thc 1:I\I\'er IS COllll1ll!ted to proc<:ed 
in the matter. 111C lawl'er and clien!. lor (\,ll11rle. l11al :I!!rcc Ilnl Ihe cr will 
undertake represcntation short of litigallon (lr tlmJu!!h the lifst dppc:iI The la\l\'er 
and client may negotiatc the hrcadth of Ihe !:lI\ler's service. TilCl 111:11 :l!!rcc. for 
example, that the lawyer will he responsihle tor matters reLilil1!! to the clicnt's 
sale of his ongoing husiness. hut not thc tax Cl0l'ccts or the tram'lctIOIl. 
Id. Similar concepts apply in other fields. Cr Carleton \, Tortosa. 17 Cal. Rptr. ~d 7]-1, 741 
(Cal. CI. API'. 199:'\) (statin!! that where an inlcstor executed seleral agrecments. which 
advised him that a real estate broker's duties did not include gil in!! advicc on tax conse-
quences. the broker owed no dut\' to minimi/e :Idlerse laX con,equcnces): s('e also RI-
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la\\ver mav agree to undertake a simple isolated task, such as the - - ~ 
lllere filing of a document. At the other extreme, the lawyer may 
consent to provide a wide array of services, including, for example, 
the rendering of advice on all legal issues affecting an individual or 
entity, or the management of a myriad of forms of dispute resolu-
tion. Bet\veen the extremes, there are infinite possibilities con-
cerning the scope of the lawyer's undertaking. Thus, before one 
can determine what a lawyer must do in order to perform properly, 
it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of assignment. 
Within the scope of the representation, whether it be large or 
smalL the client is entitled to first-class treatment, meaning the 
lawyer must place the client's interests above all others. Within 
lllat sphere. the attorney owes a client a panoply of demanding du-
ties. including. among others. full loyalty. complete confidentiality, 
diligence. and competence. Anything that threatens to interfere 
with the lawyer's performance of duties within the scope of repre-
sentation is a potential or actual conflict of interest that requires 
special precautions or withdrawal. l ' h 
However. lawyers have no obligation to advance the interests of 
clients falling outside the scope of the representation.I'Y! They have 
'i I I n.\lFl'T (THIRD) ()F THE LAW GOV!·R:-;I:-;,; LIII\TRS ~ 1<) cmt. 0 (::000) (stating "[tlhe 
,cope of a representation may properly change during a representation. and the lawyer 
111<11 sometimes he ohligated to oring changes of 'co pc to a client's noticc"): id. ~ 19 cmt. c 
(Ii,ting "file safeguards" that apply to contracts limiting the scope or ohjectives of a 
representation ). 
19~. See \fOIlIL Rl LLS ()f PROf 'I CO'I)( ( I R. 1.7 cmt. ~ (21l()2) (stating that "[e]vcn 
\1 here there is nn direct adverseness. a conflict (\1' InterC'it e,ISh if there is a Significant risk 
llut a lawver's ahilitl' to considcr. recommcnd nr CII'!I out an appropriate course of action 
fur the client will he materialll limited as J rc:sult of Ihl' Id\\'\l'r\ oth"r responsihilities or 
Intcrests" ). 
199. Sl,' \facmher Eng·g. Inc I. Roh'ion 8:. \filler.'+7 F.Jd 25.'. ::::'\6 (~th ('ir. 1995) 
(hulding that a m,tll'racticc claim failcd hecausc thc negltget1t conduct alleged fell outsidc 
thc scope of th" attornc\-client relationship): Sl'illlnaus \ Larkin. Hllffman. Daly, and 
Lindgren. L.td ... '6:-\ :\.W.2d 395. y)~ (\linn (1.\pp. 19~.~) (i'inding that summary judg-
ment \\as pmpeTh i2rantcd against a cii"nt\ lll,ilpr,lctlcc claim "ilh re:'I,cct III a matter that 
fell outside the scope: of thc attorney-clicnl rc'ld!l(llhhlp): Klai2er I. <)66 S.W.2d 
77. ~3 (Tex. r\pp.~-San Antonio 19<J6. no \\1'111 (holding that a law fim) did not assume 
duty to ,upef\lse a client\ entire "medical care' bI virtue ()f ih rderLiI" of the client to a 
hre:a,t wrgeon. e\cn if the law firm dirccted lhc h,lI1dling uf ,ilicunl' Implants and tissue 
samples as elldc:nce for usc in implant litigillion). Oil rl'ilCill'lllL; /11 /Jilrl. <J57 S.W.::d K:'i2 
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1<)<)6. writ dcnied): Armor I. Lantz. Y15 S.E.2d 737. 7.+7 (W. Va. 
20(0) (stating that "West Virginia authority 'iuppurls the notion that a lawyer's duty may 
he limited hI' the tcrms of the attorney-client relationship"): RfSL\lU.1!c'Jl (Tfllf·(i)J OF 
11l1. LII\ G()\Ff-(:-;I'<; LI"YIRS ~ 16 cmt. c (21)()()) (stating that .. !t]he laWler's duties are 
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not been hired to perform those tasks. and it would be unfair to 
impose such obligations on them in the absence of either a well-
established customary practice or an agreement with the client ac-
companied. in the usual case. by compensation,::'IH) Consequently. 
the professional obligations of attorneys-the duties that exceed 
those generally owed by members of the public to one another-
normally extend no further than the scope of the work the Ia\vyer 
has been asked to handle.::'1I1 
More specifically. the disclosure obligations of attorneys do not 
extend to all matters regardless of hem remote or tangential to the 
task at han(.1. Rather. those duties are limited to the scope of the 
representation. They include only information bearing lIpon the 
legal services the lawyer has been asked to prmide and informa-
tion acquired during the performance of the work. As to other 
ordinarii\' limlkd l<l maltlT, cmered lw the repl.e"l'l1latloll"): (;1 (III RI , C. H \/,\I{Il. JR. 
& \V. WII,I.I.\\I J-j( )Ill.\. TilL L\I\' ()J L"" I FI", :'-32 (3d cd, 2ll(1) (l[krillg an illustra-
tion showing that a Ll\\\'er O\\'Cs a client no ubllgation "fur matters uutslde: the: scope of 
that emplovment"): I R()',\1.1l E. \lALI.l'- l\: JIIIFEY M, S:l.IIII1. LH;,\L \,;j.\LI'I{,\(IICI 
~ S.l (:,th cd, 20()O) (stating that "ltlhe liabilit\' (1\ lhe attorne\, depends on whether a duty 
was breached that was reasonablv within the scnpe 0\ the employment"): see also State \, 
Layton. -132 S.E.2d 7-10. 756 (1993) (stating that "I t 10 prnail on a claim that counsel acting 
in an advisor\' or Dther limited capacity ha, rcnlkred indfc:cti\e a"i,;tance. a ,elf-repre-
,ented ddendant I11U,t 'ihm\' that counsel failed to I'crform competentI\' lvi/hill lill' lillliler/ 
scope or file dlllil'.1 iI,\\ft;l1ei/ {() or US.IlIlIled hi ('''11111('/''), The scope elf repl-e"enlalion is,uc 
in legal l11alpraclll'l' i, .,imilar to the scope 01;1 \'()Iuntan unlkrtaklIH2 i"ue' lhat arises in 
many tort C<l,es, SCI' <;olcralll' \'1'('1 'I R, J(lII'-'()' e\: AI. I' (;1 ". Sit 1l11' I'- A\III"-
( I' T()i<1 L.\\I -rq-~h (2d cd, 1l)<)9) rdi,cu"'!lC2 e\I'e,)' 
2()(), See t;1 '>II Ri, C 1"1\/,\1(11 . .II{, 8: \\, \\11 I 1\\1 J-j( JIll \, 1'111 L\\\ 'll L.\\\' , II{ 
clients normal" ,illluJd bc able to agree that lile 1;I\I\cr 1\111 commit more or Ie,s time and 
energ\ 10 the client '\ cause. assume I11llre or k,' re'p(lIlsihilit\'. and general<.: more or k,,, 
in the \\a\' of kgal kL""), 
201. SCC' JO'iepil \, Sute .. ' S, \V,3d 627. (,.-;'J I leI. \14th 1),,1. I 1999. no 
peL) (,tating. IllCldcntal to il\ rejection of an Illc.'lfcct!\e a\SlStance ul C(IUllse'l claim in II 
criminal case. lhat "Itlhe nalure of the attelrllcl-cllel1l relalion,hlJ' deline" an Illlume\';, 
duties and the pruk,slOnal senices 10 he rcnde'red" I: \1'1' ,i/w SOlll1Lln I, (ioll'!, \;(l, 1):'-9.,-
OOOOx-C\'. 199.) \\L 4027-10. at "9 (Tex, App,-Dallas Oct. n, IYt).,. Ill) IHlt) (not lic:siL'-
nated f(lr puhlication) (stating that ,,[\\ Ihik the ,cnpe uf a confidcntlal relalionship Ib~­
tween the attorne\ and client] is hroad. the le,as Supreme ('ourt has placed certain 
general limitations uplln the hrcadth of a fidUCIal.\' \ dutv"), 
2()2, See \1(1)11 Rl us ()I PROf'l CO'lll ( I R, 1.6(a) (2IJ02) (indicating that. With 
limited exceptions. "\a] lawyer shall not re\'eal information rdating to the representalion 
of a client unless the client gin;s informed COIbent"). It is generally agrec:d that the client 
has the right to exercise: control over the confidentiality of information that the lawyer 
acquires while \\'orking on the client's case. 
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infnrmation falling outside the scope of the representation, the 
lawver has discretion as to how those facts should he handled, The 
all,;rney may elect to communicate those facts or may choose not 
tn do so, There is no legally enforceable duty to disclose to the 
client information outside the scope of representation. 
Similarly. with only limited exceptions. co , when the representa-
tion terminates. the special duties that commence \\ith the incep-
tion of the attorney-client relationship come to an end.2()~ "A 
lawyer has no general continuing obligation to pass on to a former 
client information relating to the former representation. "cO" 
~o-'. S"e RI ,I \11 \11:--'1 (THIRD) ()I 1111 L \11 (j,,\ I R'I'(; L\\\\I R, ~ .j" (~OOO) (dis-
cu'sln~ th..: duti..:s il1cide'lltal to krmillation of ,I .Illmlle\-Cliellt rel,lli(lll,llIp-)uch as tak-
in~ interim step) to protect client inkrest;, ,Inei rl'lurnill~ cliellt prupcrt\. 'n1": dutv of 
clHlfidcntialil\ ,ur\i\cs the t..:rmination ()I thl' ,lllmlle\-clicnt re'lalioll,hlp. See irl. ~ JJ 
Cillt. C (Slalin~ Ihal "Ialla\\'\cr"s ohli~alion t(\ l'miL'l'l I ill' cunficie'llcc, (,1,1 l·liellt .. cOlltin-
Ue' after th..: representation ends"). rhoc I) dh(, ,I 1I:11llCei dut\ to l'lll1\C\ IIllnr1l1atiol1 to a 
lurm..:r clicnt. Accordin~ tu thc RcsUlL'lllelll: 
.-\fter tnmmation a law\..:r mi~ht r,,:cCI\(' a IWIIC,'. kiter, or ulher Clll11111UllICIIlllil in-
tcnded lor a for!11..:r cli..:n!. The lawyer l11ust lhe' reasonahle "Ifuns to forward the 
c0l11l11unication.1l1e lawyer ordinarii v must ;tho Inform the source ullhe communica-
tion that the lawver no I()n~er rcpresents the former client 111e lawyer must 
lik"wise notify a form"r client if a third person s..:..:ks to obtain material relating to the 
r..:pr..:sentation that is still in the lawver's custody. 
Id. ~ JJ cm!. h. 
20-+. SCI' Keck, 'vlahin & Catc \. :\at'l ('Illon Fire IllS. Co .. 20 S.W .. 'd 6<)2. 6<)<) n.3 
(lex. 20(0) (rclatin~ that th..: presumption that II hU'olnc'S\ transaction h<:lllecn a lawver and 
client is invalid on the part of th..: lawvcr \Iould IWI dPpl\ "had Ciranada ,e\cr..:d the attor-
ne\-clicnt relatiomhip "ith K:VIC and hired l1e\1 ,lItOrl1e,S helmc d~rc'ein~ to thc rc-
ka,>e"): H,ill \. StephellSon, 919 S. W.~d -+'\-+ . .jh'; (Tc:x. A,pp.--Fmt Worth 1<)96. writ 
denied) (statin~ that "a k~al injun cannol ()CClIr .lller 'h..: dt!Orllc'\-cllent r"lalionshlp ha'> 
ended bccause the dtWrn,,\ has no duty to thl' (I'ell[ ,:1 Ih<ll pOint"): ,( I .i(hl.l'll SI(W" 
C()'I\II~I.\RIIS ()' E\)I II, ./IRISI'RI l)f~( I ~ ,~111.1 II:i!' 'J. IK771 ('oldtll1~ Ihat allhough 
a bargain hd\leen a principal and a~cnt I\ill hc '<.'1 a'ilic ilthe agent hd'o e'ollCeakd facts 
within his kn()wled~e that mi~ht mllue lCe the lud"l11l'nl ()f his pnnclpal. "If th..: relation of 
principal and a~ent has \\ IlOllv ceased, the partk" <Ire restor..:d to th":lr Clllll1110n compe-
tencY to deal with each other"): Stele :v fcC 'onllll"(.\. Ruh\ 11 Bi~el,,\\, 1,'1111111/,1/'1 or Ue(,(,111 
[)('IC/O[!III(1fiS ill '{('.\iI.1 Le~{// Jfulpl'lldlCe f,illI, .~.~ "i \! \In', 1...1. h07. h.~.j (~()1)2) (.,!;ttin" 
that "lain attornc\-client relationship generallY lcrlllllLlIC, Urlln Ihe C()[l1l'ic:tIOIl ulthe pur'-
pose of thc emplmmcl1!' Thu,. ,I hreach lli' fldu,·l.lr\ dUll canll(l[ be 1'.I'l'c! l,,>lm conduct 
suhsequent to thc CUJ11plctioll of the purpo\c ()I lile Cmplll\ ment"!. 
:'O:'i. RI'SI,\II \11.'1 (TIIIRI)) (li 1111 L\\\ ("1\1 ,,'I", l.\\I'1 R' ~,'.' cm!. h eO()U). 
Howeyer. the Rcstate'l11ent ~o..:s Oil to Ilote: 
111c lawver might. hO\vc\cr. have such an ubligallllll if th..: la\\\er continues [() re-
present the client in other matt..:rs or under a C(lntillull1~ relationship. Whether such 
an ohli~ation exists r..:garding particular inlornUlion dep..:nds un such factors as the 
cli..:nt's reasollahlc cxpectations: the seop..:. ma"nitude, and duration of the client-Iaw-
782 ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:737 
In Soliman v. Goltz, a case using the phrase "absolute and per-
fect candor," the court said that "fiduciary duties extend only to 
dealings within the scope of the underlying relationship of the par-
ties. "206 The invocation of that rule was undoubtedly correct. Al-
though, as indicated above, the court may have erred in applying 
the rule to the facts of the case, the legal principle that the court 
sought to employ is an appropriate and well-established norm in 
the law of attorney conduct.~()7 
B. M aterialiE}' 
Courts have repeatedly recognized that the fiduciary obligations 
of an attorney require disclosure of facts that are material to the 
representation.~l)s The implication of these expressions is that im-
material facts need not be disclosed. Such a construction is consis-
tent with the fact that. even in the case of intentional 
misstatements, liability is imposed under the 1,1\\/ of deceit only if 
materiality is established. 20') 
In a recent Minnesota decision, the issue of materiality was 
squarely addressed. In STAR Centers, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, 
L.L.P.,·210 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a grant of sum-
yer relationship: the evident significance of the: information to the: clie:nt: the: burde:n 
on the lawyer in making disclosure: and the likdihood that the client will receive the 
information from another source. 
Id. 
206. Soliman Y. C;oltL '\0. O:;-9.1-OO()()S-CV. Il)l}~ \\1. .l1)~7_+O. dt'l) (T-"'x. App.~Dal­
las Oct. 6. 199.1. no \Hill (not designated for publicatl( \I)). 
207. See Part Ill-A supra (discussing Ronkilli. 
20S. See, e.g .. Willis \. Maverick. 760 S.W,2d h·C ()·t'" (Tex, Il)SS) that 
"[aJs a fiduciary. an attorne\' is obligated to render a full ~lnd lair disclosure 01 fach m~lte:­
rial to the client's representation"): Crean v. ChollCI-;, -1-4 S.W.2d hi. 62 (Tex, 
Antonio 19S6. writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that "Itlhe alltlrll<.:\ client rci:ltlon,hip IlllP()SC'S un 
the attorneY' a duty to di,cluse facts mall:rial to his rCI'l'cSen[;[tion"), 
209. See Vincent Relhert Johnson. Fraud (/1/(/ neeI'll, /1ic/II"ill~ \"t.;ligelll (Inri /IIIIOCm[ 
.flvfisrepreSenllllioll ~ I.O.i171. ill PI [-(S( lc;\L !-sJlln' :\, II, )'s. DI II "I s. [) \ \1 \(,[ S I I 'JSS I 
(defining materialit\). This chapter ,tales: 
Virtually all common la" forms of relief based on mlsrCpreselltatl(lll reljuirc that the 
statement relate: to a material fact. A material lact Is one tel \\ hich a reasonahle per-
son would giVe! some \Veight in making a decision: it need not he the sole or predomi-
nant factor in the recipient's deCISion making proces\, 
Id. (citations omitted): sec a/so id. ~ 1.().1[11 (stating that "an action Will not lie in the ab-
sence of some perversion of material factual data chargeabk to the defendant"). 
210. 644 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 20(2). 
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mary judgment in favor of a law firm." 1 The suit alleged kgal mal-
practice and breach of fiduciary duty. hut the court found that the 
undisclosed information was not material to the firm \ representa-
tion of the plaintiff.2 12 The plaintiff in STAR Centers asserted that 
its law firm knew that it sought information about the viability of a 
lender known as Consortium. eLl Through certain dealings. the firm 
learned that Consortium denied a loan to another entity. but did 
not communicate that information to the plaintifFI~ In holding 
that the nondisclosure would not support an action for hreach ot' 
fiduciary duty. the court wrote: 
[TJhat a lender refused to fund a loan. without more. reveals nnthiniL 
material about the lender. To a prospective borrower. the rei/SOilS 
for the lender's refusal are what matters .... There is no evidence in 
the record that Faegre learned why Con~mtiul11 refused to fund the 
loan .... Finally. there is no evidence in the record that FaeiLre knew 
about Consortium's lending practices. . Therefore. reilStll1able 
minds can reach only one conclusion: that the informati(lll LleiLre 
obtained about Consortium from Cem,na\ inquiry did not ctlnstitute 
a material matter bearing on its representation of STAR.' I'; 
Unreliable information is one type of information that may be 
found to lack materiality. In STAR Centers, the law firm had de-
fended Consortium in a previous law suit. 216 In furthering its dis-
cussion, the court reprinted a portion of an affidavit by the 
plaintiffs attorney in the prior case attesting to the law firm's 
knowledge of Consortium's financial strength. 217 The affidavit 
stated: 
Shortly after Faegre made its first appearance on behalf of Consor-
tium in the case, Denver Golfs attorney told Faegre that he "thought 
Consortium may have engaged in fraud." He also told Faegre that 
he did not believe that Consortium had sufficient eapital to fund all 
of its commitments. He sought :nformation that might suhstantiate 
211. STAR C"nt"rs. Inc. \. Fa"gr" & B"ns()ll. ILl' h-l-l \:.W.2J 7' -";1 \1111!1- 20(2). 
21:'. Id 
2 U. Id at 77 n.:'. 
21-1. Id 
~15. !d Cit 77-7'6. 
216. STAR eelliers. 644 N.W.2J Cit 75. 
:'17. ld. at 75-76. 
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his belief that there was a misrepresentali\lI1 111 CO'lsonium's hro-
chure, and did not assert that he had such pronL:>I" 
In the subsequent malpractice suit one issue was whether it was a 
breach of fiduciarv dutv for the law firm not to disclose that infor-
mation to STAR. since STAR \vas interested in Consortium's via-
bility as a lender. 21 ' i Focusing on the unreliable nature of the 
information, the court concluded that the law firm had not 
breached its fiduciary duties. cC () It wrote: 
To determine whether the oral allegations (\1 fraud constituted infor-
mation that was material to Faegre's rel'r~",entation of STAR, we 
must analyze them within their context. Fir"l. Demer (Jolf and Con-
sortium were litigating a claim that Consortium hre{lchec\ a contract 
hy refusing to fund a loan. Denver Goll"o; cUl11plaint did not allege 
fraud. Second, there is no evidence in the reeord that Denver Golf 
offered evidence to support its allegation'.. (\f fraud. The attorney 
mentioned fraud in the context of a re4ul.'''t lor information to sup-
port his helicf that Consortium engaged in tr:lUd .... Without some 
evidence to support the oral allegations. Fae,J e had no reason to 
think that thcy \vC're anything hut litigatiun tactics. and reasonahlc 
minds can conclude only that the unsuhstantiated allegations of 
fraud wcre not material to Facgrc's representation of STAR. There-
fore, we hold as a matter of law that Faegre did not learn information 
that was matcrial to its representation of STAR from the oral allega-
tions of fraud. 00 I 
In other contexts, courts have similarl\ recognized that unrelia-
ble information need not be disclosed. Thus, courts have held that 
securities laws requiring revelation of m,ltcrial facts do not require 
dissemination of unreliable and speculati\l' infnn nation.::'22 
'IS. hi. at 7S. 
219. M at 77. 
22(). fd at 7S. 
221. STIR (,'1/[,'1'1. h44 :\.\\.2J :It 7S lcilallun ,'ll,lllc:d I 
'" Scc Garcia \. (',)rei,lIl!. 'n() F.2d S26. :'-"U (111[11 ('11' 1\)91! (11\)ldin~ lilallhl.' inf,,!'· 
mlltJ(lI1 al i~sul.' \\<\, lou unrellahle' and ~pI.'CUlali\c' III h:'lllllterial" under Rule I()h·). and 
li1u, lhe defendant had no dUI\ to discl()~e ~uch Illl()rrlllltJ()!l to ,11lIrelwldeh helm.: 
pllrcha,ill~ Iheir stock): ct: Arnold \. Soc", lor Sl\\ Blillc'(lrp. Inc .. h.~(1 A2d 1271l. 1::'<'-)0·<'-)1 
(Dc!. 199.+) (noting that the Ill\\ doc, not require the dircctllrs ur a cmpol'llliun to di,ciose 
"inlll.'rellth unrcliahk or ,peculati\c informatiun \\Illch \\ould tend tll cl)nfuse stockhold· 
ers or inundate them wilh an o\er\oad of informlltilln." hut holding thai 111 light of partial 
and incomplete disclo,ure uf historical information additional discltbure was required). 
The court aho staled that "disclosure of an unreliahle share \aluation can. under some 
circumstance,. constitute material misrepre'>entation.O< fd at I'::S.'\. 
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Support for a materiality limitatiun l)f1 the duty uf "absolute and 
perfect candor" can be drawn from the far removed field of rein-
surance. The doctrine of lInerrinw tidt's. vvhich as discussed above 
is defined as requiring "absolute and perfect c<1ndor."22' has been 
held to apply in that context. "Many courts [dealing with reinsur-
ance issues]. hm\ever. do not treat this duty to disclose as absolute. 
but. instead. analyze the materiality of the facts at issue. together 
with the circumstances surrounding the non-disclosure or 
misrepresenta tion. "22-1 
C. Clien ( K/UJIt'/edge 
An attorney is not liable for failing to reveal facts of which the 
attorney has no knowledge. 22 :i Conversely. there IS no dut\' to dis-
::'::'3. See Siale: I. B:lke:r, :""l) S.W.::'J -'6'7, ,~-j r k\. CII .. -\I'I'.-~.\Lhlin I'rh, Ilrit rd'd 
n.r.e:.) (per cun:lm) (c:\pl:linin~ "lIr/J,'rrilllll/ili('\ I' "'[tlhe il1(hl :lhunJ:lnt go()d laith: ah-
,,)lllIL' and perlc:cl canci()r (l!' upe:nnc." and h()lh."ll. tile ahr,ellce ()i am L'll 11 cL':iI T11L'n t (l!' 
licce:ptioll, 11011e:\er ,light'''). 
:':'-1. John S. DI:lconi" l'1IIlU.I[ (;o()Ii !-{1I11i 'Illri /("('i\II()il: \Oll,/h.lr-/ulllr(' ur \Ii/I('no/ 
!-i1er.1 il/ RI'II/I'II((/I/('(' Al!,rCel/l('/II,I, ill 7:"6 (>/<.\( 11,1'-" f..\11 h\1111 II: C'l\I\II.!H'l11 L\\I 
\ ,.;[) PR\( III'!. C()/ I{\I H.·\'-.IlIH)( JK SFRlh ~,~,~, 266 (1'll)7 J, i/\ui/ahle al \\'L 7:"6 lOLl 
CO\I\I :':":": sec also Stuart Colton, Cimosl Good hlilh-f-i)//Ol\' IIii' /-()rlllll('.I, liIe Thcon'lIlld 
llie Rl'i/lill': lriwi are IIii' IlIIplic{f{iol1s (or Cedclll.I (/1/1/ Ii)/' ReinslIrl.'r{', in PI{V"II\I'" LA\\ 
hsnll II·.: C"\I\lIl{(I .. \L L\\\ ,\'-Il PR.\( I III ("II RSL H·\'-.IlIH)()K SI'RILS 193, 19~ 
(1999), illtII/(/Ii/e al WL 793 PLL'C()\I\.1. 193 ( that "an insurer \e:eking reinsurance: 
co\erage has all ul1ljualifie:d dUI\ to make full dnd ,Iccurate disc!()Surc of all facts material 
to thc risK. i.e., tho.,c facts tllat a re:imurancc unlknHltcr would norl11alh Ilani to consicic:r 
when e\alu:lling \\he:lhcr to as'iUmc cmcragc"): 1':IlJl:1 Hamilton Le:c, (nllil/~ Ihe (lori/ran 
A.·//O{ alld ()/)l'IIII/~ [',illi/"l'll" Bo.\': The .\('cd 'or '.1 (1IIIi}/'II/ /-"Iiel'lll .\lilr/1II111' HiliI' ill 
('hcrflllLle: Fide:I "ilh i{CI/,e('{ {() i/arille 1111/11'<111,,'. !'I l'l I. \1 \1(. L.J. -III. -III (1')'),'1 1,1ir" 
cur,r,ing dut\ of iul! ,hclu,urL' and ,l<ltmg that "cI i.!c'l IS cOlhldered Ill:liCflal II. ·tl) a pru-
dent in,urer. Ih e\I'otcncl' would affect de:CI''!llll' ,'II ik rhi-; :I,sl!l11ed'''): John P. Killan:lgh. 
Jr .. "A.lk .\11' \Ii (jlli'.ll/O/ll <Il1d 1'// Idl YOII .\() tj," fhe!' '('11'1111' ot l herril11:1e hdc:111I 
\llIrill(, /11.\111'11/1('" li'iI/lII/Cl/iJ/ll, 17 Tl L. \1.\1{. L..J .~-. -l() (1992) ('t:tlln~ "the :h,ured IllU\l 
inform the lllldel'\\fllc'fs oi all kll\l\\l1 11,cltertal LICh "hleh influence (Jr alfrXI Ihe Ilhurcd 
ri,k" ) 
22:". S,'" \\rl~hl I. Lel\ir" 777 S.\\.::'d ~~II. '~~,2 .. ' (k\ .. '\I'I'.~C(lrplb CiHl,ti 1t):N, 
IHit de:ni"d) (h()lciing th:ll. he:C:llI.,e: there II.!, I,,) ,'I I ,Ie nL'!.' IILll ,I 1,1\I\er ~Ilell ,lhe)lIl :1 
Illisde:rneallor plc:1 h:lr0.'llIl, the:rc: \\:IS nu dutl t() d'."·:Osl' liliit Inl,li'I1Ul,'lnl: ,<'I' iI/\(I ,-\ilill' 
:lll'ci CUlllputcr S,T\\. .. Inc. I. Ka,mlr & Kr:lc'c I 1..1' .. '\(1. 1),~-c);;,11i)22-,C\, .21)(li) \\1. 
I 7[):'6,':" , at-l n~\. '\0\. I.", ~()lj(i. re\ 11'\1 denied I (Iwt ,lcsl0.11:!kd I,ll' pllhll-
cation) ( that: 
IAlt the timc the c,ctlicmcllt chan II:lS prel,:!re,! Ithe 1:11\ II rIll I did not i-;1l()\1 ui the 
p(ltl'ntial e\pur,ure to the ri\r.; million dolldr nui,' I:lncil c()uid Iwt hall' dl,cl(he:d Ih 
intention to colieci on the fill' million JoiliH Illlte[.I ... once !the firml k:nnCLi of the: 
changed circumr,tance:s, it had a duty to di,cl()'>e: all information rdel'ant to Ithel 
repre:'>e:ntalion ). 
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close information that is alreadv known. -nle latter rule. rooted in 
commonsense and efficiency. is applied throughoLlt the law. cch 
Thus, a doctor is not compelled by the informed-consent doctrine 
to warn a patient of risks that arc already understood.'" Nor IS a 
possessor of land ordinarily obliged to disclose dangers that arc 
"known or obvious. ".:'.:'ii 
The same rule applies in the context uf lawyer-client relations. 
for little would be gained by mandating disclosure of information 
already possessed by the client. To be sure. there will be cases 
where there are questions as to what the client "knows." and there 
will be instances where it is fair to conclude that what the client 
"knows" the client fails to appreciate adeLjUalely.22'1 In sllch situa-
Of course. if th" attorn,,\, through th" exercis" of rc',I"lii.lhk eire ,I1,)uldl1:I\c' KIl()I\[l Ihe 
information in lju"stiol1. th" attorn"I' rna\' h" ,l!c'd 1,)1' ill.llpraCllce, 1l,l\\eler. 111 ,ucil Ill' 
stances. th" attornev's deLlul1 is more proper'" Ylc'llc,d :h a hreach ()I Ihe dUll ()I cillnpe, 
t"nce. rather than as a fad un: (() disclose. 
2:::h, See. e.g,. Honncutt v. Kendall. :'i~9 F. Supp, Sl)~. ,'-:Il:'\ (D, Dc:I I lJ1)2) (recogn lIing 
the duty of an insurer to a client): QuintanJ v. T"nn, FarmCfs \fllf. 1m. Co .. 77-1 S,\\,,2d 
h30. h34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19/)'1) (stating that "an linsurance) agent has no duty to in/orlll a 
client of a policy's cancellation if the client knew or SllllUld have knol'l-n or Ihe cancellalion 
by other means"): Salinas v, General Motors Corp .. 1)'-;- S.W.:::d ')~~. 950 (Tex. App,--
Houston [1st Dist.] 1')93. no writ) (holding that Glr manufacturers have no dUll' to warn 
elderly drivers about the known risks of driving while Illlpilired or incompetent. or 10 II'Mn 
car dealers about the known risks of selling cars to InCllll1pl'lc:nt drill'r\), 
227. See, e,g .. Yeates Y. Harms, 393 P,2d 91C. 991 (K,lll. 1%-1) (reieCliIH! an ar~uml'llt 
th<lt would have reljuin:d phl'sirians to warn of kllllllil l'I\~S): Scolt I, Brddl()rd. h()h P,:'d 
55~, :'i5~ (Okla. IY~O) (st,lIing that "It]here is no need 10 d",,'I,he risks thai eHilc'f' ilu"hl 10 
he Known hy evenone ur are alread\' kl10wn to Ihe P,III<.:I1I"), 
2:::S, See RESI\II \11'0,1 (Sll'I)'o,I») III '['(WIS ~ .~.l; \11 1 e\. Cillf. e I I ',IllS 1 (,I:illilg Ihill 
"Ir]casonable care (In Ih" Pdrt o( the possessor, , d,)e, 11(\1 (lrcill1arlil rc'qulre 1'!'eCauII(\J1,. 
or "I"n warning. agail1.sl dangers which are Known 10 the 11'1101'. or ,u ,liol IOUS te) 11lIn Ih,ll 
he mal' he expected to dlscmer thcm"): ICe al),) BrollnS\ ilk '\avlgalllHl 1)1"[, I, I/I~lllrrl'. 
S2<) S.\V.2d IS<). 16() (Tcx. 1<)9:') (holdi[]~ thai in d C~J'e \Ihc:re ~I 1I':Ilil'r (\Il'riurnc'd ,,11Iil' 
parked on mudd\' "oti. :1 landlord had llO dutl 10 Ildrll ,,I'()UI lilc' r"~, l"heLl hI "pl:lil1 
dirt" ) 
:::29. Cr RISI,llfl'll 'o,j (Tlll"I)) ()I Ifli till (,'>\I!!"['o,,; L\II"I{S ~ ~II (1111, l' 
(20()O) (commenling on Ihl' ""IIc:r's dutv 10 cumuli), I !;\' l'()I11I11l.'1l1 ,Idlc" 111,11' 
'Ille lavlyer's LIuty [() COilsult goes hcvond dispatc'l1l11 IIlI()I'Il];ilIOIl 10 Ihe cllell!. l'llc' 
lawver must. when appropriale'. inquire about the cllellt', ~1l()\1' Idls. ,Illd c'on, 
cern'> ahout thc matter. and must he open to dl'CUS\l'111 01 Ihe approl'flale course of 
aClion, A law\'cr should not necc\sarilv ",sume th:iI ,I ellc'nt 1\ i,he, I() pn,"is :111 Ihe 
client's rights to the linlil. reg;lrdks;, of cost or Imp:lcl (\11 'llhers, . , , /:lel1 If a clic:nl 
fails to rl'ljuest information. a law\,cr mal' he ohl 10 he fmlhc0l11lng h"callse the 
client may hc unaware or the limits of th" client's kno,vkdge. Similarlv. new and 
unforeseen circumstances ma\ indicate that a lawvcr SllllUld ask a clienl 10 reconSider 
a r"quest to hl' Idt uninformed. 
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tions, the lawyer must err on the side of full disclosureYo But 
within a certain range of cases it is possible to conclude that the 
facts in question are both known and appreciated, and if that is 
true the duty of "'absolute and perfect candor" does not require 
disclosure. 
D. Conzpeling Obligalions [() ()filers 
Lawyers normally serve many clients, simultaneously and se-
quentially. Obligations of confidentiality are owed to all of those 
persons. even after the termination of an attorney-client relation-
shipYI Sometimes the duties of confidentiality to one client con-
tlict with disclosure obligations to another. A complex body of law 
relating to conflicts of interest gmerns how such cases must be 
handled. In the most extreme case. ethics rules require the lawyer 
to decline or withdraw from proposed or existing representation, 
rather than breach confidentiality, Hmvever. there is never a 
Iri. 
230. CI \j"'.ROL H. FRIFD'IA'..l''.1l1 P'I \'-1)1'.<; L\\\YIR.': EIIII"S)'J (1990) (stat-
ing that .. the lawver's role in the decisionnni-.:ill).' process is not a passile nne. On the 
contrary. the lawver should 'exert his hest effort<., to Ie Insure that decisions of his client are 
made only after the client has heen informed of relevant considerations"'). 
231. See, e.g, /11 re Roseland Oil & Gas. Inc hI-: S.W.3d 71-:4, 7R8 (Tex. App.-East-
land 2001. no pel. h.) (statin).' that "re/lients, current and former. have a reasonahle expec-
tation that the information provided to an allornc\' in a professional sellin).' IS confidential 
in nature"): SCI' ({Iso Summerlin v. Johnson, :n:; S.E.2d X79, I-:XI (Ga. Ct. Ai'I'. 19X:'i) (stat-
in).' that "ft/he ohlig.ation to presCfve confidenccs continues aflt:r cmplOll1lcnt is tcrmi-
nilled"): Rrsl.\II\IISI (TIIIRD) or 111I L\II C")\IR'-I'-." L\\\'dR' ~ .i3 cmt. c (2()()()) 
!Stating. tilal "1~ljla\\\er's ohlig.ation to prole'c'l thl' confidences ()f a clicnt . contll111eS 
aflt:r the represcntation ends"). 
232. SI'( III /'(' Roselalld Oil '" GIIS. III, .. "'\ S.\\.3d at 7:-;:-\ (ordcrin).' lihqualliication 
hccause the allornel lIas "in a precarious [''''Itl'l!l III "hlch ill' mal hc forcc'd to n1:l~c the 
cilOlce hetwc<.:i: Icalousl, rcpresenting. hi' cllenl..; and Illdlfltaillln).' the l'(lilfidcntilliitv of 
information rcceiled from his former CIICllt'''): Llh :-\ng.cles Count\ Fklr ,\s';n Ethics 
Comm. Op . .+63. h LII\. \\ \'-.. PIWll ,)'.I)[ ( I '+~l) ([')'Ji) (requlrin).' withdr;mill unless the 
law\'(:r ohtains cOllsellt from a former client), di,,'!I\led ill e,l ('II RI\ C. 11 V IRI), .IlL & 
W. \VIi II \\1 H, 'Il! S. '1'111 L \11 ,)[ L\II \ I I"'.', c)-'ll) ililh. '1-.' Lid cd. ~1j(111: (/ I knriben 
I. (;re~ll Am. S,II & Loan. 1.+ eli. Rptr ~d 1"-+ 1,,\1> (Cli. ('I. ApI'. I')')~I (q~JlIIl).' th~1l 
conflicts rules prolect confidentialitv and th~11 1111' Iiducian nature of the dllornel'-client 
relalionship all'l\\s a f()rl11er client to sed, dl"JlLlillk'~lli()1l of ~I (orl11l'i' atlorllc'\ posseS\in).' 
confidenll~t1 inlornutiun that is adverse to thl' !(\rlllc'r cllc'ilt I: ,\13A ('''I11Il1. (\!l [tilKs and 
Prof'1 Responsihilill', Forll1al Op. 90-3:;:-; (1l)')II) (,talln).' that "[\\Ihell the InlOrI1l~ltioll im-
parted hI' la/ I\ould-he c1iellt Ito whom ~l dut\ \)1 c(\nlidenllalltv is owedjl' ernical to the 
representation of all e!;!"ting, or n<:'\. client ill the "a me Ilr related maller . tile law\'er 
must withdraw or decline the representation uilies., a waiver or confidenllalit\ has hecn 
ohtained" ). 
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duty to disclose to one client what must be held c'lnfidential to 
protect another.:'3' Thus. the demands of "absolute and perfect 
candor" may compel a lawyer to step aside because those duties 
cannot be performed. but disclosure obligations never necessitate a 
breach of confidentiality. 
This point has been recognized by the American Law Institute 
on various occasions. For example. in discussing a lawyer's duty to 
inform and consult with a client. the commentary to section 20 of 
Restatement (Third) of the Lm Governing Lawyers observes 
"[s]ometimes a lawyer may have a duty not to disclose information. 
for example because it has been obtained in confidence from an-
other client or because a court order limits its dissemination. ":''-1 
In a similar vein. the same Restatement opines: 
A lav.:yer may deny a client's request to retrie\e. insl'L'ct. m copy 
documents when compliance would \iolate the hl\\ver's dut\ to an-
other. ... That would occur. for e\:ample. if a court's protecti\l: order 
had forbidden copying of a document obtaineL c:urill~ discovery 
from another party. or if the lawyer reasonably oelie\ed that the cli-
ent would use the document to commit a crime .... Justification 
would also exist if the document contained confidences of another 
client that the lawyer was required to protect. 235 
Similarly. the Restatement (Second) of Agency. section 381. 
states that: 
Unless otherwise agreed. an agent is subject to a duty to use reasona-
ble efforts to give his principal information \vhich is rele\clIlt to af-
fairs entrusted to him and which. as the agent has notice. the 
principal would desire to have and \\hich can be cOlllllluniclted II'i{ll-
ow vio/a{ing (/ \upcrior dl/n' {() (/ third !)('!\O/l.:"'· 
233. C(. \1"lll I R.l I I ~ ')1 FR' lI"! (''' .... Ill , I R. 1./ (2()li21 hUtln" lile' :.',·\1eral ("\1-
i'lict-()i"-inkrc'l rule I. The commcntar\ to R.ule' i - ,!elk,: 
['nelcr 'Ol1h' cm:Ul1lq~lnCC' It m~I\' hc lmpo"li,k 1(\ mllKe Ih,' dl\cl'hllrc' 11,'CC,':Ir\ to 
nhtain Cllll,ent. For e\ampk. \\hel1 Ihe LI\\\C'l" ,','i'rc:\enh dilTl'relll CIIL'I~h 111 rcldkd 
malter, and one of the client, rcfu\e\ to con,c!]l id Ihe dl,cln'lnc' IleXl','II!\ 1,\ pcrmll 
the other client III ll1i1ke an informed dCCI'lell). iilL' la\\ler elll1l1(\1 l,r"I'L'rh IhK Ihe 
lalter tll con,ell\. 
Iii. em!. 19. 
23'+. RI \1 III \11 .... 1 (TIlIRD) 01· 1111- LI\\ (;"\1 "'-1'-<1 L 1\\\ I ", ~ 211 emt. d (21)1)()). 
23:\ !d. ~ .+6 cm t. c. 
2311. R"I III \II '-I (SIT')'-I)) Of A<>I ..... ', ~ .'-SI (1l):"C;) (cmpha\ls added). 
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Consequently. obligations owed to others constrain the demands of 
"absolute and perfect candor." 
E. Cliem Agreement 
Within a broad range. fiduciary ohligations. including the duty of 
candor. are subject to modification hy the parties to the relation-
ship.217 111e general rule is set forth in section 376 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency. which prmides ,,[ t Jhe L',istence and 
extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are determined hy 
the terms of the agreement hct\\een the parties. interpreted in light 
of the circumstances under which it is made .... "'" 
Explaining that provision. the commentary opines: 
Thus. the duties ... of care .... (li ohedience. and ... ()j' lo\alt\, . , . 
[as set forth in various prmisions oi the Restatement] arL' inferences 
drawn from the conduct of the parti,,'" in lig.ht or common experience 
and what reasonable men reg.ard ;b Llir. TIlL' rules st;tic:d in slIch 
Sections are the rules :lpplicahk t(l the normal «he. in \\ hich the 
parties ha\e not made a differcnt ag.reelllent., IT]he ll;tnics can 
make what ag.reemenls they ple;l\e. [\\itb limited e\eel'tionsj.:'" 
The principle that fiduciary parties han: the ability to vary the 
terms of the relationship is also recognized in provisions of the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. which in discuss-
ing the communication obligations of attorneys to clients expressly 
provides "(tJo the extent thar the Iwnies ha\'e not or/zerll'ise agreed. a 
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances determines 
2:)7, .'leI' \'irlL'cllt Rllhcrt Johllsoll . .\O/I('lIdt.'''1I (II {(/It rim! (/i('I1/1 h, f)"I'(/rI!lI~ /)UI'I-
lIers lind A'\I!('!({/(", I{)/-I, Fidl/cial,\" lind nil< 'illiln ri,,/I;/:/\, .~(I I 1', I! I RI \, I. J(I~ 
(19~~) (e'\:plall1lll"- that "fiJucian (\hli!,atl(lIh r,' ,ui'<,',', it) ,lliLT:III()(] ('\ L:!,,','(1ic' 11 I (Ii Ih,~ 
parties in\ohe'd" IlnJ ciiscussi(]!, Ihc appllcllt!(\ll "I Ihell I-doc' I() [,I\\\ers ch;!()~I!l~ 1,111 IlrIlh). 
2J~, Rr \I \11\11 'I (St ((I'll) (ll ,-\(01 ,. ') ~;-h (I(!~,~I: \('C (//'" \:t)1 lie' ":11111' \ 
Bank 0/ AI11, "at'J Irusl & SIl\-\SS .,. 2~1 (':11, RI'lr _~,~(), .~_~I ((';11, (1'\1'1' I <},-;SI (Sl.III(]"-
that a "bank'~ LIllI: ~h a~cnl I" liJllitL'd In Ih,: 'L{Jj'L' III 111\.' ,1~L'lll': ,,>\..'11\\]"\)] ill 11k' !l~!rtil"'''' 
ag.rccnlL'!1l" ), 
2.'19, RI SI \11 'II" (SI' "'"l 1)1 ,,\ • .1 '-
that -;uch a~1.rL·l'n1'-\111" h""'{\\l'CJ1 till .. ' 1],lrliL'\ \\Pili.! 'l(lt b<--' ,-'ll!(Il"I..'L',!hL .. ' ulhl,-" 
In CI)l11l11cnt h_ \\ illeil 1'1'(\\ Ilks: 
Thc <i!'cnl's JUtle'S IllII\ he Ilfkclc'd 1'1 lil,. ill.'~,!II!\ 'li thl' ,'IllI,I(), 1ll,'I1!. 1,\ 11-,,' Llc'! 111,(1 
he Ilr tilc prll1Cllolil hll>; hc'cn IrllUdulcllt. 111 \\I1:,il C,lsC thl' ruk, "c'I1,':-III\ "i'I,I(l',ii'k 11\ 
the' dkcI nr Irauduie'111 c()l1ciuCl prellll!: (\i' h 'he' L!et Il1<lt (Iill' ()I IhL 1',lrill" i' '(lhiLCI 
In a lbahilit\ or ha.s all iJ11IllUIlII\' frol11 1lllhill!\ III the' (HilL'!', 
Id. cm!. h (citation, "Illlltcd), 
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the appropriate measure of consultation. "2-10 More specifically, 
section 19 states: "( 1) Subject to other requirements stated in this 
Restatement. a client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a 
lawyer would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is ade-
quately informed and consents: and (b) the terms of the limitation 
are reasonable in the circumstances. "2-11 
However. there are limits on how far a lawyer and client can 
alter the usual "rules of the game. ".'-12 The conduct of lawyers is 
constrained by ethical obligations imposed by disciplinary codes. 2-l 3 
Such codes allow clients to waive certain protections afforded by 
the rules. even though other such protections are nonwaivable. For 
example. a client may consent to re\dation of otherwise confiden-
tial information2 -l-l or various low-level conflicts of interests pro-
vided there is full disclosure and informed consent. 2-l' At the other 
extreme. the safeguards afforded by the represented-person rule 
generally cannot be waived by the client. 2 -1h 
Other provisions of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers. strongly suggest that the disclosure obligations of 
attorneys can be tailored to the needs of the client.:,r The sophisti-
cation of the client will be highly relevant as to how far the usual 
2.:10. RES],\ I F\!f'd (TIlIRD) OF IIlL LA\\ Ci( )VER"iIN(i LAWYLRS ~ 20 emt. e (2000) 
(emphasis added): cf Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rv. Co. v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 
:'i90 N.W.2d 433. -l3i'> (N.D. 1999) (holding that although "[a]gency law generallv recog-
nizes ... [that anI agent's duties to the principal are determined hv the parties' agreement 
and the nature of the fiduciary relationship[.J. If the principal consenh to self-dealing 11\ 
the agent. the agent must fully and complete" disclose all relevant facts to the principal 
unless the agreement provides otherwise"). 
:::-11. Sec RI ~I Vii \11,,1 (flllRD) 01 1111 LVII (j';\I~R'I"'; LV\\,II" ~!9 (:::01)0). 
1-12. Sec Id. ~ 19 dlus .. 1 eO()()) (offering (;lCh on whicl] a client's agreement "to wai\e 
the requirement ni reason<lhle compdence" \1()uIJ he invalid). 
:::-I~,- Sce r;(,llera//1 Vincent R. Johnson. The VIrflles lind Llillirs oj" CndcI III I_ega! F.rh-
In. 1-1 ~()I!{I 0.\\11 J.L. ErlliCs & PI·Il. P()I', :~ . .29-.16 (2000) (disclls"n~ how mlles o( 
IegJ! ethics foster client protection Jnl! equalit\ III client treatment). 
2-1-1. See. e.g .. \j()j)11 RI lIS ()F P!{()I'I (""Ill (I R. I.h(a) (:::I)().2) (Indicating that a 
client Illust gile infnrmed consent for law\er t() releal confidential iniormation) . 
.2-1:'. See. c." .. \f(Jllll RI liS ()I PI,'H'I e""!)l ( I R. 1.7(h)(.2) (.2I)(J.2) ( th"t 
,Ihsent a concurrent conflict of interest. "" la\\\er mal' represent a client If .. the represen-
tatlllll is not prohlhlteJ hI' law"). 
2-16. SCI' Vinccnt R. Johnson, The Erhln of ( nllllllulllcarlng "Irli ['/lli/fll'e C/iI.I.\ .\felll-
!'ers. 17 RII. LIII(,. -197. :'i02 (l99i'» (indicating \\Ilh respect to \jodel Rule -1 . .2 and its 
state-law counterparts that "the demands of the Rule cannot he wailed hI' the represented 
per\on whose interests arc at stake"). 
:::-17. RISIAII\II"I (TIIIRI))()f IlIiLAI\ CJ')\IR",,(;L\\nIR~~ 21) CI1lI.c.deO()O). 
~ll]e Restatement states: 
2003] "ABSOLUTE AND PERFECT CANDOR" TO CLIENTS 791 
duties of an attorney can be varied. 2"!:--: Consequently, the demands 
of "absolute and perfect candor" are limited by the existence of a 
valid lawyer-client agreement to the contrary.:'..!') 
F. Harm to Client or Others 
Finally. the disclosure obligations of attorneys may be limited if 
disclosure would be harmful to the client or others. According to 
the American Law Institute: 
Under conditions of extreme necessity, a lawyer may properl\' refuse 
for a client's own benefit to disclose documents to the client unless a 
tribunal has required disclosure. Thus, a lawyer \\/110 reasonahly con-
cludes that showing a psychiatric report to a mentally ill client is 
likely to cause serious harm may deny the client access to the report. 
Ordinarilv. however. what will he useful to the client is for the client 
to decide::'5<1 
The same principles apply wh\..'n disclosure threatens harm to 
third persons.::''i l Presumably, unly the rare case \\ill justify 
nondisclosure. 
The appropriate extent of consultation is itself a proper suhject for consultation. The 
client may ask for certain information ... or Illav express the wish not to he consulted 
ahout certain decisions. The lawyer should ordinarily honor such wishcs .... To the 
extent that the parties have not otherwise agreed. a standard of reasol1ahlcllCsS under 
al/llzc cirCIIIIl.I{{/IlCCS dClerl11ines Ihe i1pprIJ[Jrilile lIleasure of COIISII1111 rioll. Reasonahle-
ness depends upon such factors as the importance of the information or decision, the 
extent to which disclosure or consultation hll\ alrcadv occurred. the clicnt"s sophistica-
tion and interest. and the time and monel tlLlt reporting or consultm" I\tli consume. 
So far as consultation about specific deChl\lll\ 1\ concerned. the 1:lI\\'cr should also 
consider the m()m for choice, the ahilitl ('I Ille client to shape the decl,!()n. and the 
time Illllliahle.. 'nle lawver mav refuse hl C(lil1rh \\ ; til unrca\ol1ablL (lic'llt requests 
for information. 
It!. (l.'mphasis addl.'d). 
2..+x. See III. ~ I C) Clll!. C (stating that ,,[ 1\lhl'n the client is sophisticakd in. . waivers, 
informed consent ordillarilv permits the Il1krcl1l'c that thl' wailer is rC;l)Onllhk'"). Bill see 
iii. ~ 20 cm!. h hLltllH' that '"[a]rticulate and ,<ll'ill\llcatcd clients (;i11 lor frequent 
cOll1ll1unicaliun \11th thclr !;l\I,vers when ;1 meltle'r 1\ ill1l'nrtllnt to them") 
:'''+l). Sec allo !)Iiln,: L. Karpilliln. Flili/(Idl\ I )hllf!,lIlio/i1 {/I/(/ f'mclli,i/ flliln ill Dral/-
Illg CUIi.lcllrl.11i h..+..+ PR.\( 11'1:-'(; LAII 1:-.'1111 [I -- L.III<,.III<':-' 8.: /\I"II:-'I\II( IIIVI' PRA("· 
1\[1 ('(ll RSI H 1:-'llll<)('K SIRII, Il)L ll):i 1:'1111I11.lillit/(/h!e!ll \VL 11..+..+ Pl.Il.il 191 (Slating 
that in Call1(lrrll<l "[sll'ccific duties and flduCI:Il"\ \lhIIQatllll1'i can hl' \\;lIIe,!. .IS 
client execute, an informed written consent .. ). 
as the 
2:iO. RISI\II \11">1 (THIRD) OF 1111 L\\\ (i()\1 1'.:-'1:-'(; L.\\\'lll{' Ii -+6 cmt. c (2000) 
(citations omitted). 
:''il. See id. ~ 2() cml. c (referring to harm t() ··the client or others"'). 
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Diminished client capacity may also justify a reduced amount of 
disclosure. although in such cases "the lawyer must. as far as rea-
sonably possible. maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship, "2:;2 
Moreover. impaired mental capacity. while excusing some nondis-
closures. may impose other obligations on attorneys. In Hefner v. 
State. in upholding the conviction ()f an attorney for theft of client 
funds. the appellate court held that the trial court did not err in 
failing to give a mistake of fact instructionY'" It wrote: '-rnle at-
torney] was not entitled to an instruction on the mistake of fact 
defense because his belief that the complainant consented [to the 
transfer of funds to the attorney's operating account] \vas an unrea-
sonable belief that an ordinary. prudent man acting in a fiduciary 
relationship would not have held" hecause the attorneY knew of 
the client's history of psychiatric rr(lhlems.c'~ 
V. CO'.;(I l SIO'.; 
It is easy to write expansively ahout the fiduciary obligations of 
attorneys. and such rhetoric serves a useful purpose, It reminds 
both practitioners and courts that members of the legal profession 
have special duties because of the unique role they play in society 
and that it is incumbent on all lawyers to adhere to high standards. 
However. it is also important to think precisely about the profes-
sional conduct demanded of attorneys. which is to say it is impor-
tant to "think like a lawyer." A careful review of the cases stating 
that lawyers have a duty of "absolute and perfect candor" to clients 
fails to demonstrate that there is a broadly applicable duty, en-
forceable in civil actions. to disclose information to a client even 
when exercise of reasonable care \\ould not call for its disclosure. 
Rather. the duty of "absolute 'md perfect candor" should be inter-
preted as limited to situations where the interests of attorney and 
client are adverse. as in the case of d business transaction, or to the 
few areas in which particular rules of conduct call for a high degree 
of disclosure. slich as the rules relating to conflict interest. client 
property. contract initiation. and \cttlement offers. Outside of 
these limited contexts. the disclosure ohligations of at torneys arc 
better described by the rule of negligence than by a rule of "abso-
2)2. Id. ~ 2-t.( I ). 
2:=;3. HlJ')Cr \. Stale. 7.1) S.\\'.2J 60~. h2..+ (T\.'\. r\pp,~I)alla~ Il)X7, writ rer-d). 
2)4. Id. 
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lute and perfect candor": an attorney must act reasonably in pro-
viding information to the client. 
In all situations it is important to remember that the disclosure 
obligations of attorneys are limited by a \'ariety of considerations 
including scope of representation. materiality. client knowledge. 
competing obligations to others. client agreement. and threatened 
harm to the client or others. Regardless of whether disclosure obli-
gations are imposed under negligence law or fiduciary duty law. 
these considerations may justify the nondisclosure of information. 
